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姓名 林書?(Shu-Yu LIN)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 企業管理學系在職專班
論文名稱 所有權結構與政治連結對股利政策之影響—以中國國有企業為例
(The effect of ownership structure and political connection on dividends policy: Evidence from Chinese State-owned listed firms)
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摘要(中) 本研究主要探討中國國有上市公司於所有權結構與政治連結下,對其股利政策之影響。在中國特殊背景與制度環境下,不同型態的政治連結可能對股利配發產生影響,故檢測不同政治連結是否對其股利政策產生調節效果。本研究以中國深圳與上海上市公司為研究樣本,研究期間為2008年至2015年。實證結果顯示:政治連結確實會對國有企業與股利政策造成影響,兼具中央與地方政府政治連結與只具地方政府政治連結之國有企業,傾向配發較多現金股利。本研究結果可作為投資人評估中國國有上市公司差異與股利政策之參考。
摘要(英) This study investigates the impacts of different ownership structures and political connections on dividends policy for Chinese State-owned listed firms. Our sample includes listed companies from the Shenzhen and Shanghai Stock Exchanges for the year 2008 to 2015. We find that politically connected firms are compared with non-politically connected firms, the former pay higher dividends. Further analysis shows that firms politically connected with local government and both central and local government are prefer to pay more cash dividends. This study provides the market participants and government with references to evaluate the differences and dividend policies disparity that between ownership structures by varied political connections in State-owned Chinese listed firms.
關鍵字(中) ★ 所有權結構
★ 股利政策
★ 政治連結
關鍵字(英) ★ Ownership structure
★ Dividends policy
★ Political connection
論文目次 目 錄
摘 要 i
Abstract ii
目 錄 iii
表目錄 iv
第一章 緒 論 1
1-1 研究動機與目的 1
1-2 研究架構 3
1-3 研究流程圖 3
第二章 文獻探討與假說建立 4
2-1 政治連結與國有企業、股利政策之關係 4
第三章 研究方法 9
3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選 9
3-2 研究方法與研究模型 9
3-2-1 研究方法 9
3-2-2 研究模型 9
3-2-3 各變數定義 10
第四章 實證結果與分析 15
4-1 敘述性統計 15
4-2 迴歸分析 19
4-3 穩健性分析 23
第五章 結論與建議 26
5-1 實證與研究意涵 26
5-2 研究限制與建議 26
參考文獻 28
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指導教授 洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung) 審核日期 2018-7-26
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