所有權結構與政治連接對關係人交易之影響--以中國國有上市企業為例

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朱政宇(TSEN-YU CHU) 查詢紙本館藏

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企業管理學系在職專班

論文名稱

所有權結構與政治連接對關係人交易之影響--以中國國有上市企業為例

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請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

本文探討不同的所有權結構在有無政治聯結的狀態下，是否會對關係人交易造成影響。本文選用2008年到2015年間的數據做為樣本，來源為中國上海與深圳股票市場資訊。研究結果顯示：地方控股的國有企業對關係人交易的狀況比中央控股的國有企業嚴重。進一步探討政治聯結對地方或中央控制的國有企業的可能差異時，研究結果顯示：政治聯結對中央政府所控管的國有企業與關係人交易之關係呈正的調節效果，而對地方政府控管的國有企業則呈現負向的調節效果。

摘要(英)

This research investigates the impact of political connections on the relationship between ownership structure and related-party transactions. The sample includes listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges over the period of 2008-2015. The findings show that the SOEs (state-owned enterprises) controlled by local government have more serious related-party transactions than the SOEs controlled by the central government. In addition, political connections positively moderate the relationship between the SOEs controlled by the central government and related-party transactions. In contrast, political connections negatively moderate the relationship between the SOEs controlled by local governments and related-party transactions.

關鍵字(中)

★ 關係人交易
★ 政治聯結
★ 所有權結構
★ 利益輸送

關鍵字(英)

★ related-party transactions
★ political connections
★ ownership structure
★ tunneling

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
表目錄 iv
第一章緒論 1
1-1 研究的動機 1
1-2 本文結構 4
第二章文獻探討與假說建立 5
2-1 關係人交易 5
2-2國有企業與關係人交易之關係 6
2-3政治聯結、國有企業與關係人交易之關係 7
第三章研究方法 11
3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選 11
3-2 研究方法與模型建立 11
第四章實證結果 15
4-1 敘述性統計與相關性分析的結果 15
4-2 迴歸分析的結果 21
4-3 穩健性測試 25
第五章結論 28
5-1 研究結論 28
5-2 研究之限制與建議 29
第六章參考文獻 30

參考文獻

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指導教授

洪榮華

審核日期

2019-1-15

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