公司治理結構、融資限制與人力資本關聯性之分析

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：18

、訪客IP：18.117.81.240

姓名

徐欣廷(Sin-Ting Hsu) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

人力資源管理研究所

論文名稱

公司治理結構、融資限制與人力資本關聯性之分析
(The Relationships between Corporate Governance, Financial Constraint, and Human Capital)

相關論文

★ 業務主管領導力對部屬招募行為之影響-以S壽險公司為例	★ 人力精簡對企業績效的影響–以產業特性為調節變項
★ 經理人超額薪酬、經理人異動與公司績效之關係	★ 人口老化對企業之影響與因應對策-以傳統產業為例
★ 運用羅吉斯迴歸探討企業績效、公司治理與經理人異動之關聯性	★ 護理人員組織承諾與專業承諾對離職傾向與離業傾向的影響
★ 運用存活分析探討高科技產業招募者人格特質與離職風險之關聯性-以A公司為例	★ 金融電子化對台灣銀行業組織績效及人力彈性影響之探討
★ 人力資源部門角色與功能轉變之個案研究	★ 高階主管薪酬級距與公司績效之關聯性分析
★ 人力招募政策及主管領導風格對新進人員晉升與離職傾向之影響-以房仲業S公司為例	★ 影響台灣勞工赴海外就業的決定性因素
★ 董事會特性對企業績效之影響-以人力資本為調節變項	★ 董事會異質性之決定因素
★ 公司治理結構與就業調整	★ 總經理雙元性、股權集中度、人力資本與組織績效

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

至系統瀏覽論文 ( 永不開放)

摘要(中)

因應金融海嘯所引發不同企業對於勞動力政策的調整，本研究欲從企業執行此政策之意願及能力，即為公司治理結構以及融資限制程度兩方面進行研究，並於勞動力窖藏的意涵中體現人力資本價值之概念。藉由外部董事比例、CEO雙元性、及現金流量權的偏離幅度作為公司治理結構的代理變數，衡量對於人力資本流失的影響，並建立KZ指數作為融資限制程度之指標，探討其作為公司治理結構與人力資本流失間關係的中介效果。樣本期間為危機爆發後的重建期（2010年至2016年），總共1,179家台灣上市及上櫃公司。經由實證結果證實，融資限制程度對其人力資本流失具有正向影響，受到融資限制程度較高的企業在人力資本流失上的速度是較為快速的。而外部董事比例與現金流量權的偏離幅度也確實分別與融資限制程度及人力資本流失有顯著的影響。最後，藉由中介效果的檢驗顯示，公司治理結構對於人力資本流失有直接層面的影響，亦能間接透過資金配置使人力資本流失產生影響。

摘要(英)

To response to the impact of financial crisis, many companies have adjusted their labor policy. The purpose of this study is to explore the willingness and capability of enterprises to implement labor policies. We employ corporate governance structure and the degree of financial constraint as our base of this research which reflect the concept of human resources in the turn of labor hoarding. We establish three proxy variables (ratio of outside director, CEO duality, and the deviation of cash flow) to measure the effect of corporate governance structure on the loss of human capital. We also use Kaplan- Zingales index as the measurement of financial constraint to investigate how enterprises mediate the relationship between corporate structure and the loss of human capital. We collect 1,179 Taiwanese listed and over-the-counter (OTC) companies during the reconstruction period after the financial crisis (from 2010 to 2016). The empirical result shows that the degree of financial constraint has a positive impact on the loss of human capital. It reflects that the higher the degree of financial constraint is, the faster the loss of human capital is. In addition, the ratio of outside director and the deviation of cash flow have a significant influence on the degree of financial constraint and the loss of human capital. At last, the analysis of mediation effect indicates that the corporate governance structure has a direct impact on the loss of human capital, and can also indirectly affect the loss of human capital by the allocation of funds.

關鍵字(中)

★ 公司治理
★ 融資限制
★ 勞動力窖藏
★ 人力資本流失
★ 董事會組成
★ CEO雙元性
★ 現金流量權的偏離幅度

關鍵字(英)

★ Corporate Governance
★ Financial Constraint
★ Labor Hoarding
★ Loss of Human Capital
★ Board Structure
★ CEO Duality
★ Deviation of Cash Flow

論文目次

第一章緒論................................................................................1
第一節研究動機與目的...............................................................1
第二節研究架構.........................................................................3
第二章文獻探討.........................................................................4
第一節勞動力窖藏與人力資本.....................................................4
第二節融資限制.........................................................................7
第三節融資限制對於人力資本流失的影響....................................9
第四節公司治理結構對於人力資本流失的影響............................11
第五節融資限制對於公司治理與人力資本流失間關係之中介效果.18
第三章研究方法........................................................................22
第一節研究架構與假說..............................................................22
第二節研究樣本........................................................................23
第三節研究模型........................................................................24
第四節操作型定義.....................................................................27
第五節研究工具........................................................................33
第四章實證結果與分析..............................................................34
第一節敘述性統計（Descriptive Statistics）.............................34
第二節相關分析（Correlation）................................................36
第三節迴歸分析（Regression Analysis）..................................38
第五章結論與建議.....................................................................44
第一節實證結果與討論..............................................................44
第二節管理意涵........................................................................48
第三節研究限制與未來建議.......................................................49
參考文獻....................................................................................50
附錄...........................................................................................58

參考文獻

中文文獻
王綺楓, & 翁鶯娟. (2013). 總經理雙元性, 家族控制與研發投資. International Journal, 5(3), 153-168.

洪榮華, 李易政, 陳香如, & 謝可杉. (2009). 家族企業特性與負債水準關係之研究. 商管科技季刊, 10(3), 491-525.

英文文獻
Abe, M. (2002). Corporate governance structure and employment adjustment in Japan: An empirical analysis using corporate finance data. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 41(4), 683-702.

Aghion P, Saint-Paul G. 1998. Virtues of bad times: interaction between productivity growth and economic fluctuations. Macroeconomic Dynamics 2(3): 322–344.

Ahn, S., & Choi, W. (2009). The role of bank monitoring in corporate governance: Evidence from borrowers’ earnings management behavior. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(2), 425-434.

Aiyar, S. (2012). From financial crisis to great recession: The role of globalized banks. American Economic Review, 102(3), 225-30.

Akerlof, G. A. (1978). The market for “lemons”: Quality uncertainty and the market mechanism. In Uncertainty in Economics (pp. 235-251).

Arthur, W. B. (1989). Competing technologies, increasing returns, and lock-in by historical events. The economic journal, 99(394), 116-131.

Baron, R. M., & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator–mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. Journal of personality and social psychology, 51(6), 1173.

Baskin, J. (1989). An empirical investigation of the pecking order hypothesis. Financial management, 26-35.

Baurle, G., Lein, S. M., & Steiner, E. (2018). Employment Adjustment and Financial Constraints-Evidence from Firm-level Data.

Baysinger, B., & Hoskisson, R. E. (1990). The composition of boards of directors and strategic control: Effects on corporate strategy. Academy of Management review, 15(1), 72-87.

Beasley, M. S. (1996). An empirical analysis of the relation between the board of director composition and financial statement fraud. Accounting review, 443-465.

Becker G. 1964. Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Eduction. University of Chicago Press: Chicago, IL.

Becker G. 1975. Human Capital. National Bureau of Research: New York.

Benmelech, E., Bergman, N. K., & Seru, A. (2011). Financing labor (No. w17144). National Bureau of Economic Research.

Berle, A., and G. Means (1932), The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: Macmillan.

Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (1999). The uncertain relationship between board composition and firm performance. The Business Lawyer, 921-963.

Binks, M. R., & Ennew, C. T. (1996). Growing firms and the credit constraint. Small Business Economics, 8(1), 17-25.

Blair, M. M., & Roe, M. J. (Eds.). (2010). Employees and corporate governance. Brookings Institution Press.

Boyd, B. K. (1995). CEO duality and firm performance: A contingency model. Strategic Management Journal, 16(4), 301-312.

Burnside, C., Eichenbaum, M., & Rebelo, S. (1993). Labor hoarding and the business cycle. Journal of Political Economy, 101(2), 245-273.

Caggese, A., Cunat, V., & Metzger, D. (2018). Firing the wrong workers: financing constraints and labor misallocation. Journal of Financial Economics.

Cairo, I., & Cajner, T. (2017). Human capital and unemployment dynamics: Why more educated workers enjoy greater employment stability. The Economic Journal, 128(609), 652-682.

Campbell BA, Coff R, Kryscynski D. 2012. Rethinking sustained competitive advantage from human capital. Academy of Management Review 37(3): 376–395.

Campello, M., Graham, J. R., & Harvey, C. R. (2010). The real effects of financial constraints: Evidence from a financial crisis. Journal of financial Economics, 97(3), 470-487.

Chang, R. D., C. J., Fang, and Y. C., Tseng. 2007. Central agency problem and earnings management: An investigation of board structure and external monitoring mechanism. Journal of Management 24, 17-39.

Chi, C. W., Hung, K., Cheng, H. W., & Lieu, P. T. (2015). Family firms and earnings management in Taiwan: Influence of corporate governance. International Review of Economics & Finance, 36, 88-98.

Chodorow-Reich, G. (2013). The employment effects of credit market disruptions: Firm-level evidence from the 2008–9 financial crisis. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 129(1), 1-59.

Claessens, S., Djankov, S., & Lang, L. H. (2000). The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations. Journal of financial Economics, 58(1-2), 81-112.

Clementi, G. L., & Hopenhayn, H. A. (2006). A theory of financing constraints and firm dynamics. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(1), 229-265.

Daily, C. M., & Dalton, D. R. (1994). Bankruptcy and corporate governance: The impact of board composition and structure. Academy of Management journal, 37(6), 1603-1617.

Dalton, D. R., Daily, C. M., Ellstrand, A. E., & Johnson, J. L. (1998). Meta‐analytic reviews of board composition, leadership structure, and financial performance. Strategic management journal, 19(3), 269-290.

Davis, J. H., Schoorman, F. D., & Donaldson, L. (1997). Toward a stewardship theory of management. Academy of Management review, 22(1), 20-47.

De Koning, J. (1989): “Labour Hoarding in Dutch Manufacturing Industry,” De Economist, 137, 155-172.

Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship theory or agency theory: CEO governance and shareholder returns. Australian Journal of management, 16(1), 49-64.

Faccio, M., & Lang, L. H. (2002). The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations. Journal of financial economics, 65(3), 365-395.

Fan, J. P., & Wong, T. J. (2005). Do external auditors perform a corporate governance role in emerging markets? Evidence from East Asia. Journal of accounting research, 43(1), 35-72.

Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. The journal of law and Economics, 26(2), 301-325.

Fazzari, S., Hubbard, R. G., & Petersen, B. C. (1987). Financing constraints and corporate investment.

Finkelstein, S., & D′aveni, R. A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management journal, 37(5), 1079-1108.

Freeman, R. E., & Evan, W. M. (1990). Corporate governance: A stakeholder interpretation. Journal of behavioral economics, 19(4), 337-359.

Gerhart, B., & Trevor, C. O. (1996). Employment variability under different managerial compensation systems. Academy of Management Journal, 39(6), 1692-1712.

Gertler, M., & Gilchrist, S. (1994). Monetary policy, business cycles, and the behavior of small manufacturing firms. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 309-340.

Gospel, H., & Pendleton, A. (2003). Finance, corporate governance and the management of labour: A conceptual and comparative analysis. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 41(3), 557-582.

Grossman, W. (2010). The influence of board monitoring, executive incentives, and corporate strategy on employment stability. Employee Responsibilities and Rights Journal, 22(1), 45-64.

Hansen, G. D. (1985). Indivisible labor and the business cycle. Journal of monetary Economics, 16(3), 309-327.

Ivashina, V., & Scharfstein, D. (2010). Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008. Journal of Financial economics, 97(3), 319-338.

Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360.

Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. The American economic review, 76(2), 323-329.

Jensen, M. C. (1988). Takeovers: Their causes and consequences. journal of Economic Perspectives, 2(1), 21-48.

Kaplan, S. N., & Zingales, L. (1997). Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints?. The quarterly journal of economics, 112(1), 169-215.

Kim, D., & Lee, C. I. (2007). On-the-job human capital accumulation in a real business cycle model: Implications for intertemporal substitution elasticity and labor hoarding. Review of Economic Dynamics, 10(3), 494-518.

Kim, K. H., Al-Shammari, H. A., Kim, B., & Lee, S. H. (2009). CEO duality leadership and corporate diversification behavior. Journal of Business Research, 62(11), 1173-1180.

Kimberly, J. R. (1976). Organizational size and the structuralist perspective: A review, critique, and proposal. Administrative Science Quarterly, 571-597.

Knudsen ES, Lien LB. 2013. Gaining share and losing ground. SNF Working Paper Series, Institute for Research in Economics and Business Administration: Bergen, Norway.

Kochhar, R., & Hitt, M. A. (1998). Linking corporate strategy to capital structure: diversification strategy, type and source of financing. Strategic management journal, 19(6), 601-610.

La Porta, R., Lopez‐de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (1999). Corporate ownership around the world. The journal of finance, 54(2), 471-517.

Lamont, O., Polk, C., & Saaá-Requejo, J. (2001). Financial constraints and stock returns. The review of financial studies, 14(2), 529-554.

Leitner, S. M., & Stehrer, R. (2010). Labour hoarding during the crisis: evidence for selected new member states from the financial crisis survey. Dynamics, (67).

Mallette, P., & Fowler, K. L. (1992). Effects of board composition and stock ownership on the adoption of “poison pills”. Academy of Management journal, 35(5), 1010-1035.

Miller, D., & Le Breton-Miller, I. (2006). Family governance and firm performance: Agency, stewardship, and capabilities. Family business review, 19(1), 73-87.

Myers, S. C., & Majluf, N. S. (1984). Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have information that investors do not have. Journal of financial economics, 13(2), 187-221.

Oi, W. Y. (1962). Labor as a quasi-fixed factor. Journal of political economy, 70(6), 538-555.

Okun, A.M. (1981), Prices and Quantities: A Macroeconomic Analysis, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC.

Pendleton, A., & Robinson, A. (2011). Employee share ownership and human capital development: Complementarity in theory and practice. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 32(3), 439-457.

Pfeffer, J. (1972). Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative science quarterly, 218-228.

Pfeffer, J. (1981). 1981 Power in organizations. Marsh-field, MA: Pitman.

Pfeffer, J., & Villeneuve, F. (1994). Competitive advantage through people: Unleashing the power of the work force (Vol. 61). Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.

Pulic, A. (2000). VAIC™–an accounting tool for IC management. International journal of technology management, 20(5-8), 702-714.

Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO duality and organizational performance: A longitudinal analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155-160.

Riahi-Belkaoui, A. (2003). Intellectual capital and firm performance of US multinational firms: a study of the resource-based and stakeholder views. Journal of Intellectual capital, 4(2), 215-226.

Rotemberg, J. J., & Summers, L. H. (1988). Labor hoarding, inflexible prices, and procyclical productivity.

Sharpe, S. A. (1994). Financial market imperfections, firm leverage, and the cyclicality of employment. The American Economic Review, 84(4), 1060-1074.

Suruga, T. (1997). Employment Adjustment in Japaness Firms: Firm Revenue and Dismissal. Nihon Kigyo no Koyo Chosei—Kigyo Rieki to Kaiko’’, 13-46.

Titman, S. (1984). The effect of capital structure on a firm′s liquidation decision. Journal of financial economics, 13(1), 137-151.

Useem, M. (1993). Executive defense: Shareholder power and corporate reorganization. Harvard University Press.

Yeh, Y. H., Lee, T. S., & Woidtke, T. (2001). Family control and corporate governance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of finance, 2(1‐2), 21-48.

Yeh, Y. H., & Woidtke, T. (2005). Commitment or entrenchment?: Controlling shareholders and board composition. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(7), 1857-1885.

Vella, M. (2018). Employment and labour hoarding: a production function approach. Journal of Economics, Finance and Administrative Science, 23(46), 230-246.

Yoshikawa, T., Phan, P. H., & David, P. (2005). The impact of ownership structure on wage intensity in Japanese corporations. Journal of Management, 31(2), 278-300.

Winker, P. (1999). Causes and effects of financing constraints at the firm level. Small Business Economics, 12(2), 169-181.

Zahra, S. A., & Pearce, J. A. (1989). Boards of directors and corporate financial performance: A review and integrative model. Journal of management, 15(2), 291-334.

Zajac, E. J., & Westphal, J. D. (1996, August). DIRECTOR REPUTATION, CEO/BOARD POWER, AND THE DYNAMICS OF BOARD INTERLOCKS. In Academy of Management Proceedings (Vol. 1996, No. 1, pp. 254-258). Briarcliff Manor, NY 10510: Academy of Management.

指導教授

陳明園

審核日期

2019-7-1

推文