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姓名 陳知俞(Zhi-Yu Chen)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 企業管理學系
論文名稱 過度自信與資訊不對稱對CEO的債務融資偏好之研究
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摘要(中) 企業股東為了解決代理問題,或欲激勵CEO 提升績效,除了增加薪資報酬,亦會
使用激勵工具輔助之,如:股票選擇權等。Malmendier and Tate (2005a)指出CEO 未執行持有到期日僅剩一年且價內40%以上的價內股票選擇權,將視為過度自信(longholder),然而若CEO 具私有資訊而確信企業價值為市場低估時,同樣有動機發生上述相同行為。故本研究在2009 至2018 年的樣本期間內,採用Longholder 衡量方法,並以未來一年的累積異常報酬(CAR)為附加條件,檢測同樣不履約價內股票選擇權的CEO,對債務融資的偏好程度。同時,探討這兩類型的CEO 於第一次公告發債的短期市場反應,並且以之後發債公告於長短期的市場反應,再次檢驗本研究方法是否能有效衡量究竟是為市場低估抑或是過度自信特質。實證結果顯示,具私有資訊而確信企業價值為市場低估的CEO 相比具過度自信的CEO 更為偏好債務融資,當初次宣告債務融資時,兩者具有相同的短期市場反應且並無顯著差異,而當再次宣告債務融資時,兩者的短期市場反應(-1,0)仍無顯著差異,長窗期的市場反應(未來第二年)下,具私有資訊而確信企業價值為
市場低估的CEO 為正且不顯著,過度自信的CEO 則為負且不顯著。
摘要(英) In order to solve the agency problem or to encourage CEOs to improve their performance, the corporate shareholders will use incentive tools to assist in addition to salary
compensation, such as employee warrants. Malmendier and Tate (2005a) defined CEOs who do not execute options which at least 40% in the money and only one year left on the maturity date as Overconfidence. However, CEOs who have inside information or are undervalued their ability also have the motivation to hold on the in-the-money stock options. This paper uses the Longholder measurement method and adds the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) as an additional condition in the next year to distinguish the two types of CEO. During 2009 to 2018 period, we test the preference degrees of debt financing between overconfident and undervalued CEOs. Meanwhile, we examine short-term and long-term market reaction to both types of CEOs’ debt financing announcements. Empirical results display that debt financing preference degrees of undervalued CEOs than overconfident CEOs’. Undervalued (overconfident) CEOs have the negative (negative) but non-significant short-term market response on issue date of first debt financing, having the positive (negative) but non-significant long-term market response on issue date of second debt financing.
關鍵字(中) ★ 過度自信
★ 資訊不對稱
★ 股票選擇權
★ 債務融資
關鍵字(英)
論文目次 摘要 i
Abstract ii
表目錄 v
一、緒論 1
1-1研究動機與背景 1
1-2 研究目的 3
1-3 研究架構 4
二、文獻探討 5
2-1-1 過度自信 5
2-1-2過度自信衡量方法 6
2-2-1過度自信與股票選擇權之行使時點 7
2-2-2內部消息與股票選擇權之行使時點 7
2-3-1外部融資決策與過度自信 9
2-3-2外部融資與市場投資人反應 10
2-4研究假說建立 12
三、研究方法 14
3-1資料來源與選樣方法 14
3-2 研究方法與模型建立 15
3-2-1假說一實證模型 15
3-2-2假說二實證模型 16
3-2-3假說三實證模型 17
3-2-4假說四實證模型 18
3-3重要變數計算 18
四、 實證結果與分析 22
4.1假說一實證結果 22
4.1.1假說一敘述性統計 22
4.1.2假說一廻歸結果 24
4.2假說二實證結果 26
4.2.1假說二敘述性統計 26
4.2.2假說二廻歸結果 26
4.3假說三實證結果 27
4.3.1假說三敘述性統計 27
4.3.2假說三廻歸結果 28
4.4 假說四實證結果 28
4.4.1假說四敘述性統計 29
4.4.2假說四迴歸結果 29
4.5附加檢定 29
五、結論 33
參考文獻 36
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指導教授 黃承祖 審核日期 2020-7-29
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