公司政治風險與CEO薪酬變化之關係

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姓名

廖韋傑(Wei-Jie Liao) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

公司政治風險與CEO薪酬變化之關係
(The Relationship Between Firm-level Political Risk and Change of CEO Compensation)

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至系統瀏覽論文 (2027-6-30以後開放)

摘要(中)

本研究探討公司政治風險對於 CEO 薪酬變化的關係，過往研究主要探討基於權益市場、公司成長及資本結構方面的風險對於 CEO 薪酬的影響，但是較少提及公司政治風險對於 CEO 薪酬的影響。本研究探討了公司在面臨政治風險時，CEO 薪酬結構會如何改變，以及後續所帶來的影響。本文利用 Hassan et al. (2019)所建構的公司政治風險代理變數，結果發現公司政治風險對現金薪酬比例為正向顯著影響，對權益薪酬比例為負向顯著影響。另外也發現公司面臨政治風險時，高權益薪酬反而會讓公司減少資本支出。而公司面臨高政治風險時，增加現金薪酬比例、減少權益薪酬比例能夠使公司投資效率提升。

摘要(英)

This paper focuses on the relationship between firm-level political risk and CEO compensation. Previous researches mainly focused the impact of risk based on equity market, firm growth and capital structure on CEO compensation. But there are little studies discuss the impact of firm- level political risk on CEO compensation. This paper discusses the change of CEO compensation structure when firm is stressed on political risk, and the results after the change. The firm-level political risk variable this research adapted is developed by Hassan et al. (2019). The result found out that there is a positively significant impact between firm-level political risk and the level of cash-based compensation and a negatively significant impact on the level of equity-based compensation. Besides, the result also suggested that high level of equity-based compensation will lead to the decline of capital expenditure. When firm is stressed on high level of firm-level political risk, increasing the level of cash-based compensation and decreasing the level of equity-based compensation can boost the investment efficiency

關鍵字(中)

★ 政治風險
★ CEO 薪酬
★ 投資效率

關鍵字(英)

★ Political Risk
★ CEO Compensation
★ Investment Efficiency

論文目次

目錄
中文摘要 ..................................................................................................................................... i
英文摘要 .................................................................................................................................... ii
致謝 ...........................................................................................................................................iii
目錄 ........................................................................................................................................... iv
表目錄 ........................................................................................................................................ v
一、緒論 ........................................................................................................................ 1
二、文獻回顧及假說建立 ............................................................................................ 3
2-1 薪酬理論文獻回顧 ................................................................................................ 3
2-2 政治風險文獻回顧 ................................................................................................ 5
2-3 假說建立 ................................................................................................................ 6
三、研究方法 ................................................................................................................ 7
3-1 研究樣本與變數定義 ............................................................................................ 7
3-1-1 CEO 薪酬相關變數 ............................................................................................... 7
3-1-2 政治風險相關變數 ................................................................................................ 7
3-1-3 控制變數 ................................................................................................................ 8
3-2 實證模型 ................................................................................................................ 8
3-3 敘述統計表 ............................................................................................................ 9
3-4 相關係數表 ............................................................................................................ 9
四、實證結果 .............................................................................................................. 12
4-1 迴歸分析 .............................................................................................................. 12
4-1-1 公司政治風險與 CEO 薪酬變化關係 ................................................................ 12
4-1-2 公司政治風險與 CEO 細項薪酬變化關係 ........................................................ 13
4-2 CEO 薪酬變化與公司政治風險調節效果關係 ................................................. 16
五、投資效率 .............................................................................................................. 20
5-1 投資效率定義解釋 .............................................................................................. 20
5-2 CEO 薪酬變化與投資效率關係 ......................................................................... 21
六、額外測試 .............................................................................................................. 23
6-1 資本支出、公司投資、招募、股價波動度對 CEO 薪酬結構影響 ................ 23
七、穩健性測試 .......................................................................................................... 28
7-1 工具變數選擇 ...................................................................................................... 28
7-2 兩階段迴歸分析 .................................................................................................. 28
八、研究結論與延伸建議 .......................................................................................... 32
參考文獻 .................................................................................................................................. 33
附錄 .......................................................................................................................................... 37

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指導教授

彭淑卿

審核日期

2022-6-6

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