姓名 郭逸真(Yi-chen Kuo) 查詢紙本館藏 畢業系所 企業管理學系 論文名稱 台灣家族與非家族企業之公司治理：以總經理異動為例
(Corporate Governance and CEO Turnover in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Businesses)
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摘要(中) 台灣有許多家族企業，積極的創業精神與強烈的家族向心力是家族企業的關鍵成功因素，然而家族主義的許多特質也可能導致異於一般非家族企業的獨特公司治理環境，本研究於是藉由觀察總經理異動與公司治理變數之間的關聯性，檢定公司治理的效能。為觀察總經理異動行為藉以檢視公司治理之效能，本研究取樣台灣上市公司共計304家，其中包括63家家族控制公司，241家非家族控制公司。實證結果顯示：家族控制公司總經理異動顯著比非家族控制公司低。此外，家族控制公司總經理異動與公司績效呈現顯著負相關。然而，總經理所有權與董事會所有權則與家族企業總經理任期無關。此項發現隱含家族企業董事會足以有效置換總經理，即使所有權相對較低。因此，從所有權結構觀點，本研究建議代理理論適用於解釋台灣非家族控制公司的總經理異動行為，然而，並不適用於解釋台灣家族控制公司的總經理異動行為。 摘要(英) Many businesses are family-controlled in Taiwan. The aggressive nature of entrepreneurship and strong cohesiveness of families are successful factors. Many aspects of familism also lead to the unique corporate governance in family businesses. This study tested the effectiveness of corporate governance by investigating the link between CEO turnover and corporate governance of family and nonfamily firms in Taiwan.
This study investigated the tenure of CEOs in a sample of 304 listed companies in Taiwan; 63 firms were family controlled and 241 were not. The results show that CEO turnover is significantly lower in family firms and its relationship to corporate performance is negative. CEO ownership and board ownership are not significant in explaining the length of family CEO tenure. These findings imply that family boards can still effectively replace the CEO despite relatively low ownership. From the ownership structure perspective, this study suggested that the agency theory is applicable for nonfamily firms in Taiwan, but unsuitable for family firms.
關鍵字(中) ★ 所有權結構
關鍵字(英) ★ Ownership structure
★ Corporate performance
★ CEO turnover
★ Family firm
★ Agency theory
論文目次 TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS V
LIST OF FIGURES VII
LIST OF TABLES VIII
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CEO TURNOVER IN TAIWANESE FAMILY AND NONFAMILY BUSINESSES
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1. MOTIVATION AND RESEARCH PURPOSE 1
1.2. RESULT PREVIEW 4
1.3. THESIS STRUCTURE 6
CHAPTER 2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 7
2.1. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN TAIWAN 7
2.2. SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILY FIRMS 11
2.3. THE RESEARCH FRAMEWORK 14
2.4. THREE EFFECTS ON CEO TENURE AND TESTABLE HYPOTHESES 18
2.4.1. The Turnover-performance Relation 18
2.4.2. Turnover, Performance and the Effects of CEO Ownership 20
2.4.3. The Role of Board of Directors 21
CHAPTER 3 SAMPLE, DATA AND METHOD 23
3.1. SAMPLE 23
3.2. DEFINITIONS OF VARIABLES 24
3.3. EMPIRICAL MODEL 25
CHAPTER 4 EMPIRICAL RESULTS 29
4.1. DESCRIPTION OF CEO TURNOVER 29
4.2. COMPARISON OF FAMILY FIRMS AND NONFAMILY FIRMS 31
4.3. ESTIMATES OF COX PROPORTIONAL HAZARDS MODEL 34
CHAPTER 5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 37
5.1. DIFFERENT PERFORMANCE INDICATORS 37
5.2. FORCED V. S. VOLUNTARY TURNOVERS 39
5.3. OTHER ANALYSIS METHODS 41
5.4. CONSIDER INTERACTION EFFECTS 45
5.5. CONSIDER INSIDE CEO SUCCESSIONS 47
CHAPTER 6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 50
6.1. DISCUSSION 50
6.2. CONCLUSION 56
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指導教授 蔡文賢(Wen-Hsien Tsai) 審核日期 2006-1-15