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姓名 鄭佳華(Chia-Hua Cheng)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 哲學研究所
論文名稱 摩爾之善的不可定義與自然主義的謬誤
(Moore’s indefinability of ‘good’ and Naturalistic Fallacy)
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摘要(中) 本論文旨在研究摩爾的自然主義的謬誤(Naturalistic Fallacy)。摩爾認為倫理的語詞,是可定義的。但倫理語詞,就不僅僅只是不可定義的自然性質、描述的或說明的,它們(倫理語詞)是非描述的,非自然性質的。道德上的字詞不能用「自然的」性質,諸如「快樂」、「欲望對象」,來定義,因此若是以自然的性質來定義非自然性質,便是錯誤的,是犯了自然主義的謬誤。因此本論文首先先闡釋摩爾的自然主義謬誤思想及論證,接下來透過學者福蘭克納(W. K. Frankena)、瑟爾(John R. Searle)對於自然主義的謬誤的批評,與學者路柏克(Neil R. Luebke)、安德森(James C. Anderson)的反駁及質疑福蘭克納、瑟爾所持的論點,如此一來可以更全面的了解摩爾的自然主義謬誤思想。也因如此,我們可以知道摩爾的論證並不是那麼強有力,致使筆者企圖以構作一融貫系統(Coherent System),即自然主義式善的定義來反駁摩爾的論據,那麼,摩爾就不能只訴諸他所謂的「開放問句論證」(Open Question Argument)來把自然主義的主張駁斥掉。
關鍵字(中) ★ 摩爾
★ 自然主義的謬誤
關鍵字(英) ★ Naturalistic Fallacy
★ G. E. Moore
論文目次 目錄
第一章 導論..................................................................1
第一節 研究動機..........................................................1
第二節 論文主旨..........................................................2
第三節 各章節撮要........................................................3
第二章 自然主義的謬誤........................................................6
第一節 「自然主義的謬誤」釋義............................................6
第二節 摩爾對自然主謬誤的解說............................................7
2.2.1 善是不可定義...................................................7
2.2.2 自然主義的謬誤................................................13
第三節 論證的分析.......................................................17
2.3.1 自然主義謬誤的論證............................................17
2.3.2 開放問題論證..................................................21
第四節 結語.............................................................25
第三章 學者對於自然主義謬誤的批評...........................................31
第一節 福蘭克納的〈自然主義的謬誤〉.....................................31
第二節 瑟爾的〈自然主義謬誤的謬誤〉.....................................43
第四章 學者對於自然主義的謬誤之新解讀.......................................51
第一節 路柏克的〈福蘭克納論自然主義的謬誤〉.............................51
第二節 安德森的〈論瑟爾的自然主義謬誤的謬誤〉...........................61
第五章 結論.................................................................65
第一節 自然主義式善的定義...............................................65
第二節 善是融貫的整體...................................................66
第三節 未來的研究展望...................................................69
參考書目及論文...............................................................71
參考文獻 參考書目及論文
(西文)
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(中文)
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3. 福蘭克納著;黃慶明譯,《倫理學》,台北市:有志圖書公司,1972。
4. 黃慶明,<摩爾的「自然主義的謬誤」>,《鵝湖月刊》,48期,(台北:鵝湖出版社,1979),頁22~25。  
5. 黃慧英,《後設倫理學之基本問題》,台北:東大圖書公司,1988。
6. 里查‧赫爾著;黃慧英、方子華譯,《道德思維》,台北市:遠流出版社,1991。
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指導教授 黃慶明(Ching-Ming Huang) 審核日期 2005-6-29
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