參考文獻 |
參考書目及論文
(西文)
1. Allen, Glen O., “From The "Naturalistic Fallacy" To The Ideal Observer Theory,” Philosophy And Phenomenological Research, 30, (1970): pp.533-549.
2. Anderson, James C., “A Note On Searle's Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacy,” Analysis, 34(1974), pp. 139-141.
3. Austin, J. L., How to Do Things with Words, (Cambridge, Mass., 1962).
4. Baldwin, Thomas, G. E. Moore, London and New York, 1992.
5. Baylis, Charles A., “Intrinsic Goodness,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 13, (1952): pp.15-27.
6. Bruening, William H., “Moore And "Is-Ought",” Ethics, 81, (1971): pp.143-149.
7.Clark, George A., “Mill’s ‘Notorious Analogy,” Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LVI, No. 15, July 16, 1959, pp. 652-656.
8. Castaneda, Hector Neri, “On The Conceptual Autonomy of Morality,” Noǔs, 7, (1973): pp.67-77.
9. Cooper, Barton C., “The Alleged Indefinability of Good,” Journal of Philosophy, 56, (1959): pp.977-984.
10. Feldman, Fred, Introductory Ethics, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N. J. 1978.
11. Frankena, W. K., Ethics, Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1963.
12. Frankena, W. K., “The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind, 48(1939), pp.464~477.
13. Genova, A. C., “Institutional Facts and Brute Values,” Ethics, 81, (1970): pp.36-54.
14. Goldworth, Amnon, “Bentham’s Concept of Pleasure: Its Relation to Fictitious Terms.”, Ethics, 82, (1972): pp.334-343.
15. Hare, R. M., Language of Moral, London, 1952.
16. Hartman, Robert S., “The Analytic, The Synthetic, And The Good: Kant And The Paradoxes Of G E Moore,” Kant Studien, 45, (1953): pp.67-82.
17. Hartman, Robert S., “The Analytic, The Synthetic, And The Good: Kant And The Paradoxes Of G E Moore,” Kant Studien, 46, (1954): pp.3-18.
18. Hudson, W. D., Modern Moral Philosophy, New York, 1970.
19. Humbert, Earl R., “The 'Ought' And The 'Is',” Mind, 72, (1963): pp.581-583.
20. Hume, David, A Treatise of Human Nature, 1988, Book III, part II, section I, pp.469~470.
21. Jury, G. S., Value and Ethical Objectivity, p. 58.
22. Kerner, G. C., The Revolution in Ethical Theory, (Oxford, 1966).
23. Abraham, Leo., “The Logic of Intuitionism ”, International Journal of Ethics, 1933.
24. Kolnai, Aurel, Ethics, Value and Reality, (edited by Klug and Dunlop, London, 1976), pp. 105~106;
25. Kolnai, Aurel, “The thematic primacy of Moral Evil,” Philosophical Quarterly, VI, 1956.
26. Kolnai, Aurel, “The Ghost of The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Philosophy, 55, (1980): pp.5-16.
27. Kovesi, Julius, “"Principia Ethica" Re-Examined: The Ethics of A Proto-Logical Atomism,” Philosophy, 59, (1984): pp.157-170.
28. Lange, J. F., “R. M. Hare’s Reformulation of The Open Question,” Mind, 75, (1966): pp.244-247.
29. Lawrence, Nathaniel, “Ethics As Mandate,” Mind, 70, (1961): pp.376-384.
30. Lewy, C., “G. E. Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy,” Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action, ed. by P. Strawson (Oxford University Press, London, 1968).
31. Levi, A. W., “The Trouble with Ethics: Values, Method, And The Search For Moral Norms,” Mind, 70, (1961): pp.201-215.
32. Luebke, Neil R., “Frankena On The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Journal of Thought, 5 (1970), pp. 262-272.
33. Margolis, Joseph, “G E Moore and Intuitionism,” Ethics, 87, (1976): pp.35-48.
34. McGuinness, B., Wittgenstein, A Life, (Duckworth, London, 1988).
35. Moore, G. E., Principia Ethica, London, 1903.
36. Murdoch, Iris, “Vision and Choice in Morality,” proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume XXX, (1956).
37. Nielsen, Kai, “On Deriving And Ought From An Is: A Retrospective Look,” Review of Metaphysics, 32, (1979): pp.487-514.
38. Nowell Smith, P. H. And Lemmon, E. J., “Escapism: The Logical Basis Of Ethics,” Mind, 69, (1960): pp.289-300.
39. Perkins, Jr. And Raymond, K., “Tom Regan, G E Moore, And Bishop Butler’s Maxim: A Revisitation”, Journal of Value Inquiry, 27(1), (1993): pp.93-100.
40. Perry, R.B., General theory of Value, p. 30; cf. Journal of Philosophy, (1931), p. 520.
41. Popkin, Richard H., “Ethical Naturalism and Hedonics,” Journal of Philosophy, 48, (1951): pp.518-523.
42. Prior, Arthur N., Logic and the Basis of Ethics, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949).
43. Rohatyn, Dennis, The Reluctant Naturalist: A Study Of G E Moore’s “Principia Ethica”, (University Press of America: Lanham, 1987).
44. Ryan, A., “Mill and The Naturalistic Fallacy,” Mind, 75, (1966): pp.422-425.
45. Searle, John R., Speech Acts: An Essay in Philosophy of Language, London, 1969.
46. Searle, John R., “How to Derive ‘Ought’ from ‘Is’, ” Philosophical Review, 73(1964), pp. 44~58
47. Soghoian, Richard J, The Ethics of G. E. Moore and David Hume: The Treatise As a Response to Moore’s Refutation of Ethical Naturalism. (University Press of America: Washington, 1979).
48 Taylor, A. E., The Faith of a Moralist, vol: I, p. 104 n.
49. Urmson, J. O., “On Grading,” Logic and Language, ed. by A. G. N. Flew, second series, (New York, 1953).
50. Urmson, J. O., Revue Internationale de Philosophie (1953); reprinted in A. G. N. Flew (ed.), Essays in Conceptual Analysis, (London, 1956).
51. Veatch, Henry, “Non-Cognitivism in Ethics: A Modest Proposal for Its Diagnosis and Cure,” Ethics, 76, (1966): pp.102-116.
52. Warke, Tom, “Multi-Dimensional Utility And The Index Number Problem: Jeremy Bentham, J. S. Mill, And Qualitative Hedonism,” Utilitas, 12(2), (2000): pp.176-203.
53. Wheelwright, P. E., A Critical Introduct1on to Ethics, pp. 40~51, 91f.
54. Whittaker, T., The Theory of Abstract Ethics, pp. 19f.
55. Wisdom, J., Mind, 1931, p. 213, Note.1.
56. Wood, L., “Cognition and Moral Value,” Philosophy, 1937, p. 237.
(中文)
1. 黃慶明,《實然應然問題探微》,台北市:鵝湖出版社,1993,二版。
2. 黃慶明編著,《倫理學講義》,台北市:洪葉文化事業有限公司,2000。
3. 福蘭克納著;黃慶明譯,《倫理學》,台北市:有志圖書公司,1972。
4. 黃慶明,<摩爾的「自然主義的謬誤」>,《鵝湖月刊》,48期,(台北:鵝湖出版社,1979),頁22~25。
5. 黃慧英,《後設倫理學之基本問題》,台北:東大圖書公司,1988。
6. 里查‧赫爾著;黃慧英、方子華譯,《道德思維》,台北市:遠流出版社,1991。
7. 摩爾著;蔡坤鴻譯,《倫理學原理》,台北市:聯經出版社,2003,初版第五刷。
8. 覺醒,《清淨國土—佛教淨土觀》(覺醒叢書第二輯),北京市:宗教文化出版社,2003。
9. 釋慧嚴,《淨土概論》,台北市,東大圖書股份有限公司,1998。
10. 宮元啟一著,心靈雅集編譯組譯,《佛學經典指南》,台北市,大展出版社,1994。
11. 斌宗大師,《佛說阿彌陀佛經要義》,台北市,文殊出版社,1988。 |