博碩士論文 92424012 詳細資訊


姓名 康廷嶽(Ting-Yueh Kang)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 產業經濟研究所
論文名稱 合作投資的時點不一致問題與政府最適政策
檔案 至系統瀏覽論文 (永不開放)
摘要(中) 論文提要及內容:
本文建立一個兩廠商合作投資的模型,探討投資時點對廠商決策與其對社會福利的影響,本文的投資時點分別為同時投資與先後投資模式。廠商各自依自身利潤會偏好於某一投資模式,所以可能會發生兩合作廠商間偏好不同的投資時點不一致問題。廠商偏好的投資時點也可能會與社會福利極大不一致,所以本文也試圖回答若運用契約機制或政府政策的介入是否可以解決社會福利損失的問題。在封閉經濟模型下,契約機制無法完全解決市場失靈問題,但政府的補貼或課稅政策則可達到社會福利極大。在外人直接投資模型下,契約機制可達到地主國福利極大,而政府也可透過訂定兩種最適的課稅政策達到地主國福利極大,但補貼政策只能部分提高福利,無法達到福利極大。
關鍵字(中) ★ 投資時點
★ 政府政策
★ 合作投資
★ 市場失靈
關鍵字(英)
論文目次 目 錄
摘要......................................................................................................Ⅲ
目錄.........................................................................................................Ⅳ
圖次.......................................................................................................Ⅵ
第一章 緒論............................................................................1
1.1 研究動機................................................................1
1.2 文獻回顧..............................................................3
1.3 本文架構........................................................4
第二章 模型設定....................................................................6
2.1 基本模型.............................................................6
2.2 廠商的投資時點選擇..........................................7
2.2.1 同時投資模式.....................................7
2.2.2 先後投資模式.....................................8
2.2.3 投資時點選擇.......................................10
2.3 投資時點不一致與市場失靈問題..........................13
第三章 封閉經濟模型......................................................18
3.1 契約機制與市場失靈....................................18
3.2 政府政策與市場失靈...................................20
3.2.1 補貼............................................20
3.2.2 課稅...........................................22
3.3 本章小結................................................23
第四章 外人直接投資模型..........................................25
4.1 契約機制與地主國福利...............................26
4.2 政府政策與地主國福利...............................28
4.2.1 補貼................................................29
4.2.2 課稅................................................32
4.3 本章小結.....................................................34
第五章 結論...........................................................36
參考文獻.............................................................38
參考文獻 參考文獻
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*MacLeod, W. and J. Malcomson (1993), “Investments, holdup, and the form of market contracts,” American Economic Review, 83, 811-837.
*Neher, D. (1999), “Staged financing: An agency perspective,” Review of Economic Studies, 66, 256-274.
*Nöldeke, G. and K. Schmidt (1995), “Option contracts and renegotiation: A solution to the hold-up problem,” RAND Journal of Economics, 26 (2), 163-179.
*Smirnov, V. and A. Wait (2004 a), “Timing of investments, holdup and total welfare,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22, 413-425.
*Smirnov, V. and A. Wait (2004 b), “Hold-up and sequential specific investments,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (2), 386-400.
指導教授 邱俊榮(Jiunn-Rong Chiou) 審核日期 2005-7-14

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