應用營收分享與上架費於供應鏈協調之研究

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姓名

張文齡(Wen-Ling Chang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

工業管理研究所

論文名稱

應用營收分享與上架費於供應鏈協調之研究
(Supply Chain Coordination with Revenue Sharing and Slotting Allowances)

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摘要(中)

由於零售端相對於供應端的力量愈來愈大，造成營收分享與支付上架費機制的興起。本論文設定在寄售、營收分享以及上架費機制之下的單期存貨模型，其需求為零售價格、時間以及存貨量的反應函數。在零售商領導的結構之下，供應商依據零售商所制定的合約(營收分享比例以及上架費)來決定使其利潤最大化的生產數量和零售價格。當供應商將商品送至零售商時，必須先支付上架費。在商品賣出之前，零售商不需要支付任何給供應商，直至商品售出，製造商會得到應有的營收分享。
本論文研究不只探討在營收分享的情境之下，環境參數對於決策變數和通路績效的影響。並且進ㄧ步研究在單獨使用營收分享機制時，若不能達到供應鏈的協調合作時，該如何使用上架費機制來達到雙贏的結果，甚至可以協調供應鏈上的夥伴合作達到通路的最大利益。

摘要(英)

Revenue sharing and slotting allowances arise because the retailer’s bargaining power with respect to each manufacturer becomes large. We consider the scenario under these mechanisms, consignment, revenue-sharing and slotting allowances. The single-period inventory model in which the demand pattern is a multivariate function of price, time, and level of inventory.
The supplier needs pay the lump-sum payments which is decided by the retailer that supplier makes to retailer for shelf-space. The supplier decides on the retail price and delivery quantity for his product and still retains ownership of the goods; the retailer deducts a percentage from the selling price and remits the balance to the supplier. In this paper we show that, under such a contract, both the overall channel performance of individual firms depend critically on demand price elasticity, demand time elasticity, demand inventory elasticity and on the retailer’s share of channel cost. We show that the decentralized decisions approach the centralized decisions as the price-elasticity index or the retailer’s cost share increases or inventory-elasticity index decreases and the channel profit loss cannot exceed 26.4%. Finally, we prove the channel to achieve pareto improvement involve the slotting allowances mechanism under the consignment with
revenue sharing.

關鍵字(中)

★ 寄售
★ 營收分享
★ 上架費
★ 通路合約

關鍵字(英)

★ slotting allowance
★ revenue sharing
★ consignment sales

論文目次

Content
Abstract.............................................................................................................................. I
Content..............................................................................................................................II
List of Figure .................................................................................................................. IV
List of Table ................................................................................................................... VI
Chapter1 Introduction...............................………….........................................................................1
1.1Background.......................................................................................................1
1.2Motivation..........................................................................................................5
1.3ResearchObjective ...........................................................................................7
1.4ThesisFramework.............................................................................................9
Chapter2 Literature Review ..........................................................................................11
2.1DemandPattern...............................................................................................11
2.2InventoryConsignment....................................................................................14
2.3RevenueSharingScheme ...............................................................................16
2.4SlottingAllowances .........................................................................................19
Chapter3 Model Development........................................................................................21
3.1ScenarioSetting ..............................................................................................21
3.2 Model Assumptions and Notations ................................................................22
3.3 Coordination Model of a Manufacturer and a Retailer with Revenue Sharing …………………………………………………………………………………24
3.3.1 Centralized Channel Decisions.....................…...........................................24
3.3.2 Decentralized Channel Decisions .........................…..................................27
3.3.2.1 Manufacturer’s Problem ........................................................................28
3.3.2.2 Retailer’s Decisions ...............................................................................29
3.3 Coordination Model of a Manufacturer and a Retailer with Revenue Sharing and Slotting Allowance.........................................................................................29
Chapter4 Experimental Study ...........................…........................................................31
4.1 The Numerical Study of Revenue Sharing ....................................................31
4.1.1 The Contract r* ................................….......................................................31
4.1.2 Parameter Analysis ...................................................................................34
4.2 The Numerical Study of Revenue Sharing and Slotting Allowances ......…....49
4.2.1 The contract ( r* , s* )....................…...........................................................49
4.2.2 A Bargaining Solution..........................…....................................................55
Chapter5 Conclusion and Future Research Directions................................................57
5.1 Conclusion ....................................................................................................57
5.2 Future Research Directions............................................................................58
REFERANCE...........................................................................................................................59
Appendix...........................................................................................................................62
Appendix A：Mathematical Proofs........................................................................62
Appendix A-1： Proof of Equation (2) ............................……...............................63
Appendix A-2： Proof of Equation (4) ............................……...............................64
Appendix A-3：Proof of when r = α that d c q q∗ = ............……...............................64
Appendix B：Numerical Data................................................................................65

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指導教授

陳振明(Jen-Ming Chen)

審核日期

2005-7-13

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