博碩士論文 944204017 詳細資訊




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姓名 李依珊(Yi-Shan Li)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 產業經濟研究所
論文名稱 存在中間財市場下的廠商授權
(Final Goods Firm’s Licensing Issue with Intermediate Goods Market)
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摘要(中) 本論文建立一個垂直相關市場的理論模型,討論存在中間財市場下,最終財廠商的創新程度為非劇烈創新與劇烈創新下的授權問題。當存在中間財市場且最終財廠商的創新程度為非劇烈創新時,我們發現不同的授權方式並不會影響中間財的價格。然而,當創新程度為劇烈創新時,最終財廠商授權將使得均衡的中間財價格會低於廠商不授權下的中間財價格。值得注意的是,在考慮中間財市場下,當創新程度為劇烈創新時,技術領先廠商可能將技術授權給技術落後廠商。此一結論打破了過去授權文獻認為創新程度為劇烈創新時,廠商一定不會授權的結論。
摘要(英) This paper establishes a vertical-related model which both considers intermediate goods and final goods, and discusses the licensing issue under two situations: the innovation of the final good firm is non-drastic or drastic. Under the model which considers both the intermediate goods and the final goods, we find that no matter royalty or fixed fees licensing will not affect the intermediate goods’ price if the final good’s firm is non-drastic innovation firm. However, when the final good’s firm is a drastic innovation firm, the equilibrium intermediate goods’ price under licensing would be higher than that under non-licensing. Besides, we have to notice that, when the final good’s firm has drastic innovation, licensing could still occur under the vertical-related model. This point is different from the past licensing literatures’ conclusion: when the final good’s firm has drastic innovation, licensing never occurs.
關鍵字(中) ★ 劇烈創新
★ 固定權利金
★ 單位權利金
★ 非劇烈創新
★ 中間財
關鍵字(英) ★ non-drastic innovation
★ royalty
★ fixed fees
★ drastic innovation
★ intermediate goods
論文目次 目錄
第1章 緒論………………..…………………………………………..……………1
1.1 研究動機與目的…………………………………………………………1
1.2 論文架構…………………………………………………………………3
第2章 存在中間財市場且創新程度為非劇烈時的授權情況..…….…………….4
2.1 不授權..…………………………………………………………………..4
2.2 授權…..…………………………………………………………………..7
2.2.1 固定權利金..………………………………………………………..7
2.2.2 單位權利金……..…………………………………………………10
2.3 最適授權方式 …………………………………………………………15
2.4 本章小結 ………………………………………………………………16
第3章 創新程度為劇烈創新下的授權情況………………..……………………17
3.1 不存在中間財市場..……………………………………………………17
3.2 存在中間財市場………..………………………………………………17
3.2.1 不授權………………………………………………………………18
3.2.2 固定權利金…………………………………………………………19
3.2.3單位權利金……………………………………………………….…23
3.2.4 最適授權方式………………………………………………………26
3.3 本章小結 ………………………………………………………………27
第4章 結論..………………….…………………………………………………28
參考文獻.....…………………….………………………………………………… 29
參考文獻 Arya, A. and B. Mittendorf (2006), “Enhancing Vertical Efficiency through Horizontal Licensing,” Journal of Regulatory Economics, 29, 333 – 342.
Banerjee S. and P. Lin (2003), “Downstream R&D, Raising Rivals’ Costs, and Input Price Contracts,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 21, 79 – 96.
Kamien M. and Y. Tauman (1986), “Fees versus Royalties and The Private Value of a Patent,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 101, 471 – 491.
Kamien, M., S. Oren, and Y. Tauman (1992), “Optimal Licensing of Cost Reducing Innovation,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 21, 483 – 508.
Mukherjee, A. and E. Pennings (2006), “Tariffs, Licensing and Market Structure,” European Economic Review, 50, 1699 – 1707.
Mukherjee, A. and A. Ray (2007), “Strategic Outsourcing and R&D in A Vertical Structure” The Manchester School, 75, 297 – 310.
Nadiri, M. I. (1993) “Innovations and Technological Spillovers,” NBER working paper 4423.
Poddar, S. and U. B. Sinha (2004), “On Patent Licensing and Spatial Competition,” Econnomic Record, 80, 208 – 218.
Poddar, S. and U. B. Sinha (2005), “Patent Licensing from High-Cost to Low-Cost Firm,” Working paper 05/03, National University of Singapore.
Sen, D. (2005a), “Fee versus Royalty Reconsidered’, Games and Economic Behavior,” 53, 141 – 47.
Sen, D. (2005b), “On The Coexistence of Different Licensing Schemes,” International Review of Economics and Finance,” 14, 393 – 413.
Sen, D. and Y. Tauman (2007), “General Licensing Scheme for a Cost-reducing Innovation,” Games and Economic Behavior, 59, 163 – 86.
Vishwasrao S. (2007) “Royalties vs. Fees: How Do Firms Pay for Foreign Technology?,” International Journal of Industrial Organization, 25, 741 – 759.
Wang X. H. (1998) “Fee versus Royalty Licensing in A Cournot Duopoly Model,” Economics Letters, 60, 55 – 62.
Wang, X. H. and Yang, B. Z. (1999), “On Licensing under Bertrand Competition,” Australian Economic Papers, 38, 106 – 119.
Wang, X.H. (2002), “Fee vs. Royalty Licensing in Differentiated Cournot Oligopoly,” Journal of Economics and Business, 54, 253 – 262.
指導教授 邱俊榮(Jiunn-Rong Chiou) 審核日期 2008-7-15
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