博碩士論文 944208004 詳細資訊




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姓名 李容嫺(Jung-Shian Lee)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 財務金融學系
論文名稱 檢視Basu的盈餘不對稱時效性模型在台灣金融服務業的適用性
(Examining the Effectiveness of Basu(1997)Measure on Taiwan's Financial Institutions)
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摘要(中) 本研究分為兩篇文章,第一篇為「盈餘穩健性、市價淨值比與治理機制-台灣金融服務業之實證研究」,第二篇為「資訊揭露與多角化經營會否提升金融服務業之盈餘穩健度」。
第一篇旨在探討1991至2004間我國上市櫃金融機構的會計盈餘能否穩健表達,係以Basu(1997)的盈餘不對稱時效性模型,衡量盈餘的穩健性,並藉著納入市價淨值比及治理機制,更嚴謹地觀察穩健表達的變化。實證結果可歸納為下列三點:第一,金融機構的會計盈餘具備穩健性,符合穩健經營的假說;第二,探討盈餘穩健特性時,雖可藉由市價淨值比的納入,減少資訊傳遞時的雜訊干擾,惟因產業特性之故,造成市價淨值比對其影響不大。第三,治理機制明顯降低盈餘的穩健表達,其中尤以與內部人持股有關的董監事持股比率及質押比率最為顯著,意味高階金融主管仍不排斥透過盈餘操縱,改變財務報表的穩健表達。
第二篇則繼續使用Basu(1997)的盈餘不對稱時效性模型,探討在2001年之後,我國上市櫃金融機構的盈餘穩健情形。實證結果可歸納為下列四點:第一,我國金融業在2001年以後,可能存在過度使用穩健原則的情形。第二,我國資訊揭露評鑑系統的成立,的確可使盈餘更合理表達其穩健特性,然因評比項目多為強制性的揭露事項,使高低資訊揭露程度並無顯著的差別。第三,我國金融機構為擴展經營規模,而從事不同的多角化行為,將導致穩健原則的採用程度隨之有異。第四,治理機制的施行,可降低財務報表的扭曲程度,使穩健性合理陳述,然因公司個別情況有異,盈餘穩健性亦隨之不同,可見我國現行的法令規章,仍留給公司相當的自主性。
摘要(英) This thesis includes two studies. One is “Earnings Conservatism, Market-to-Book Ratio, and Governance Mechanism: Evidence from Financial Institutions in Taiwan.” The other is “Do Information Disclosure and Diversification Increase Earnings Conservatism of Financial Institutions in Taiwan?”
The purpose of the first one paper is to examine earnings conservatism of Taiwan’’s financial institutions over 1991-2004. First, we use Basu (1997) to evaluate earnings conservatism. Secondly, we add market-to-book ratio (MTB) and governance mechanism to Basu in sequence, enable our analysis more rigorous. The findings are as follows: (1) The earnings of Taiwan’’s financial institutions conform to conservatism. (2) Because our sample is financial institutions, MTB affects earnings conservatism slightly. (3) Governance mechanism reduces earnings conservatism obviously, especially the variables related to the stock held by insiders, the ratio of the stock held by directors and supervisors and equity pledge ratio of directors and supervisors. It means executive management may change earnings conservatism by earnings manipulations.
The second paper is to examine earnings conservatism of Taiwan’’s financial institutions after 2001. The main findings are as follows: (1) Taiwan’’s financial institutions possibly overuse conservatism after 2001. (2) The implementation of information disclosure and evaluation system indeed causes the expression of earnings conservatism more reasonable. However, the difference between "high disclosure" and "low disclosure" companies is not statistically significant. (3) Because Taiwan’’s financial institutions have different diversification, their earnings conservatism are also different. (4) Government mechanism may reduce the distortion of financial report. As a result, companies can use conservatism more reasonable. However, earnings conservatism would change according to the situation of company individually.
關鍵字(中) ★ 資訊揭露
★ 穩健性
★ 多角化
★ 治理機制
關鍵字(英) ★ Diversification
★ Information disclosure
★ Conservatism
★ Government mechanism
論文目次 中文提要 i
英文提要 ii
誌 謝 iii
目 錄 iv
圖 目 錄 vi
表 目 錄 vii
Ⅰ、盈餘穩健性、市價淨值比與治理機制-台灣金融服務業之實證研究
一、 研究動機與目的 1
二、 文獻回顧 5
2-1 與盈餘不對稱時效反應有關的基本模型 5
2-2 盈餘不對稱時效性與市價淨値比關係之研究文獻 6
2-3 盈餘不對稱時效性與治理機制之文獻回顧 8
三、 研究模型 10
3-1 盈餘不對稱時效性之基本模型 10
3-2 考慮市價淨値比構面的盈餘不對稱時效性模型 12
3-3 考慮治理機制的盈餘不對稱時效性模型 14
四、 研究樣本 18
五、 實證結果與分析 19
5-1 利用Basu模型,觀察金融機構的會計盈餘能否穩健表達 19
5-2 檢視兼顧市價淨値比的盈餘不對稱時效性模型,能否更合理地衡量盈餘穩健性 21
5-3 檢視兼顧治理機制與期末市價淨值比的盈餘不對稱時效性模型,能否改善資訊傳遞的不對稱性 23
六、 結論 27
參考文獻 28
附錄一、敘述統計量 31
附錄二、公民營行庫的個別穩健性檢驗 31
Ⅱ、資訊揭露與多角化經營會否提升金融服務業之盈餘穩健度
一、 研究動機與目的 1
二、 文獻回顧與假說發展 5
2-1 盈餘穩健性 5
2-2 資訊揭露和盈餘穩健性 6
2-3 多角化的相關研究 7
2-4 治理機制和盈餘穩健性 8
三、 研究模型 10
3-1 盈餘不對稱時效性模型 10
3-2 考慮資訊揭露構面的盈餘不對稱時效性模型 11
3-3 考慮多角化構面的盈餘不對稱時效性模型 11
3-4 控制治理機制後的盈餘不對稱時效性模型 12
四、 研究樣本 16
五、 實證結果與分析 17
5-1 考慮資訊揭露構面後的盈餘穩健情況 17
5-2 考慮多角化構面的盈餘穩健情況 19
5-3 控制治理機制後的盈餘穩健情況 21
六、 結論 26
參考文獻 27
附錄一、治理變數對會計盈餘的預期影響方向與參考文獻 31
附錄二、敘述統計量 31
附錄三、Chow test的檢定方法 32
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Ⅱ、資訊揭露與多角化經營會否提升金融服務業之盈餘穩健度
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指導教授 陳錦村(Jing-Twen Chen) 審核日期 2007-7-9
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