| 摘要(英) |
It has been twenty years since the government’s announcement of the “Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area” in 1987, when Taiwanese business were allowed to invest indirectly in the Mainland China business through a third country. During the period, the government has made continuous revision on various economic, trade and financial policies to accommodate to the strong demand from the increasing economic activities across the strait. A common concern of all the investors, lending banks and the government through these years is whether the Taiwanese business have kept their earnings in the Mainland China or a third country, with all the liabilities left in Taiwan? Has the head office in Taiwan been benefited as well when the subsidiary in China has made great profits? Or has the credit been further secured by the profit-making? All these are big concerns of the relevant parties.
In view of the above, we endeavor to discuss in this study the interaction between the subsidiaries in China and their Taiwan head office in terms of the corporate governance mechanism and the earning management systems, through a study of the publicized financial information of such Chinese-based Taiwanese companies, including the transactions between related parties and the management module of the Chinese operations. As indicated by Mr. Chi Shive, President of Taiwan Academy of Banking and Finance: “When you are developing a market other than the China market, you are holding an umbrella. You only open it when you need it. For the China market, however, you should hold a more prudent attitude as if you were parachuting. Make sure the parachute can be opened before you jump”. For banks in Taiwan, therefore, it is better to evaluate the credit risk of a Chinese-based company before offering a credit. Any herd behavior without careful consideration would very possibly lead into a harmful result, rather than profit.
Through the empirical analysis made in this study, we found that the various transactions made by the related parties were significantly impacted by the amount of investment in China, shareholding ratio and the bank borrowings by the head office, etc. A significant negative relationship was seen between the investment amount in China and the investment return. It was further noticed that the bank borrowings by the head office had a significant influence on the performance of the head office, showing that the financial leverage had not been fully effective. Obviously, Taiwanese companies with investment in China were manipulating the various discretionary items, operational or non-operational, for their earnings management. To obtain banking facilities or better terms for their borrowings, such companies would firstly strive to achieve a decent financial report for their head office. Some companies, however, would pass on the procurement and fund collection authorities to their offshore subsidiaries, considering that most of the equipments and production lines have been moved to China. In such cases, it would be less convenient for them to use the operational discretionary items for earnings management. Comparing with those who have direct investment in China, companies who made their investment in China through a third place normally have a higher tendency in manipulating the non-operational discretionary items for their earnings management. In terms of the level of public offering, GTSE listed companies were seen to have been manipulating the earnings management, operational or non-operational, to a greater extent than the TSEC listed companies or emerging stock board companies. Companies with a less effective corporate governance mechanism are obviously more influential on the earnings management, when compared with companies with a better corporate governance. The credit grading system used by TEJ, therefore, is adversely impacted or restricted in terms of its accuracy or effectiveness, when the company has not adequately disclosed its reinvestments through the financial reports. One unusual phenomenon was that companies with higher credit grades are more likely to make use of the non-operational earnings management.
The empirical research findings, covering the management modules, comparison of corporate governance mechanisms, and the various factors influencing the earnings management style, etc., shall provide more specific and diversified credit standards for the financial institutions in Taiwan when evaluating the credit risks of local enterprises with investment in China, no matter if the credit is offered to the head offices for their investment in China, or to its offshore subsidiaries. This is believed to be superior to the conventional credit rating instruments for the credit review process. |
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