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姓名 鄭弘良(Hung-Liang Cheng)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 工業管理研究所
論文名稱 在寄售與營收分享價格相依的機制下考慮需求與價格和空間相依之通路協調
(Channel Coordination under Consignment and Price-Dependent Revenue-Sharing Mechanism with Price-Sensitive and Shelf-Space Demand)
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摘要(中) 寄售與營收分享的合約方式目前普遍流行於電子商務網站中,亞馬遜(Amazon)和電子灣(eBay)的商業營運模式是個適當例子。然而,是否亞馬遜和電子灣的商業收費結構能夠使供應鏈通路達到協調呢?在電子商務的營運過程中,它是一個很重要的策略性問題,也是一個令人有趣之研究假設的議題。在此寄售與營收分享合約機制下,我們面對一個製造商和一位零售商的通路結構,採用Stackelberg之供應通路的決策制定模型。零售商是領導者,提供製造商一個營收分享的合約(收費結構),指明零售商的分享比例(和上架費),和製造商的相對營收分享部份。製造商(供應商)則選擇一個零售價格(和架位空間)做為反應決策。我們在集中型通路和面對分散型通路的合作與不合作的情況下,進行通路決策的均衡分析。
我們的研究顯示不合作的分散型通路利益的損失是顯著的,它也與製造商決定較高的零售價格,和零售商訂定較高的營收分享比例,呈現出一致相符的關係。特別地,通路利益損失的大小會隨著需求之價格彈性的增加而增加,但反而會隨著零售商之通路成本比值的增加而減少。換言之,若零售商之通路成本的比值愈小和(或)需求的價格彈性愈大時,合作的分散型通路將產生比不合作的分散型通路更多利益。除此之外,為了達到通路的完全協調,我們提出利用上架費的利益分享機制,以期在通路成員之中彼此致力於柏拉圖的改善。
摘要(英) Consignment-based revenue-sharing contract is prevalent in internet commerce, such as Amazon’s and eBay’s merchandising business models. Can Amazon’s or eBay’s fee structure coordinate the channel? It’s a critical strategic problem in e-commerce operations and an interesting research hypothesis as well. Under such a contract, we model the decision-making of a supply channel with one manufacturer and one retailer as a Stackelberg game. The retailer, acting as the leader, offers the manufacturer a revenue sharing contract (i.e., fee structure), which specifies the percentage allocation of revenue (and slotting allowance) between herself and the manufacturer. The manufacturer (vendor) chooses a retail price (and number of shelf space) as a response. We conduct equilibrium analysis for both the centralized and decentralized channel settings with and without cooperation.
Our study reveals that the profit loss due to non-cooperative decentralization is significant, and it tends to have a consistent bias, i.e., setting higher retail price by the manufacturer and higher revenue-sharing percentage by the retailer. Notably, the loss is increasing in the price elasticity of demand and decreasing in the retailer’s cost-share. In other words, the cooperative decentralization will generate more profit than that of the non-cooperative if the retailer’s cost-share is small and/or the elasticity is high. In addition, a profit-sharing scheme through slotting allowance is proposed to achieve perfect coordination, which leads to Pareto improvements among channel participants.
關鍵字(中) ★ 通路協調
★ 營收分享
★ 存貨寄售
★ 遊戲理論
★ 上架費
★ 供應鏈管理
關鍵字(英) ★ Channel coordination
★ revenue sharing
★ inventory consignment
★ supply chain management
★ game theory
★ slotting allowances
論文目次 中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
Acknowledgments iii
Table of Contents iv
List of Figures vi
List of Tables vii
Notations viii
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation 1
1.2 Objectives 3
1.3 Scope and Constraints 6
1.4 Research Framework 7
Chapter 2 Literature Review 11
2.1 Revenue Sharing 11
2.2 Inventory Consignment 11
2.3 Shelf Display 12
2.4 Slotting Allowance 13
2.5 Channel Coordination 15
Chapter 3 Channel Coordination under Deterministic Price-Sensitive Demand Model 17
3.1 The Problem Context and Notations 18
3.2 The Model 20
3.2.1 The Centralized Channel 20
3.2.2 The Non-Cooperative Decentralization 21
3.2.3 The Cooperative Decentralization 24
3.3 Analysis 24
3.3.1 Analysis and Managerial Implications 25
3.3.2 Pareto Improvements through Slotting Allowances 27
3.4 Numerical Example 28
3.4.1 The Base Case 28
3.4.2 Pareto Improvements 29
3.4.3 Sensitivity Analysis 30
3.5 Summary 34
Chapter 4 Channel Coordination under Price-Sensitive and Shelf-Space Dependent Demand Model 35
4.1 The Problem Context and Notations 36
4.2 The Model 38
4.2.1 The Centralized Channel 38
4.2.2 The Non-Cooperative Decentralization 41
4.2.3 The Cooperative Decentralization 45
4.3 Analysis and Managerial Implications 46
4.3.1 Decision Implications 47
4.3.2 Profit Implications 49
4.3.3 Pareto Improvements 51
4.4 Numerical Example 53
4.4.1 The Base Case 53
4.4.2 Pareto Improvements 54
4.4.3 Analysis of Profit versus Parameter 55
4.4.4 Analysis of Profit versus Decision Variables 57
4.5 Summary 57
Chapter 5 Channel Coordination under Price-Dependent Revenue-Sharing Model 59
5.1 The Problem Context and Notations 61
5.2 The Model 63
5.2.1 The Centralized Channel 63
5.2.2 The Decentralized Channel with Revenue-Sharing Contracts 64
5.3 Analysis and Managerial Implications 68
5.4 Numerical Example 72
5.4.1 The Base Case 73
5.4.2 Sensitivity Analysis 74
5.5 Summary 76
Chapter 6 Conclusions and Future Research 78
6.1 Conclusions 78
6.2 Future Research 79
References 81
Biographical Sketch 86
A. Journal Papers 86
B. Conference Papers 87
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指導教授 陳振明(Jen-Ming Chen) 審核日期 2010-12-28
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