博碩士論文 951404004 詳細資訊




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姓名 王萱茹(Hsuan-ju Wang)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 哲學研究所
論文名稱 論納斯邦(Martha C. Nussbaum)的動物正義論:動物倫理爭議的解決
(On Martha C. Nussbaum’s Theory of Animal Justice:A Solution for Animal Ethical Controversy)
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摘要(中) 本文主要闡述納斯邦的「能力進路」,說明彼如何透過此觀點,為動物建立必須受到保障的基本權益。本文進一步透過重新建構及修正納斯邦的論述,解決此理論所具有的缺失,亦同時解決動物倫理學中的各項爭議。在論題討論方面,主要分為三個部份。第一、納斯邦缺乏由「能力進路」而來的說明,用以解決「人類與動物之間的能力發展衝突」,直接得出動物必須受到犧牲之結論,是這個論述的最大缺失;第二、由於納斯邦取消傳統社會契約論的基礎,諸如:理性與協議的概念,導致「能力進路」在社會契約論中的定位模糊不清;第三、不論是辛格的「效益主義」與雷根的「權利觀點」,都不免犯下「實然-應然問題」,而此問題是動物倫理學中長久以來的爭議。本文對這三方面的議題提供一一的解答。

本文主要透過提出「分層思考」解釋模式,作為展示及解決上述三大問題的方向。在第一個論題部份,透過若干中層的「道德原則」作為能力進路之具體化,用以解決倫理爭議的依據;其中,就「尊重生命原則」、「不傷害原則」及「仁愛原則」之詮釋,確立能力進路尊重並促進所有個體的能力發展,並且不傷害具有感知能力的生命;而「能力分層原則」及「生命價值序列原則」,則是透過能力的重要性以及生命價值序列的高低,做為解決衝突的依據。其他諸如「人道原則」與「修正原則」等等,則是作為補充的說明。藉由這些原則的建構,能力進路得以確實解決各種動物倫理議題,包括實驗動物與經濟動物之倫理問題。在第二個論題的部份,則是藉由修正「契約協議」的原理,援用史坎龍(Thomas Scanlon)的「他人無法合理拒絕的理由」,作為消解能力進路在社會契約論的定位模糊之問題。在最後一個論題的部份,則是透過對於道德根源的探究,即納斯邦的道德情感之論述中作為價值根源之「憐憫之情」,作為解決「實然-應然問題」之基礎。本文透過這些觀點的論述與說明,不僅使納斯邦的論述更臻於完善,亦解決動物倫理學中的各項爭議。
摘要(英) This dissertation explores Nussbaum’s capabilities approach and shows how she establishes the basic entitlements of animals with this approach. In this dissertation, I try to point out the shortcomings of Nussbaum’s theory. In due course, it is reconstructed and revised and a number of important issues in animal ethics are resolved. My dissertation concerns with three main issues. First, I find that Nussbaum did not provide a clear discourse from capabilities approach to solve the conflicts between humans and animals in their respective capabilities development and she suggested that animals need to be sacrificed for human interests. This is clearly unsatisfactory. Second, since Nussbaum dismissed the foundational conceptions such as rationality and social agreement of traditional theory of justice, the relation of her capabilities approach with the contractarian tradition is somewhat vague and unclear. Third, the long time dispute of “is-ought problem” in animal ethics, which not even renowned theories of Singer’s and Regan’s could escape, and a solution for this problem is proposed.

In this thesis, I employ the model of “levels of thinking” to deal with these three issues. For the first problem, I try to construct and employ certain mid-level moral principles in order to arrive at a proper and justifiable way for the solution of the conflicts of capabilities development between human and animal. The three main principles are respect for life, non-maleficence and beneficence. They imply that we have to respect and protect the development of capabilities of all individuals especially those sentience ones. While the principle of differentiation of levels of capabilities and the principle of comparison of order of life values are the basic principles for the solution of conflicts. Moreover, the principle of humanity and the principle of revisability provide additional explanations to help solve possible conflicts. With these principles, the capabilities approach could indeed solve animal issues like experimental animals and animal farm factory. Besides clarifying some of the vague points of Nussbaum’s theory, I elaborate Thomas Scanlon’s idea of “others could not reasonably reject” to fortify its position. Finally, I re-interpreted the Nussbaum’s idea of compassion and using it as the source of morality in order to solve the “is-ought problem”. As a result, it makes Nussbaum’s theory more capable to solve various issues of animal ethics.
關鍵字(中) ★ 納斯邦
★ 能力進路
★ 動物倫理
★ 分層思考
★ 憐憫之情
★ 正義
★ 道德原則
關鍵字(英) ★ Nussbaum
★ capabilities approach
★ animals ethics
★ levels of thinking
★ compassion
★ justice
★ moral principles
論文目次 目錄
中文摘要………………………………………………………………………i
英文摘要………………………………………………………………………ii
誌 謝………………………………………………………………………iii
凡例說明………………………………………………………………………iv
目錄……………………………………………………………………………v


第一章:導論………………………………………………………………………1.
第一節 研究背景及目的……………………………………………………………1.
第二節 問題意識及分析……………………………………………………………3.
第三節 解決的脈絡與方向………………………………………………7.
第四節 文獻回顧與探討…………………………………………………9.
一、 當代動物倫理學者-效益主義:辛格…………………9.
二、 當代動物倫理學者-權利觀點:雷根…………………12.
三、 納斯邦的動物能力進路之觀點…………………………15.
四、 回應納斯邦的論述之相關文獻…………………………18.
第五節 各章節的主旨與摘要……………………………………………19.


第二章:納斯邦的能力進路觀點之理論根源I
-情感、憐憫之情與動物…………………………………………21.
第一節 情感作為價值的判斷………………………………………………22.
一、 新斯多葛學派的觀點……………………………………23.
二、 情感與幸福………………………………………………26.
三、 情感的非認知要素、想像力……………………………28.
第二節 憐憫之情的基本結構………………………………………………30.
一、 憐憫之情的認知結構………………………………………31.
二、 同情共感與憐憫之情………………………………………37.


第三章:納斯邦的能力進路觀點之理論根源II
-情感、憐憫之情與動物………………………………………41.
第一節 動物的情感能力……………………………………………………41.
一、 動物的情感能力-憐憫之情……………………………41.
二、 動物的情感能力
-來自新斯多葛學派的修正(The Neo-Stoic View Revised)……46.
第二節 納斯邦道德情感論述之反省
-動物的脆弱性:人類的宰制與動物的身體…………………………49.
第三節 動物倫理學中「實然-應然」問題之探究-
從納斯邦的「憐憫之情」提出一解決的進路…………………………53.
一、 辛格的動物效益主義理論中的「實然-應然問題」……54.
二、 雷根的動物權利理論中的「實然-應然問題」…………57.
三、 動物倫理學中的「實然-應然問題」之分析..........59.
四、 納斯邦的「憐憫之情」-動物倫理的道德根源.......62.
五、 由「憐憫之情」所建構的道德原則.................65.

第四章:正義、社會契約論、能力進路與動物………………………………68.
第一節 康德與羅爾斯對待動物的態度………………………………………68.
第二節 沈恩的能力進路觀點…………………………………………………71.
一、 沈恩對於正義觀點的詮釋-什麼樣的正義理論……………72.
二、 沈恩的能力進路觀點-自由與能力、永續經營之觀點……73.
第三節 納斯邦的能力進路觀點……………………………………………75.
一、 社會契約論無法解決的三大問題……………………………75.
二、 納斯邦對於羅爾斯的批評……………………………………76.
三、 能力進路觀點-人性尊嚴與能力……………………………77.
四、 能力進路與社會契約不同之處………………………………78.
五、 對於納斯邦能力進路之評述…………………………………80.
第四節 正義觀點的延伸……………………………………………………81.
一、 動物正義的環境………………………………………………82.
二、 正義的三元關係………………………………………………83
三、 「承認」動物正義……………………………………………85.
第五節 社會契約論的修正與動物……………………………………………87.
一、 社會契約論中對待動物的正反意見…………………………87.
二、 何謂社會契約論中的「約」(contract)及契約中的「道德行動者」:
「約」的擴張與關係及道德情感……………………………93.
三、 動物進入社會契約中的方法:他人無法合理拒絕的理由…95.
四、 無法拒絕動物進入社會契約論的理由………………………96.

第五章:重新建構能力進路之觀點I-方法論及生命價值序列………………99.
第一節 方法論-外部:邊緣案例論證,內部:想像力……………………99.
第二節 方法論-內部:想像力(imagination)……………………………108.
第三節 生命價值的序列……………………………………………………112.
一、 關於生命價值序列的討論…………………………113.
二、 重新建構能力進路中的生命價值序列……………119.

第六章:重新建構能力進路之觀點II-
能力分層觀點與道德原則之建構………………………………123.
第一節 能力分層(levels)觀點……………………………………………123.
一、 對於納斯邦的能力列表內容的審視……………………… 123.
二、 能力分層概念之說明……………………………………… 130.
第二節 道德原則的建構-尊重生命原則、不受傷害原則與仁愛原則…135.
第三節 其他道德原則之建構………………………………………………142.
一、 能力分層原則與生命價值序列原則……………………144.
二、 人道原則、存疑原則、修正原則及補償原則…………147.

第七章:能力進路觀點的意涵…………………………………………………150.
第一節 能力進路觀點解決衝突的程序…………………………………150.
第二節 實驗動物…………………………………………………………153.
第三節 經濟動物…………………………………………………………159.
第四節 動物娛樂表演……………………………………………………163.

第八章:結論……………………………………………………………………166.
第一節 論題回顧與研究成果……………………………………………………166.
第二節 研究限制與未來展望……………………………………………………169.

參考書目…………………………………………………………………………172.

參考文獻 Nussbaum, Martha C.納斯邦主要著作

1995, Poetic Justice: the Literary Imagination and Public Life, Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press.

2001, The Fragility of Goodness: Luck and Ethics in Greek Tragedy and Philosophy, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

2001, Upheavals of Thought: the Intelligence of Emotions, Cambridge, New York : Cambridge University Press.

2004c, Hiding from Humanity: Disgust, Shame, and the Law, Princeton : Princeton University Press.

2006, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press: Harvard University Press.

2013, Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.


一、中文文獻
(一)中文專書

李瑞全(1993),《休謨》,台北:東大,初版。

李瑞全(2000),《儒家生命倫理學》,台北:鵝湖出版社。

李瑞全(2013),《儒家道德規範根源論》,新北市:鵝湖。

努斯本(Martha C. Nussbaum)著; 徐子婷,楊雅婷及何景榮譯(2008),《正義的界限 : 殘障.全球正義與動物正義》,台北縣:韋伯文化國際,初版。

彼得.辛格(Peter Singer)著,錢永祥,孟祥森譯(1996),《動物解放》(Animal Liberation),台北市:關懷生命協會,初版。

馬克.貝考夫(Marc Bekoff)等著,錢永祥等譯(2002),《動物權與動物福利小百科》(Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and Animal Welfare),台北縣新店市:桂冠。

傅可思(Michael Allen Fox)(著),王瑞香(譯)(2005),《深層素食主義》(Deep Vegetarianism),台北市:關懷生命協會,初版。

盧梭著,李平漚譯 (1989),《愛彌爾》,台北:五南出版社。

錢宜群,《政治哲學中的情感:瑪莎.納斯邦論情感與正義之關係》,國立台灣大學社會科學院政治學系,碩士論文。

羅爾斯(John Rawls)著,李少軍、杜麗燕、張虹譯(2003),《正義論》,台北:桂冠。

(二)中文文章

〈創世紀〉,《聖經》,(香港 : 聯合聖經公會,新標點和合本)。

王萱茹(2012),〈動物實驗之倫理問題:依雷根(Tom Regan)與儒家之觀點論析〉,收錄於〈兩岸青年學者-生物倫理學與社會規制論壇〉會議論文集,中國,北京。

---------(2013),〈正義、社會契約論與動物─從修正「能力進路」(capabilities
approach)觀點談起〉,《應用倫理評論》,中壢:國立中央大學哲學研究所,第55期。

---------(2014),〈動物倫理學中的「實然-應然問題」之探究-從道德根源探討一可能解決的進路〉,《應用倫理評論》,中壢:國立中央大學哲學研究所,第56期。

朱建民 (2000),〈由儒家觀點論西方環境倫理學人類中心主義與自然中心主義的對立〉,《鵝湖學誌》,新北市:鵝湖,第25期。

----------(2009),〈正義概念的源頭探討〉,《鵝湖月刊》,新北市:鵝湖,第406期。

李凱恩 (2001),〈Singer動物解放倫理學批判研究〉,《應用倫理評論》,中壢:國立中央大學哲學研究所,第 51 期。

房曼琪(著)王萱茹(譯),〈生命的權益-批判倫理學〉(The Right To Life-A Critical Ethics)。網站資料::http://www.moondesert.com/4.html。(該文英文版亦刊登於「動物解放陣線」(Animal Liberation Front)網站)。

錢永祥 (2006),〈納斯邦的動物倫理新論〉,《思想》,第1期。

蔣功成等著,〈基於3R理論的動物實驗教學改革〉,《實驗室研究與探索》, 2006,第25卷第3期。

懷特(Robert White)著,張忠宏譯(1997),〈支持動物實驗的主張〉,收錄於路易斯.波伊曼(Loius P. Pojman)編著; 張忠宏等譯,《為動物說話》,台北市:桂冠,初版。

二、英文文獻

(一)英文專書

Bentham, Jeremy (1988). The Principles of Morals and Legislation. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books

Beauchamp, Tom L. (et al.)(eds.)(2008). Contemporary Issues in Bioethics. Australia, United States: Thomson/Wadsworth, 7th Ed.

---------------------------and Childress, James F. (2009). Principles of Biomedical Ethics, New York: Oxford University Press, 6th ed.

Carruthers, Peter (1992). The Animals Issue : Moral Theory in Practice. Cambridge [England]; New York : Cambridge University Press.


Christine Korsgaard (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

C. R. W., Spedding (2000). Animal Welfare, London: Earthscan Publications.


Dombrowski, Daniel A. (1997). Babies and Beasts: The Argument from Marginal Cases, Urbana : University of Illinois Press.

Fesmire, Steven (2003). John Dewey and Moral Imagination: Pragmatism in Ethics, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.

Hume, David, Selby-Bigge, L. A.(ed.)(1979). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford: At the Clarendon Press.

Leahy, Michael (1994). Against Liberation: Putting Animals in Perspective, London, New York : Routledge.

Mill, John Stuart, Piest, Oskar(ed.)(1957). Utilitarianism. Bobbs-Merrill.

Palmer, Clare (2010). Animal Ethics in Context, Columbia University Press.

Pojman, Louis P. (1993).Life and Deat : Grappling with the Moral Dilemmas of Our Time, Boston : Jones and Bartlett.


Rawls, John (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

----------------(1993). Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

----------------(1999). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Regan, Tom (1985). The Case for Animal Rights. Berkeley: University of California Press.
--------------- and Cohen, Carl eds. (2001). The Animal Rights Debate, Lanham : Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.

------------- (2001). Defending Animal Rights. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

------------- (2003). Animal Rights, Human Wrongs: An Introduction to Moral Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield, December.


Rowlands, Mark (1998). Animal Rights: A Philosophical Defence. Consultant editor, J Campling, New York: St. Martin′s Press.
---------------------(2009). Animal Rights: Moral Theory and Practice. Palgrave MacMillan, London, 2nd.

Scanlon, Thomas (1998). What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.


Schlosberg, David (2007). Defining Environmental Justice: Theories, Movements, and Nature. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Sen, Amartya (1999). Development as freedom. New York: Oxford University.

------------------(2009). The Idea of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.


Singer, Peter (1975). Animal Liberation. NY: New York Review.

----------------(1993). Practical Ethics. New York: Cambridge University.

Smith, Adam (2000). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.

Warren, Mary Anne (2000). Moral Status: Obligations to Persons and Other Living Things. Oxford : Oxford University Press.

Webster, John (2005). Animal Welfare: Limping Towards Eden: A Practical Approach to Redressing the Problem of Our Dominion over the Animals, Oxford, UK ; Ames, Iowa : Blackwell Pub.


(二)英文文章

Abbey, Ruth, “Rawlsian Resources for Animal Ethics,” Ethics and the Environment 12.1(2007):9-12.

Anderson, Elizabeth (2004). “Animal Rights and The Values of Nonhuman Life,” in Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, in Cass R. Sunstein and Martha C. Nussbaum(eds.), Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Directions, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, pp.277-298.

Boettcher, James, “A Review of “Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species, Membership by Martha Nussbaum,” Journal of Human Rights 8(2009): 190-193.

Coeckelbergh, Mark, “Distributive Justice and Co-Operation in a World of Humans and Non-Humans: A Contractarian Argument for Drawing Non-Humans into the Sphere of Justice,” A Journal of Legal and Social Philosophy15.1 (2009): 67-84.

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三、網路參考資料
1.維基百科網頁,詞目:動物福利(Animal Welfare):http://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/

2.〈關於意識的劍橋宣言〉(The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness):http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf

3.〈關於意識的劍橋宣言〉(The Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness)
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cambridge_Declaration

4.〈46國簽《倫敦宣言》 誓言終結野生動物非法交易〉:
http://e-info.org.tw/node/97434

5.〈實驗猩猩被囚30年釋放後歡笑相擁〉:
http://www.jgospel.net/rewrite/recontent.aspx?id=34586
相關報導可以參考台灣動物平權促進會:
https://www.facebook.com/TAEA2013?hc_location=timeline

6.影片資料:Release of chimpanzees, 30 years after undergoing experiments:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x7PAMgNEtSY

7.「世界保護動物組織」(World Society for the Protection of Animals, WSPA):
https://www.facebook.com/WSPAAustralia

8.《里斯本條約》(Treaty of Lisbon):
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:FULL:EN:PDF

9.中華民國關懷生命協會:
http://www.lca.org.tw/news/node/4698

10.「歐盟」(the European Union)網站,關於歐盟國家廢除化妝品實驗動物之歷程與記錄:
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/sectors/cosmetics/animal-testing/index_en.htm

11.實驗動物疼痛程度之評估方法,參考自國防醫學院之網站:
http://www.ndmctsgh.edu.tw/mediafile/18580030/fdownload/110/51/2013-12-31-8-25-17-51-nf1.pdf.

12.Dr T Colin Campbell Discusses Food Inc - The China Study - Healing Cancer Naturally:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xzrWGOKK3E8.

13.〈拒絕消費觀看鯨豚表演〉,出自台灣動物平權促進會網站:http://www.taeanimal.org.tw/action-and-sound/animals-are-not-entertainment/216

14.泛科學:科學界終於正式宣稱動物也有意識
http://pansci.tw/archives/23959

15.〈劍橋宣言〉全文英文網站:
http://fcmconference.org/img/CambridgeDeclarationOnConsciousness.pdf

16.自由電子時報,〈教育?動物園公開肢解長頸鹿 幼童旁觀〉
http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/948866

17.牛逃出牛圈所做的第一件事,讓所有人類愧疚:http://onefunnyjoke.com/2014/02/25/%E7%89%9B%E9%80%83%E5%87%BA%E7%89%9B%E5%9C%88/

指導教授 李瑞全(Shui-chuen Lee) 審核日期 2014-7-25
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