盈餘管理與增發新股公司之營業績效：以中國上市公司為例

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廖婉伶(Wan-ling Liao) 查詢紙本館藏

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財務金融學系

論文名稱

盈餘管理與增發新股公司之營業績效：以中國上市公司為例
(Earnings management and the operating performance of seasoned equity offerings: evidence from Chinese listed firms)

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摘要(中)

本研究擬探討(1)中國增發新股公司之盈餘管理行為對營業績效之影響；(2)申請配股成功與增發成功公司在發行前後兩年之營業績效；(3)比較申請增發成功公司與被中國證監會拒絕之失敗公司，盈餘管理及發行後營業績效狀況是否有顯著差異，以瞭解管理當局監督市場能力為何。現有文獻缺少探討法規變革對增發公司之盈餘管理行為及其營業績效之影響，亦缺少檢視申請增發成功公司與配股公司，或與申請增發失敗公司之比較。因此，本研究擬補足既有文獻在此部份之不足。
　　本研究之樣本期間為2001至2004年，樣本公司涵蓋72家增發公司、158家配股公司及86家被中國證監會拒絕的公司。實證結果顯示，盈餘管理動機低的公司，其增發前盈餘管理行為與配對公司並無顯著差異，相反地，盈餘管理動機低的公司，其增發後營業績效顯著高於配對公司。此外，本研究發現增發公司在發行前後各兩年的營業績效皆比配股公司為佳。本研究亦發現增發公司與失敗公司在營業績效上並無顯著差異，顯示中國證監會尚未能完全發現上市公司於增發前之盈餘管理行為。

摘要(英)

The objective of this study is to examine whether the extent of earnings management of firms obtaining seasoned equity offerings varies with the profits from main operations. In addition, this study investigates whether firms successfully obtainging seasoned equity offerings approval may outperform rights offerings firms before and after issuing. This study further examine whether the extent of earnings management of firms successfully obtaining seasoned equity offerings approval and firms applying for but failing to receive the approval.
The sample period is from 2001 to 2004. The sample is comprised of 72 firms obtaining seasoned equity offerings, 158 firms obtaining rights offerings and 86 firms applying for but failing to obtain seasoned equity offerings approval. The empirical results indicate that the extent of earnings management devices for SEO firms with high profits from main operations is not significantly higher than that of matched firms. SEO firms with high profits from main operations outperform the matched firms prior to and subsequent to the issuance of seasoned equity offerings. Furthermore, SEOs firms outperform rights offerings firms subsequent to the offerings. Finally, the empirical results indicate that there is no significant difference of post-issuing performance between SEO firms and denied firms. It implies that the CSRC fail to thoroughly “see through” the managed quality of firms applying for SEOs.

關鍵字(中)

★ 盈餘管理
★ 增發
★ 配股
★ 營業績效
★ 應計項目
★ 關係人銷貨

關鍵字(英)

★ Seasoned equity offerings
★ Rights offerings
★ Related party sales
★ Operating performance
★ Discretionary accruals
★ Earnings management

論文目次

1. Motivation ........................................................................................................................ 1
2. Literature Reviews .......................................................................................................... 2
2.1 The development and regulation of seasoned equity offerings in China ................... 2
2.2 Earnings management and rights offerings/seasoned equity offerings ..................... 4
2.2.1 Incentives for earnings management ............................................................... 4
2.2.2 The impact of different earnigns management devices on firms performance ...................................................................................................... 4
3. Hypotheses ....................................................................................................................... 6
3.1 Earnings management and long-term performance of SEOs .................................... 7
3.2 Comparison of operating performance between SEOs and rights offerings firms .. 7
3.3 Comparison of earnings management and operating performance between approved firms and denied firms ............................................................................... 8
4. Research Model ............................................................................................................... 9
4.1 Data ............................................................................................................................ 9
4.2 Variables .................................................................................................................... 9
4.2.1 Earnings management devices ......................................................................... 9
4.2.2 Long-term operating performance .................................................................. 11
4.2.3 Core ROE ........................................................................................................ 11
4.3 Univariate Tests ........................................................................................................ 11
4.4 Multivariate Tests ..................................................................................................... 12
5. Empirical Results .......................................................................................................... 13
5.1 Sample Selection ...................................................................................................... 13
5.2 Descriptive Statistics ................................................................................................ 13
5.2.1 Firms’ characteristics between SEOs and matched firms .............................. 17
5.2.2 Firms’ characteristics between SEOs and rights offerings firms ................... 18
5.2.3 Firms’ characteristics between SEOs and denied firms ................................ 19
5.3 Empirical Results ..................................................................................................... 21
5.3.1 Analysis of earnings managemnt and operating performance of SEOs ........ 21
5.3.2 Comparison between SEOs firms and rights offerings firms ......................... 29
5.3.3 Comparison between SEOs firms and denied firms ....................................... 33
5.4 Robustness Tests ....................................................................................................... 39
5.4.1 Regression with two alternative variables: ROE and core ROE ................... 39
5.4.2 Comparison of post-performance between SEOs firms and matched firms classified by ARPS .......................................................................................... 39
6. Conclusions .................................................................................................................... 48
Reference ............................................................................................................................... 50

參考文獻

Reference
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指導教授

陳慧玲(Huei-ling Chen)

審核日期

2008-6-29

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