||We consider the effect of vertical relationship to the optimal import policy for the intra-industry countries. In this paper, we set up an intra-industry trade model which two firms import the input from a monopolist upstream at the third country and produce homogeneous final goods compete to each other. Hence, we solve the solution by three-stage game and compare the effects to optimal import policy under different market structure. In general, the import policy tools for a government are import tariff and import subsidy. Therefore, we find when vertical relationship does not exist, the optimal import policy under linear demand is import tariff. On the other hand, when vertical relationship exists, the optimal import policy for the large market size country is import tariff and for the small market size country depends on the relative market size of two countries. At last, we find the optimal tariff under horizontal relationship is larger than uniform pricing under vertical relationship than price discrimination under vertical relationship.|
||王光正與邱俊榮 (2004), 「垂直相關市場與最適出口貿易政策」,《經濟論文》, 32, (2), 363-389。|
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