家族集團之盈餘管理行為

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姓名

李易政(I-Cheng Li) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

家族集團之盈餘管理行為
(Earnings Management Behaviors of Taiwan Business Groups and the Families behind Them)

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摘要(中)

本研究將台灣上市上櫃公司之樣本觀察值區分為家族集團、非家族集團、家族非集團以及非家族非集團等四群子樣本，考量歐美國家與亞洲國家在擁有權結構與文化背景上的差異後，本研究主要研究問題為：1.家族企業與集團企業是否存在互動效果，如果有，此互動效果對於家族集團之盈餘管理行為之影響為何；2.管家理論相對於代理理論是否更能合理解釋台灣家族集團之盈餘管理行為。實證結果顯示家族企業與集團企業間的確具有互動效果，且家族集團相對於其他子樣本具有最少的動機來操弄公司盈餘，符合管家理論之推論結果。

摘要(英)

We classify the Taiwan listed firms in our sample into four sub-samples: family groupings, non-family groupings, family non-groupings, and non-family non-groupings after taking into account organizational and cultural differences between Eastern and Western countries so as to examine: 1. whether there are interaction effects between family businesses and business groups; 2. if the stewardship theory, compared with the agency theory, can better explain the earnings management behaviors in Taiwan. The results show that there are indeed interaction effects, and that family groupings have the weakest incentive to engage in earnings management, consistent with the stewardship theory.

關鍵字(中)

★ 盈餘管理
★ 家族企業
★ 集團企業
★ 家族集團
★ 管家理論

關鍵字(英)

★ earnings management
★ family business
★ business groups
★ family groupings
★ stewardship theory

論文目次

Content
摘要……………………………………………………………………….i
Abstract…………………………………………………………………..ii
Content…………………………………………………………………..iii
List of Figures…………………………………………………………...iv
List of Tables……………………………………………………………..v
1. Introduction………………………………………………………..…1
2. Literature Review and Hypotheses……………………………….….8
2.1 Business Groups V.S. Non-business Groups………………….…8
2.2 Family Business V.S. Non-family Business……………………11
2.3 Family Groupings Versus the Other Three Sub-samples……….16
3. Methodology………………………………………………………..21
3.1 Measuring Earnings Management……………………………...21
3.2 Empirical Method………………………………………………21
4. Sample Selection and Description………………………………….25
5. Empirical Results…………………………………………………...27
5.1 Business Groups versus Non-business Groups…………………27
5.2 Family Businesses versus Non-family businesses……………...30
5.3 Interaction between Family businesses and Business Group…..32
5.4 Robustness Test…………………………………………………37
6. Discussion and Conclusions………………………………………..40
References………………………………………………………………44
List of Figures
Figure 1………………………………………………………………….16
List of Tables
Table 1…………………………………………………………………..26
Table 2…………………………………………………………………..28
Table 3…………………………………………………………………..29
Table 4…………………………………………………………………..33
Table 5…………………………………………………………………..34

參考文獻

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指導教授

洪榮華(Jung-Hua Hung)

審核日期

2013-3-18

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