經理人之家族企業特性與過度自信對其舉債決策之影響

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：27

、訪客IP：3.128.226.125

姓名

王禹軒(Yu-hsuan Wang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

經理人之家族企業特性與過度自信對其舉債決策之影響
(Impact of Managers’ Family Business Characteristics and Overconfidence on Their Capital Structure Decision)

相關論文

★ 股權分置對中國上市公司現金股利發放之影響	★ 所有權結構與政治連結對股利政策之影響—以中國國有企業為例
★ 董監事最低持股成數規定之研究	★ 合格境外機構投資人制度對投資/現金流量敏感度之影響
★ 從股票價格區間探討股票買回活動之資訊內涵	★ 跨境上市對於企業負債比率的影響：以中國跨港上市公司為例
★ 家族集團之盈餘管理行為	★ 股權結構與投資效率:中國上市公司之多重大股東實證研究
★ 股權分置改革對中國上市公司現金持有的影響	★ 手機按鍵生命週期探討企業轉型之路
★ 制度改革對於關係人交易的影響	★ 伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與營運資金管理對公司價值影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例
★ 股利宣告對股價超常報酬的影響-以台灣集團與非集團上市公司為例	★ 公司規模、股價、益本比、淨值市價比與股票超常報酬關係之實證研究
★ 台灣股票上市公司營運資金管理相關議題之實證研究	★ 我國財務危機上市公司股權結構之探討

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

[檢視]

[下載]

本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

考量到經理人並非全然理性的狀況，本論文因此納入經理人「過度自信」（overconfidence）此一被廣泛採用的行為因素，以探討經理人之家族企業特性與過度自信傾向對其舉債決策的影響。本文以2001年至2007年間台灣上市櫃公司為樣本，並考量到內生性問題，而利用三階段最小平方法檢測：（1）家族企業與非家族企業經理人所選擇的負債水準是否有差異；（2）過度自信是否為影響負債水準之因子；（3）探討家族企業之經理人其家族企業特性是否會制約過度自信對其舉債行為的影響力；（4）本研究進一步將家族企業經理人分成由家族成員擔任與非家族成員擔任者，以釐清同樣在具有過度自信傾向的情況下，家族企業與非家族企業經理人舉債行為的差異是來自於家族企業的何種類型經理人。實證結果發現：（1）家族企業經理人相對於非家族企業者會選擇較高的負債水準，表示家族企業經理人傾向採用高舉債來維持控制權以及鞏固控制私有利益（private benefits of control）；（2）過度自信經理人相較於非過度自信者會選擇較高的負債水準，表示過度自信的經理人會由於高估其公司證券的價值，而認為該證券的價值被外部市場低估，融資成本過高，使過度自信的經理人在面臨資金需求時，會偏好發行價值被低估程度較小的債券而非權益；（3）相較於非家族企業具過度自信傾向的經理人，家族企業經理人若具過度自信傾向，在家族企業「風險趨避」特性的壓制下，反而會選擇較低的負債水準；（4）在同樣具有過度自信傾向的情況下，家族企業與非家族企業經理人舉債行為的差異是來自於家族企業具過度自信的家族成員經理人。

摘要(英)

Considering the fact that managers cannot be totally rational when it comes to decision-making, this paper incorporates one of the commonly used behavioral factors, overconfidence, and examines how family business characteristics and overconfidence affect their financial leverage. This research sample contains Taiwanese listed and OTC companies, and uses three stages least squares method to solve the endogeneity problem. This paper investigates whether financial leverage of family businesses is different from that of non-family businesses; whether managers’ overconfidence has a role to play in their capital structure decision; and whether the unique characteristics of family businesses would suppress the influence of managers’ overconfidence on financial leverage. Moreover, this research divides managers of family business into two groups, one is family CEOs and the other is non-family CEOs in order to find out the source of the difference of financial leverage between family and non-family businesses under the condition that managers are overconfident. The results support the hypothesis that family business managers tend to use more debt for maintaining the control right to the company and entrenching their private benefits of control. Second, overconfident managers prefer higher financial leverage than non-overconfident managers. Moreover, compared to overconfident non-family business managers, overconfident family business managers would use less debt under the suppression of family business’ “risk-averse” characteristics. Finally, under the condition that managers are overconfident, we find that the difference of financial leverage between family and non-family business comes from family business’ family CEO.

關鍵字(中)

★ 家族企業特性
★ 過度自信
★ 負債水準
★ 三階段最小平方法

關鍵字(英)

★ 3SLS
★ Financial Leverage
★ Overconfidence
★ Family Business Characteristics

論文目次

目錄
中文提要………………………………………………………………ii
英文提要………………………………………………………………iii
目錄……………………………………………………………………iv
表目錄…………………………………………………………………v
第壹章緒論……………………………………………………………1
第貳章文獻探討與研究假說…………………………………………5
第一節家族企業特性與經理人的舉債行為…………………………5
第二節經理人的過度自信與其舉債行為……………………………8
第三節家族企業特性與過度自信對經理人舉債行為的影響………10
第參章研究方法………………………………………………………13
第一節研究對象與資料來源…………………………………………13
第二節研究設計與變數定義…………………………………………14
3-2-1 實證方法………………………………………………………14
3-2-2 研究模型建立…………………………………………………15
3-2-3 PLS模型之主要變數………………………………………… 16
3-2-4 PLS模型之控制變數………………………………………… 17
3-2-5 3SLS模型 …………………………………………………… 20
第肆章實證結果分析…………………………………………………23
第一節敘述性統計分析………………………………………………23
第二節PLS複迴歸結果分析………………………………………… 29
第三節3SLS聯立方程式結果分析 ………………………………… 31
4-3-1假說1的實證結果………………………………………………31
4-3-2假說2的實證結果………………………………………………32
4-3-3假說3-1之實證結果……………………………………………32
4-3-4假說3-2之實證結果……………………………………………33
4-3-5其他控制變數的實證結果…………………………………… 33
第四節穩健性測試……………………………………………………38
4-4-1其他負債水準衡量方式……………………………………… 38
4-4-2其他過度自信衡量方式……………………………………… 39
第伍章結論……………………………………………………………42
附錄穩健性測詴之主式實證結果……………………………………45
參考文獻………………………………………………………………51

參考文獻

馬黛與李永全，「家族控制對負債融資決策的影響─以台灣為例」，台大管理論叢，民國九十七年，第十八卷第二期，133-170。
李永全與馬黛，「台灣家族公司負債融資成本之研究」，管理評論，民國九十五年，第二十五卷第三期，69-91。
黃旭輝、陳隆麒與謝劍平，「公司成長機會對經理人持股與董事會組成影響之研究」，中山管理評論，民國九十年，第九卷第一期，37-59。
洪榮華、陳香如與柯璟瑩，「從代理理論的角度探討董事會特性、股權結構與負債之關聯性」，管理與系統，民國九十四年，第十二卷第四期，33-53。
洪榮華、陳香如與林慧珍，「公司治理機制對創新、多角化策略及公司績效之影響－研發密集產業之實證」，中山管理評論，民國九十六年，第十五卷第一期，37-60。
洪榮華、李易政、陳香如與謝可杉，「家族企業特性與負債水準關係之研究」，商管科技季刊，民國九十八年，第二次修改。
許士軍，「家族主義、專業主義與創業-以華人企業為背景的探討」，管理評論，民國八十六年，第十六卷第一期，1-9。
周賓凰、池祥萱、周冠男與龔怡霖，「行為財務學：文獻回顧與展望」，證券市場發展季刊，民國九十一年，第十四卷第二期，1-48。
葉銀華，「家族控股集團、核心企業與報酬互動之研究-台灣與香港證券市場知比較」，管理評論，民國八十八年，第十八卷第二期，59-86。
葉銀華與邱顯比「資本結構、股權結構與公司價值關聯性之實證研究：代理成本理論」，臺大管理論叢，民國八十五年，第七卷第二期，57-90。
王元章與辜儀芳，「資本結構的選擇、融資與負債清償規模」，財務金融期刊，民國九十二年，第十一卷第三期，35-87。
Agrawal, A. and N. J. Nagarajan, 1990, “Corporate Capital Structure, Agency Costs, and Ownership Control: The Case of All-Equity Firms,” The Journal of Finance 45, 1325-1331.
Alicke, M., Klotz, M., Breitenbecher, D., and Yurak, T., 1995, “Personal Contact Individuation, and the Better-than-Average Effect,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 68(5), 804-825.
Almeida, H. V. and D. Wolfenzon, 2006, “A Theory of Pyramidal Ownership and Family Business Groups,” Journal of Finance 61, 2637-2680.
Alpert, Murray, and Howard Raiffa, 1982, A Progress Report on the Training of Probability Assessors, in Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky, ed. Judgement under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.
Anderson, R. C. and J. M. Bizjak, 2003, “An Empirical Examination of the Role of the CEO and the Compensation Committee in Structuring Executive Pay,” Journal of Banking and Finance 27, 1323-1348.
Anderson, R. C., S. A. Mansi, and D. M. Reeb, 2003, “Founding Family Ownership and the Agency Cost of Debt,” Journal of Financial Economics 68, 263-286.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler, 2002, “Market Timing and Capital Structure,” Journal of Finance 57(1), 1-32.
Bebchuk, L. A. and M. Kahan, 1990, “A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests,” California Law Review 78, 1071-1138.
Bebchuk, L., 1999a, “A Rent Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control,” Working Paper, Harvard University.
Bebchuk, L., 1999b, “The Evolution of Ownership Structure in Publicly Traded Companies,” Working Paper, Harvard University.
Ben-David, I., J. Graham, and C. Harvey, 2006, “Managerial Overconfidence and Corporate Policies,” Working Paper, Duke University, Durham.
Berger, P. G., E. Ofek, and D. L. Yermack, 1997, “Managerial Entrenchment and Capital Structure Decisions,” Journal of Finance 52, 1411-1438.
Bertrand, M., P. Metha, and S. Mullainathan, 2002, “Fretting out Tunneling: an Application to Indian Business Groups,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, 121-148.
Blumentritt, T. P., A. D. Keyt, and J. H. Astrachan, 2007, “Creating an Environment for Successful Nonfamily CEOs: An Exploratory Study of Good Principals,” Family Business Review 20(4), 321-335.
Campbell, J., 1996, “Understanding risk and return,” Journal of Political Economy 104, 298-345.
Casson, M., 1999, “The Economics of the Family Firms,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 47, 10-23.
Chen, C. R., and Steiner T. L., 1999, “Managerial Ownership and Agency Conflicts: A Nonlinear Simultaneous Equation Analysis of Managerial Ownership, Risk Taking, Debt Policy, and Dividend Policy,” Financial Review 34, 119-136.
Claessens, S., S. Djankov, J. P. H. Fan, and L. H. P. Lang, 2002, “Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholdings,” Journal of Finance 57, 2741-2771.
Claessens, S. and J. P. H. Fan, 2002, “Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey International,” Review of Finance 3, 71-103.
Davis, J. F., F. D. Schoorman, and L. Donaldson, 1997, “Toward a Stewardship Theory of Management,” Academy of Management Review 22(1), 20-47.
DeAngelo, H. and L. DeAngelo, 1985, “Managerial Ownership and Voting Rights: A Study of Public Corporations with Dual Classes of Common Ctock,” Journal of Financial Economics 14, 33-69.
DeAngelo, H., L. DeAngelo, and D. J. Skinner, 1996, “Reversal of Fortune: Dividends Signaling and the Disappearance of Sustained Earnings Growth,” Journal of Financial Economics 40, 223-241.
Debondt, W. F. M., and R. Thaler, 1985, “Dose the Stock Market Overreact?” Journal of Finance 40(3), 793-805.
Dittmar, A. K., 2000, “Why Do Firms Repurchase Stock?” Journal of Business 73, 331-355.
Driffield, N., V. Mahambare, and S. Pal, 2007, “How Does Ownership Structure Affect Capital Structure and Firm Value? Recent Evidence from East Asia,” Economics of Transition 15(3), 535-573.
Du, J. and Y. Dai, 2005, “Ultimate Corporate Ownershio Structures and Capital Structures: Evidence from East Asian Economies,” Corporate Governance 13, 60-71.
Ehrhardt O. and E. Nowak, 2001, “Private Benefits and Minority Shareholder Expropriation-Empirical Evidence from IPOs of German Family-Owned Firms,” CFS Working Paper.
Eisenhardt, K. M., 1989, “Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review,” Academy of Management Review 14, 57-74.
Ellul, A., L. Guntay, and U. Lel, 2007, “External Governance and Debt Agency Costs of Family Firms,” International Finance Discussion Papers, No. 908.
Fairchild, Richard, 2006, “The Effect of Managerial Overconfidence, Asymmetric Information, and Moral Hazard on Capital Structure Decisions,” Working Paper, University of Bath.
Fairchild, Richard, 2007, “Managerial Overconfidence, Agency Problems, Financing Decisions and Firm Performance,” Working Paper, University of Bath.
Fama, E and K. French, 2002, “Testing Trade-off and Pecking Order Predictions about Dividends and Debt,” Review of Financial Studies 15, 1-33.
Filbeck, G. and S. Lee, 2000, “Financial Management Techniques in Family Businesses,” Family Business Review 13(3), 201-216.
Forbes, D. P., 2005, “Are Some Entrepreneurs More Overconfident than Others,” Journal of Business Venturing 20(5), 623-640.
Frank, M. Z. and V. K. Goyal, 2007, “Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are Reliably Important?” Working Paper, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, USA.
Gervais, S., J. B. Heaton, and T Odean, 2003, “Overconfidence, Investment Policy, and Executive Stock Options,” Working Paper, Duke University.
Gilson, S., 1989, “Management Turnover and Financial Distress,” Journal of Financial Economics 25, 241-262.
Gomes-Mejia, L., Nunez-Nickel, M., and Guttierrez, I., 2001, “The Role of Family Ties in Agency Contracts,” Academy of Management Journal 44, 81-95.
Hackbarth, Dirk, forthcoming, “Managerial Traits and Capital Structure Decisions,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
Hair, J. F., R. E. Anderson Jr., R. L. Tatham, and W. C. Black, 1998, “Multivariate Data Analysis (fifth edition),” New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, Inc,.
Harijono, H., M. Ariff and G. Tanewski, 2004, “The Impact of Family Control of Firms on Leverage: Australian Evidence,” EFMA Basel Meeting Paper.
Harris, M. and A. Raviv, 1988, “Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and Majority Rules,” Journal of Financial Economics 20, 203-235.
Harvey, C. R., K. V. Lins, and A. H. Roper, 2004, “The Effect of Capital Structure when Expected Agency Costs are Extreme,” Journal of Financial Economics 74, 3-30.
Heaton, J. B., 2002, “Managerial Optimism and Corporate Finance,” Financial Management 31, 33-45.
Jensen, M. C. and W. H. Meckling, 1976, “Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360.
Jensen, M., 1986, “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers,” American Economic Review 76, 323-339.
Jensen, G. R., D. P. Solberg, and T. S. Zorn, 1992, “Simultaneous Determination of Insider Ownership, Debt, and Dividend Policies,” Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis 27, 247-262.
Kim, W. S. and E. H. Sorensen, 1986, “Evidence on the Impact of the Agency Costs of Debt on Corporate Debt Policy,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 21, 131-144.
Landier, A. and D. Thesmar, 2009, “Financial Contracting with Optimistic Entrepreneurs,” The Review of Financial Studies 22(1), 117-150.
Lang, H. P., R. M. Stulz, and R. A. Walkling, 1991, “A Test of the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis,” Journal of Financial Economics 29, 315-335.
Langer, E., 1975, “The Illusion of Control,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32, 311-328.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 1999, “Corporate Ownership around the World,” Journal of Finance 54, 471-518.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny, 2000, “Investor Protection and Corporate Governance,” Journal of Financial Economics 58, 3-27.
Lin, Y. H., S. Y. Hu, and M. S. Chen, 2005, “Managerial Optimism and Corporate Investment: Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 13, 523-546.
Lin, Y. H., S. Y. Hu, and M. S. Chen, 2008, “Testing Pecking Order Prediction from the Viewpoint of Managerial Optimism: Some Empirical Evidence from Taiwan,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 16, 160-181.
Lins, K., 2003, “Equity Ownership and Firm Value in Emerging Markets,” Journal of Financial Quantitative Analysis 38, 159-184.
Malmendier, U. and G. Tate, 2005, “CEO Overconfidence and Corporate Investment,” Journal of Finance 60, 2661-2700.
Malmendier, Ulrike, Geoffrey Tate, and Jun Yan, 2007, “Corporate Financial Policies with Overconfident Managers,” 8th Annual Texas Finance Festival, NBER Working Paper Series, UC Berkeley.
March, J. G. and Z. Shapira, 1987, “Managerial Perspectives on Risk and Risk Taking,” Management Science 33, 1404-1418.
McConaughy, D. L., 2000, “Family CEOs vs. Nonfamily CEOs in the Family-Controlled Firm: An Examination of the Level and Sensitivity of Pay to Performance,” Family Business Review 13, 121-131.
Mefteh, S. and B. Oliver, 2007, “Capital Structure Choice: The Influence of Confidence in France,” Paper Presented at the French Finance Association.
Miller, D. and I. Le Breton-Miller, 2003, “The Challenges and Advantages of Family Business,” Strategic Organization 1, 27-34.
Miller, M. and K. Rock, 1985, “Dividend Policy under Asymmetric Information,” Journal of Finance 40, 1031-1052.
Mishra, C.S. and D. L. McConaughy, 1999, “Founding Family Control and Capital Structure: The Risk of Loss of Control and the Aversion to Debt,” Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice 23, 53-64.
Myers, S. and N. Majluf, 1984, “Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions: When Firms Have Information that Investors Do Not Have,” Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221.
Ng, W. and J. Roberts, 2007, “Helping the Family: the Mediating Role of Outside Directors in Ethnic Chinese Family Firms,” Human Relations 60, 285-314.
Nofsinger, J., 2003, “Social Mood and Financial Economics,” Working Paper, Department of Finance, Washington State University.
Oliver, Barry R., 2005, “The Impact of Management Confidence on Capital Structure,” Working Paper, Australian National University.
Pearce II, J. A. and S. A. Zahra, 1992, “Board Composition from a Strategic Contingency Perspective,” Journal of Management Studies 29, 411-438.
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales, 1995, “What Do We Know About Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International Data,” Journal of Finance 50(5), 1421-1460.
Romano, Claudio A., George A. Tanewski, and Kosmas X. Smyrnios, 2000, “Capital Structure Decision Making: A Model for Family Business,” Journal of Business Venturing 16, 285-310.
Roll, R., 1986, “The Hubris Theory of Corporate Takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 197-216.
Schulze, W. S., M. H. Lubatkin, and R. N. Dino, 2002, “Altruism, Agency, and the Competitiveness of Family Firms,” Managerial and Decision Economics 23, 247-259.
Shefrin, H., 2000, “Beyond Greed and Fear: Understanding Behavioral Finance and the Psychology of Investing,” Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press.
Shleifer, A. and R.W. Vishny, 1997, “A Survey of Corporate Governance,” The Journal of Finance 52, 737-783.
Solomon, J. F., S. W. Lin, S. D. Norton, and A. Solomon, 2003, “Corporate Governance in Taiwan: Empirical Evidence from Taiwanese Company Directors,” Corporate Governance 11, 235-248.
Stulz, R. 1988, “Managerial Control of Voting Rights: Financing Policies and the Market for Corporate Control,” Journal of Financial Economics 20, 25-54.
Tan, W., and S. T. Fock, 2001, “Coping with Growth Transitions: The Case of Chinese Family Business in Singapore,” Family Business Review 14(2), 123-140.
Titman, S. and R. Wessels, 1988, “The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice,” Journal of Finance 43, 1-18.
Tsai, W. H., J. H. Hung, Y. C. Kuo, and L. Kuo, 2006, “CEO Tenure in Taiwanese Family and Nonfamily Firms: An Agency Theory Perspective,” Family Business Review 19(1), 11-28.
Weinstein, N. D., 1980, “Unrealistic Optimism about Future Life Events,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 39, 806-820.
Wiwattanakantang, Y., 1999, “An Empirical Study on the Determinants of the Capital Structure of Thai Firms,” Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 7, 371-403.
Yeh, Y. H., 2005, “Do Controlling Shareholders Enhance Corporate Value?” Corporate Governance 13, 313-325.
Yeh, Y. H. and T. Woidtke, 2005, “Commitment or Entrenchment? Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition,” Journal of Banking & Finance 29, 1857-1885.
Yeh, Y. H., T. S. Lee, and T. Woidtke, 2001, “Family Control and Corporate Governance: Evidence from Taiwan,” International Review of Finance 2, 21-48.
Zahra, S. A., 2005, “Entrepreneurship Risk Taking in Family Firms,” Family Business Review 18(1), 23-40.

指導教授

洪榮華、張力
(Jung-Hua Hung、Li Chang)

審核日期

2009-7-11

推文