1. 葉銀華、蘇裕惠、柯承恩、李冠德，2003，公司治理機制對於關係人交易的影響，證券市場發展季刊，15: 69-106。
1. Ajinkya, B., S. Bhojraj, and P. Sengupta. 2005. The Association between outside directors, institutional investors and the properties of management earnings fore-casts. Journal of Accounting Research 43(3): 343-376.
2. Anderson, R., and D. Reeb. 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm
performance: Evidence from the S&P 500. Journal of Finance 58(3): 1301-1328.
3. Ahmed, A. S., B. K. Billings, R. M. Morton, and M. Stanford-Harris. 2002. The role of accounting conservatism in mitigating bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy and in reducing debt costs. The Accounting Review 77 (4): 867-890.
4. Ahmed, A.S., and Duellman, S., 2007. Accounting conservatism and board of di-rector characteristics: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting and Econom-ics 43: 411-437
5. Ali, A., Chen, T.Y., and Radhakrishnan, S., 2007. Corporate Disclosures by Fami-ly Fims. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44: 238-286.
6. Ball, R., 2001. Infrastructure Requirements for an Economically Efficient System of Public Financial Reporting and Disclosure. Brookings-Wharton Papers on Fi-nancial Services: 127-182.
7. Basu, S. B. 1997. The conservatism principle and asymmetric timeliness of earn-ings. Journal of Accounting and Economics 24: 3-37.
8. Beaver, W. H., and S. G. Ryan. 2000. Biases and lags in book value and their ef-fects on the ability of the book-to-market ratio to predict book return on equity. Journal of Accounting Research 38 (1): 127-148.
9. Bhojraj, S., Sengupta, P., 2003. Effects of corporate governance on bond ratings and yields: the role of institutional investors and outside directors. Journal of Business 76: 455–476.
10. Bliss, j. H. 1924. Management through accounts. The Ronald Press Co., New York.
11. Botosan, C. 1997. Disclosure level and cost of equality capital. The Accounting Review 72(3): 323-350.
12. Chen, T., 2005. Executive compensation contracts of family firms. Working paper, University of Texas at Dallas.
13. Chen, Shuping., Chen, Xia., Cheng, Qiang., Hutton, Amy., 2008. Do family firms provide more or less voluntary disclosure? Journal of Accounting Research 46(3):
14. Christie, A., and J. Zimmerman, 1994. Efficient and Opportunistic Choices of Accounting Procedures: Corporate Control Contests. The Accounting Review 69: 539–66.
15. Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and Lang, L. H. P. 2000. The Separation of Ownership and Control in East Asian Corporation. Journal of Financial Economics 58:81-112.
16. Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and consequences. Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155–1177.
17. Fan, P. H., and T. J. Wong. 2002. Corporate ownership structure and the informa-tiveness of accounting earnings in East Asia. Journal of Accounting and Econom-ics 33(8): 401-425.
18. Fields, T.D., Lys, T.C., Vincent, L., 2001. Empirical Research on Accounting Choice. Journal of Accounting and Economics 31, 255-307.
19. Gilson R.J., Gordon. J., 2003. Controlling controlling shareholders. Working Pa-per # 228, Columbia Law School, The Center for Law and Economic Studies, New York.
20. Givoly, D., and C. Hayn. 2000. The changing time-series properties of earnings, cash flows and accruals: Has financial reporting become more conservative? Journal of Accounting and Economics 29 (3): 287-320.
21. Givoly, D., Hayn, C., Natarajan, A., 2007. Measuring reporting conservatism. The Accounting Review 82: 65–106.
22. Haw, I. M., B. B. Hu., L. S. Hwang., and W. Wu. 2004. Ultimate ownership, in-come management, and legal and extra-legal institutions. Journal of Accounting Research 42: 423-426.
23. Healy, P., Palepu. K., 2001. Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Ac-counting and Economics 31, 405-440.
24. Hermalin, B.E., Weisbach, M.S., 2003. Boards of directors as an endogenously determined institution: a survey of the economic literature. Economic Policy Re-view 9: 7–26.
25. James, H., 1999. Owner as a manager, extended horizons and the family firm. In-ternational Journal of Economics of Business 6: 41–56.
26. Jensen, M. C., W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305-360.
27. Jensen, M.C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit and failure of internal control systems. Journal of Finance 48: 831–880.
28. Kaeamanou, I., and N. Vafeas. 2005. The association between corporate boards, audit committees, and management earnings forecasts: An empirical analysis. Journal of Accounting Research 43(3): 453-486.
29. Kang, D.(1998). The impact of ownership type on performance in public corpora-tion: A study of the US textile industry 1983-1992. School working paper, Har-vard Business.
30. Klein, A., 2002a. Economic determinants of audit committee independence. The Accounting Review 77: 435–452.
31. Kwak, M., 2003. The advantages of family ownership. MIT Sloan Management Review (Winter), 12.
32. Lafond, R., and Roychowdhury., 2007. Managerial Ownership and Accounting Conservatism. Working Paper, MIT-Sloan School of Management.
33. LaFond, R., Watts, R.L., 2006. The information role of conservative financial statements. Working Paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
34. La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, and A. Shleifer. 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. Journal of Finance 54: 471-517.
35. Leuz, C., D. Nanda and P. D. Wysocki, 2003. Earnings Management and Investor Protection: An International Comparison. Journal of Financial Economics 69: 505–27.
36. Roychowdhury, S. and Watts, R. 2006. Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, Mar-ket-to-Book and Conservatism in Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics 44: 2-31.
37. Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny. 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 94: 461-488.
38. Skinner, D. 1994. Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news. Journal of Account-ing Research 32: 38-60.
39. Solomon, J. F., Lin, S. W., Norton S. D., & Solomon, A. (2003), Corporate Go-vernance in Taiwan: empirical evidence from Taiwanese company directors. Corporate Governance 11: 235-248.
40. Stein, J., 1989. Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate behavior. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 104(11): 655-669.
41. Villalonga, B., and R. Amit. 2006. How do family ownership, control, and man-agement affect firm value? Journal of Financial Economics 80: 85-417.
42. Wang, D. 2006. Founding family ownership and earnings quality. Journal of Ac-counting Research 44: 619-656.
43. Watts, R.L., 2003. Conservatism in accounting part I: explanations and implica-tions. Accounting Horizons 17: 207–221.
44. Watts, R.L. 2003b. Conservatism in accounting part II: Evidence and
research opportunities. Accounting Horizons: 287-301.
45. Watts, R.L., 2006. What has the invisible hand achieved. Working Paper, Massa-chusetts Institute of Technology.
46. Welker, M. 1995. Disclosure policy, information asymmetry and liquidity in equi-ty markets. Contemporary Accounting Research 11(2): 801-828.
47. Yeh, Y. H., Lee, T. S. and Woidtke, T. 2001. Family control and corporate gover-nance: Evidence from Taiwan. International Review of Finance 2:21-48.