博碩士論文 964208003 詳細資訊


姓名 湯哲維(Che-Wei Tang)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 財務金融學系
論文名稱 領導者或追隨者:被忽略公司分析師盈 餘預測行為之研究
(Following the Leader: A Study of Analysts’Initial Coverage on Firms )
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摘要(中) 本研究探討(1)能力佳與經驗多的領導分析師,是否有可能先於其他分析師追蹤被忽略公司,(2)能力佳與經驗多的領導分析師,是否有可能不會先於其他分析師追蹤很多分析師報導的公司,(3)市場對於具有不同能力或經驗分析師,開始追蹤被忽略公司與很多分析師報導的公司之股價反應是否有所不同。
實證結果顯示,能力佳的領導分析師可能不會先於其他分析師追蹤被忽略公司。同時,能力佳與經驗多的領導分析師可能不會先於其他分析師追蹤很多分析師報導的公司。市場對於不同能力或不同經驗領導分析師,開始追蹤被忽略的公司之股價反應並無顯著差異。此外,市場對於能力較高或經驗較多的分析師,開始追蹤很多分析師報導公司亦無顯著的正向反應。原因可能是因為很多分析師報導公司的攸關資訊大部分已經被其他的分析師所揭露,領導分析師開始追蹤報導所能帶來的價值與資訊效益不高,降低領導分析師追蹤公司的動機。
摘要(英) This paper examines whether a lead analyst with high ability and more experience will more likely to lead to follow a neglected firm. This paper also investigates whether a lead analyst with high ability and more experience will not likely to lead to follow a most covered firm. Third, we examine whether the market reacts positively to the initial coverage of lead analysts on firms.
The empirical results show that a lead analyst with more experience may not be more likely lead to follow a neglected firm. Meanwhile, a lead analyst with high ability and more experience may not be likely lead to follow a most covered firm. As to the market reaction, investors do not respond significantly positively to the initial reports issued by a high ability lead analyst or a more experienced lead analyst for a neglected firm. Similarly, investors do not react significantly positively to the initiation issued by a high ability or a more experienced lead analyst for a most covered firm. One possible is that the initial coverage may contain less information since other analysts may have already provided enough information for investors to make investment decisions.
關鍵字(中) ★ 市場反應
★ 分析師追蹤決策
★ 被忽略公司
★ 領導分析師
關鍵字(英) ★ Lead analysts
★ Most covered firms
★ Analysts’ coverage
★ Neglected firms
論文目次 1. Motivation ............................................................................................................. 1
2. Literature Reviews ............................................................................................... 2
2.1 Determinants of Analysts’ Following ............................................................... 2
2.2 Analysts’ Experience and Ability ...................................................................... 5
2.3 Lead and Follower ........................................................................................... 6
2.4 Analysts’ coverage and stock market reaction ................................................. 7
3. Hypotheses ............................................................................................................ 7
3.1 Analysts’ Characteristics and Their Add Coverage Decisions for Neglected
Firms ...................................................................................................................... 7
3.2 Analysts’ Characteristics and Their Add Coverage Decisions for Most
Covered Firms ........................................................................................................ 9
3.3 Analysts’ Initiations and Market Reaction ..................................................... 10
4. Research Model .................................................................................................. 11
4.1 Analysts’ characteristics and their add coverage decisions on
neglected firms ..................................................................................................... 11
4.2 Analysts’ characteristics and their add coverage decisions on most
covered firms ........................................................................................................ 16
4.3 Market Reactions and Analysts’ Coverage Add Decisions .................. 18
4.3 Data................................................................................................................ 20
5. Empirical Results ............................................................................................... 21
5.1 Sample Selection ............................................................................................ 21
5.2 Descriptive Statistics ...................................................................................... 21
5.3 Empirical Results ........................................................................................... 23
5.3.1 Univariate Tests .................................................................................. 23
5.3.2 Analysts’ Characteristics and Their Coverage Decisions on Neglected
Firms ............................................................................................................ 26
5.3.2 Analysts’ Characteristics and Their Coverage Decisions on Most
Covered Firms .............................................................................................. 34
5.3.3 Market Reaction to Analysts’ Initial Coverage on Neglected Firms .. 41
5.3.4 Market Reaction to Analysts’ Initial Coverage on Most covered Firms
...................................................................................................................... 41
6 Conclusion .......................................................................................................... 46
Reference .................................................................................................................... 48
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指導教授 高櫻芬、陳慧玲 審核日期 2009-6-26
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