偏見環境下的婚配市場

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林冠廷(Kuan-tin Lin) 查詢紙本館藏

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論文名稱

偏見環境下的婚配市場
(The Discrimination in Marriage Market)

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摘要(中)

自從Becker (1973) 的文章問世後, 許多學者投入研究婚配市場內的配對行為, 然
而卻鮮少有人研究異族通婚的問題, 我們從美國Current Population Survey(CPS
) 資料發現, 黑白婚配情況相當地稀少。本文採用Burdett and Coles (1995) 隨機
搜尋配對模型為基礎, 並應用Becker (1957) 對「偏見」等非貨幣誘因為外生的見
解, 推導出單向偏見、雙邊偏見以及共識偏見下婚配市場的均衡結果, 此三個理論
模型的結論均可有效解釋為何黑白婚配如此稀少, 單相偏見下, 我們發現優白人最
為強勢, 但不一定所有個體皆會模仿其決策; 雙邊偏見下, 在婚姻市場內占有較大
比例的人較有優勢; 共識偏見下, 會有人因偏見效果而被迫以單身姿態離開市場。

摘要(英)

There are many economists have researched in searching and matching in
marriage market since the work of Becker (1973) but there are a few economists
research in black-white intermarriage problem. We find that the black-white
intermarriage is quite low from the United States Current Population Survey(
CPS) data. This thesis uses random search and match model proposed
by Burdett and Coles (1995) and combine Becker (1957) ’s opinion that the
discrimination is exogenous with model to derive the equilibrium result of
single discrimination, two side discrimination and consential discrimination.
We conclude that our model can explain that why does the black-white intermarriage
be low. We find that the best people is the good type of white but
not all of people will follow the decision of the good type of white. People
who has larger proportion would have the predominance in two side discrimination
model. there are some people would be forced to leave the market
by single cause of discrimination effect in consential discrimination model.

關鍵字(中)

★ 偏見
★ 婚姻市場
★ 配對

關鍵字(英)

★ Marriage Market
★ Discrimination
★ Match

論文目次

1 緒論1
2 文獻回顧10
3 模型與均衡14
3.1 假設. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
3.2 婚配的決策與均衡. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3.2.1 無偏見. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2.2 單向偏見. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
3.2.3 雙邊偏見. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.2.4 共識偏見. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4 比較靜態分析和與文獻上的差異45
4.1 比較靜態分析. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.2 與Wong(2003b) 之比較. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
5 結論54
6 附錄55
6.1 Wong(2003b) 實證介紹. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

參考文獻

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of Chicago Press.
(1973), “A Theory of Marriage: Part I”, Journal of Political Economy,
81, 813–847.
(1981), A Treatise on the Family, The University of Chicago Press.
Burdett, Ken and Melvyn G. Coles (1995), Marriage, Matching and Dynamics,
University of Essex.
(1997), “Marriage and Class”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112,
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Fisman, Raymond, Sheena S. Iyengar, Emir Kamenica, and Itamar Simonson
(2006), “Gender Differences in Mate Selection: Evidence from a Speed
Dating Experiment”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121, 673–697.
Gale, D. and L. S. Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the Stability of
Marriage”, American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9–15.
Heer, David M. (1966), “Negro-White Marriage in the United States”, Journal
of Marriage and the Family, 28, 262–273.
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827.
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Liu, Haoming and Jingfeng Lu (2006), “Measuring the Degree of Assortative
Mating”, Economics Letters, 92, 317–322.
Lones, Smith (1995), Cross-Sectional Dynamics in a Two-Sided Matching
Model, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Moen, Espen R. (1997), “Competitive Search Equilibrium”, Journal of Political
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Mortensen, Dale T. and Randall Wright (2002), “Competitive Pricing and
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Wong, Linda Y. (2003a), “Structural Estimation of Matching Models”, Journal
of Labor Economics, 21, 699–727.
(2003b), “Why Do Only 5.5% of Black Men Marry White Women?”,
International Economic Review, 44, 803–826.
58

指導教授

鄭保志(Cheng P. C. Roger)

審核日期

2009-7-24

推文