家族持股對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性的影響

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姓名	魏町宇(TING-YU WEI) 查詢紙本館藏	畢業系所	企業管理學系
論文名稱	家族持股對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性的影響 (The Effects of The Family Firm on the Association Between CEO Compensation and Innovation.)
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摘要(中)	本研究以2005至2008之台灣上市櫃公司之電子產業為樣本，經由實證結果，股權較集中的家族企業，因股東與經理人之間的衝突相對較小之下，為其自身利益與降低承擔之風險，故較有意願與誘因去蒐集RD相關資訊，使股東與經理人之間的資訊不對稱問題減緩。且家族企業亦會因長遠眼光與永續經營之觀點，鼓勵高階經理人從事創新活動，以維繫於產業中的地位與競爭優勢。於此，運用薪酬獎勵制度與創新牽引一起的做法，皆獲得顯著的證據支持家族較非家族企業有誘因與動機從事創新活動，以維持企業生存。
摘要(英)	This research adapted listed electronic industries on Taiwan during 2005-2008 for an example to survey. Through empirical validations, applied salary reward constitution and creation migration approach could be reduced company risk and cooperation benefit, because there were less confliction between shareholder and manager. Therefore, it generated willing and incentive to collect RD related information, then reduced asymmetric information, which was between shareholder and manager. In a long term aspect, family-owned enterprise encouraged innovation activities to maintain the industrial status and competition advantage sustaining. Thus, there is significant evidence that there’s more incentive motivation in family than in non-family enterprise of innovation activities to support long term operation.
關鍵字(中)	★ 家族企業 ★ CEO薪酬 ★ 創新	關鍵字(英)	★ Innovation ★ CEO compensation ★ Family firm
論文目次	壹、緒論------------------------------------------1 貳、文獻探討--------------------------------------4 一、家族企業相關研究------------------------------4 二、薪酬與高階經理團隊相關研究------------------8 三、創新相關研究-------------------------------10 參、假說發展-------------------------------------13 肆、研究方法-------------------------------------14 一、研究期間與資料來源---------------------------14 二、 CEO薪酬、家族企業與創新的衡量----------------15 三、實證模型與變數定義---------------------------16 伍、實証結果分析---------------------------------20 一、敘述性統計-----------------------------------20 二、相關分析-------------------------------------21 三、家族企業對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性之影響----------21 陸、額外測試-------------------------------------24 一、家族企業CEO類型對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性之影響---24 二、家族企業股權偏離對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性之影響--27 三盈餘門檻之下家族企業對CEO薪酬與創新關聯性之影響---------------------------------------------------------29 柒、結論-----------------------------------------34 中文文獻英文文獻
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指導教授	魏町宇(ting-yu wei)	審核日期	2010-7-26
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