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姓名 劉誠剛(Cheng-kang Liu) 查詢紙本館藏 畢業系所 工業管理研究所 論文名稱 供應鏈中一製造商及兩競爭零售商之廣告策略
(Advertising strategies in one manufacturer and two competitive retailers supply chain)相關論文 檔案 [Endnote RIS 格式]
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摘要(中) 中文摘要
本篇研究在探討包含一製造商及兩競爭零售商之供應鏈的廣告策略及定價決策問題。假設製造商生產某一項產品藉由兩間互相競爭的零售商去販售,製造商會藉由品牌廣告以提升消費者的需求,而兩零售商亦會考量所面對的顧客群進行特定的廣告行為。消費者的需求除了受到零售商的零售價格影響之外,也受到製造商及兩零售商的廣告策略所影響;這兩間零售商會藉由廣告及定價策略相互競爭來極大化自己的利潤。我們提出了一個雙占模型,利用納許均衡 (Nash equilibrium) 來闡述兩零售商的競爭過程。
假設製造商在供應鏈中擁有較大的主導權而兩零售商只能隨著製造商所給定批發價格及品牌廣告來訂定決策;換句話說,兩零售商的最佳定價及廣告策略會隨著製造商所給的批發價格與廣告而不同,因此製造商會考量預期的兩零售商的競爭結果來制定對自己最有利的批發價格及廣告量。我們以製造商為領導者(leader)角色,兩零售商為跟隨者(follower)角色來架構一個Stackelberg 模型以分析討論三方最佳的定價及廣告策略。最後我們針對模型中各個參數進行敏感度分析。
摘要(英) Abstract
In this study, we discuss the pricing decisions and two–tier advertising strategies between one manufacturer and two competitive retailers in a supply chain. We assume the manufacturer produces one product and sells the goods through two competitive retailers. The manufacturer use brand advertising to increase customer’s interest and to increase the overall demand as the result. Retailers also utilize local advertising campaign to attract customers. Customer’s demand depends on the retail prices and advertisements by the manufacturer and two retailers. Two retailers compete with each other by pricing strategies and advertising strategies to maximize their individuals’ profits. We propose a duopoly model and use Nash equilibrium to elaborate two competitive retailers’ competition process.
We assume the manufacturer has bargain power in the supply chain, and two retailers make their decisions based on manufacturer’s wholesale price and brand advertising. In other words, retailers’ optimal decisions follow the manufacturer’s decision on wholesale price and brand advertising. The manufacturer expects retailers’ competition results to make his best decisions. We construct a Stackelberg model in which the manufacturer is a leader and two retailers are followers, and analyze three way optimal pricing strategies and advertising strategies. Furthermore, we study the sensitive analysis on the parameters.
關鍵字(中) ★ 雙頭壟斷寡占
★ 價格競爭
★ 廣告關鍵字(英) ★ advertising
★ price competition
★ duopoly論文目次 Table of Content
中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
Table of Content iii
List of Tables iv
List of Figures v
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and motivation 1
1.2 Research objectives 2
Chapter 2 Literature review 4
2.1 Advertising 4
2.2 Pricing with duopoly 5
2.3 Supply chain competition 6
2.4 The source of our demand function 7
Chapter 3 The model 8
3.1 Scenario setting 8
3.2 Demand function and notations 9
3.3 The competitive model 11
3.4 The manufacturer’s profit model 13
Chapter 4 Numerical analysis 14
4.1 The identical retailers 14
4.1.1 The local advertising and retail price of two identical retailers 14
4.1.2 The optimal decisions of manufacturer 17
4.2 The order quantity of retailer 18
4.3 The different market foundation of retailers 19
4.3.1 The local advertising and retail price of retailers 19
4.3.2 The retailers’ decisions given the wholesale price and brand advertising 20
4.3.3 The optimal decisions of manufacturer 21
4.4 The different local advertising effect of retailers 23
4.4.1 The local advertising and retail price of retailers 23
4.4.2 The retailers’ decisions given the wholesale price and brand advertising 24
4.4.3 The optimal decisions of manufacturer 26
4.5 The local advertising effect of retailers 28
4.5.1 The difference of advertising effect 28
4.5.2 The optimal decisions of manufacturer 29
Chapter 5 Conclusion 31
References 33
參考文獻 References
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5. Choi, S. C., (1991), “Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer,” Marketing Science, 10 (4), 271-296.
6. Dub’e, J. P., Hitch, G. J., & Manchanda, D., (2005), “An empirical model of advertising dynamics,” Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 3 (2), 107-144.
7. Huang, Z., and Li, S. X., (2001), “Co-op advertising models in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain: A game theory approach,” European Journal of Operational Research, 135 (3), 527-544.
8. Ingene, C. A., and Parry, M. E., (1995), “Channel coordination when retailers compete,” Marketing Science, 14 (4), 360-377.
9. Jorgensen, S., Sigue, S. P., & Zaccour, G., (2000), “Dynamic cooperative advertising in a channel,” Journal of Retailing, 76 (1), 71-92.
10. Jorgensen, S., and Zaccour, G., (2003), “Channel coordination over time: incentive equilibria and credibility,” Economic Dynamics and Control, 27 (5), 801-822.
11. Lin, K. Y., and Sibdari S. Y., (2009), “Dynamic price competition with discrete customer choices,” European Journal of Operational Research, 197 (3), 969-980.
12. Tsay, A. A., and Agrawal, N., (2000), “Channel dynamics under price and service competition,” Manufacturing& Service Operation Management, 43 (2), 137-155.
13. Vidale, M. L., and Wolfe, H. B., (1957), “An operations research study of sales response to advertising,” Operations Research, 5 (3), 370-381.
14. Zhang, J. L., Chen, J., & Lee, C. Y., (2007), “Joint optimization on pricing, promotion and inventory control with stochastic demand,” International Journal of Production Economics, 116 (2), 190-198.
15. Zhao, X., and Atkins, D. R., (2008), “Newsvendors under simultaneous price and inventory competition,” Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 10 (3), 539-546.
指導教授 曾富祥(Fu-shiang Tseng) 審核日期 2010-6-22 推文 plurk
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