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論文名稱 存在中間財市場下的跨國廠商進入模式選擇
(Optimal entry modes for MNE while host country exist intermediate good market)
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摘要(中) 摘要
本文建立一個三階段的賽局來討論存在中間財市場下的跨國廠商進入模式選擇。結果發現,當地主國存在獨占的中間財市場時,雖然跨國廠商採取直接進入下最終財市場的競爭程度會比跨國商採取併購下高,不過此時最終財廠商可以面對的中間財價格也較低。地主國中間財獨占廠商的利潤及消費者剩餘在跨國廠商採取直接進入時較高,但是不同進入模式對地主國最終財廠商利潤的影響效果不確定,以社會福利為考量的地主政府必須衡量此兩個效果的衝突,我們發現此時地主國政府會希望跨國廠商採取直接進入;至於跨國廠商的最適進入模式則視直接進入所需的固定成本高低而定。當跨國廠商的進入模式與地主國政府所希冀其所採取的進入模式相違背時,就形成政策干預的空間。
我們亦探討地主國中間財市場自由進出的情況,結果與中間財市場獨占時的結論大致相同。不同的是,當中間財市場自由進入時,兩種模式下中間財廠商對中間財的訂價皆較中間財市場獨占時低。此外,有別於中間財市場獨占時的情況,當中間財市場自由進入時,以社會福利為考量的地主國政府可能會希望跨國商採取併購。最後,我們發現若跨國廠商與地主國最終財廠商成本差距不大,則比起中間財市場自由進入的情況,中間財市場獨占時跨國廠商會更偏好採取併購。
摘要(英) Abstract
This article establishes three stages game to discuss optimal entry modes for MNE while host country exist intermediate good market. The MNE can enter the host’s final good market through direct entry or mergers & acquisition. We find that if host country exist monopoly intermediate good market, the competition degree of final good market is greater when MNE chooses direct entry. But, at this time, the final good firm may face low intermediate good price. In the host country, the profit of the monopoly firm in intermediate good market and the consumer surplus will be high when the MNE chooses direct entry. But, the effect of different entry modes on the firm in final good market is uncertain. Given this conflict, the host country government must measure which entry mode of MNE can bring higher domestic welfare. We discovered that, at this time, the host country government will hope MNE choosing direct entry. However, the optimal entry mode for MNE is depend on the volume of fixed cost while MNE choose direct entry. The clash, between the MNE’s optimal choice and the host government’s expectation, forms the space which policy maker can intervene.
We also discuss the case, which the host country’s intermediate good market is free entry for firm. The result is almost the identical as before. The difference is that, at this condition, the intermediate good price in both entry modes is lower than that intermediate good market is monopoly. In addition, if intermediate good market is free entry, the host country’s government may hope MNE choosing M&A. Finally, we discovered that, if the production cost is similar between the MNE and the host firm in final good market, compare to intermediate good market is free entry, the MNE may prefer to choose M&A when the intermediate good market is monopoly.
關鍵字(中) ★ 外人直接投資
★ 進入模式
★ 直接進入
★ 併購
★ 中間財市場
關鍵字(英) ★ intermediate good market
★ mode of entry
★ direct entry
★ greenfield investment
★ mergers &
★  acquisition
★ FDI
論文目次 目錄
第 1 章 緒論 1
1.1 研究動機與目的1
1.2 文獻回顧 3
1.3 文章架構 8
第 2 章 中間財市場獨占的情況 9
2.1 模型架構 9
2.2 跨國廠選擇併購 10
2.3 跨國廠商選擇直接進入 16
2.4 最適進入模式 21
第 3 章 中間財市場自由進入的情況 30
3.1 模型架構 30
3.2 跨國廠選擇併購及直接進入 30
3.3 最適進入模式 34
第 4 結論 43
參考文獻 45
附錄一 跨國廠商選擇併購及直接進入下地主國中間財獨占廠商的
利潤高低 48
附錄二 中間財市場獨占時,跨國廠商選擇併購及直接進入下地主
國福利的高低 48
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指導教授 邱俊榮、吳大任
(Jiunn-Rong Chiou、Dachrahn Wu)
審核日期 2010-7-26
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