執行長誘因獎酬，會計師特性：沙賓法案前後期

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姓名

林宜文(I-Wen Lin) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

執行長誘因獎酬，會計師特性：沙賓法案前後期
(CEO Incentive Pay, Auditor Attributes: Pre- and Post-Sarbanes-Oxley Periods)

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摘要(中)

本研究主要探討公司執行長誘因獎酬引起之代理問題與會計師選擇、非審計公費及審計意見之關聯。公司舞弊醜聞導致沙賓法案於2002年通過，並顯著改變審計行為，例如：增加獨立董事功能、加重會計師、董事與執行長法律責任，制定內部控制規範，特別是由於非審計服務會影響會計師獨立性，因而禁止提供特定非審計服務予審計客戶。故本研究以美國2000年至2006年所有上市公司為樣本，並分為沙賓法案前後期間測試法案對於會計師選擇、非審計公費及審計意見之影響。此外，過去研究亦發現當審計委員會成員與薪酬委員會成員重疊時，財務報導品質較佳。本研究發現當公司審計委員會與薪酬委員會無重疊情況時，執行長股票選擇權獎酬與選擇五/四大會計師呈正相關；而誘因獎酬與非審計公費之負向關係在沙賓法案後便不顯著，表示會計師在提供非審計服務時趨向保守；最後，會計師在簽發審計意見時會考量客戶之代理問題。歸納實證結果，審計委員會成員與薪酬委員會成員重疊、執行長誘因獎酬與法律責任改變會影響會計師選擇與會計師行為。

摘要(英)

In this study, we focus on the agency problem caused by CEO executive stock option and the choice of Big N auditors, non-audit fees and audit opinion. Corporate scandals result in the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 which significantly influence on auditing. SOX provisions expansion the role of the independent directors members, impose strict litigation liability on auditors, directors and officers, and requirements of internal control. Especially, SOX bans several non-audit services for audit clients because it is a threat to auditor independence. Therefore, we also partition the sample period to pre- and post-SOX periods to examine the SOX effect on auditor choice, non-audit fees, and audit opinions. The study uses a sample of U.S. public trading companies for the period 2000 to 2006. Prior researches suggest that when audit committee also sits on compensation committee, the financial reporting quality is better. We document that when firms without overlapping membership, CEO incentive pay is positive correlated with appointing of Big N auditors. Moreover, the positive effect of CEO incentive pay on non-audit fees is insignificant in the post-SOX period. Auditors become more conservative when providing non-audit services. Finally, we find that Big N auditors take their clients’ agency problems into consideration when making audit opinions decisions. To sum up, these results suggest that changes in overlapping, CEO incentive pay, and legal liability may have some effects on the selection of auditor and auditor behavior when a change is made.

關鍵字(中)

★ 會計師公費
★ 會計師選擇
★ 沙賓法案
★ 審計意見

關鍵字(英)

★ Sarbanes-Oxley Act
★ auditor choice
★ auditor fees
★ audit opinions

論文目次

1. Introduction 1
2. Measurement and Hypotheses 4
2.1 Compensation as a proxy for agency conflicts 4
2.2 Auditor Attributes 5
2.3 Overlapping 6
2.4 Hypotheses 7
2.4.1 Competing Views 7
2.4.2 Hypotheses of Auditor Choice 8
2.4.3 Hypotheses of Auditor Fee 9
2.4.4 Hypotheses of Audit Opinion 9
3. Research Methodology 10
3.1 Data and Measurement 10
3.1.1 Sample Selection 10
3.2 Method 12
3.2.1 Regression of Auditor Choice 12
3.2.2 Regression of Non-audit Fee 14
3.2.3 Regression of Audit Opinion 15
4. Empirical Results 17
4.1 Basic Statistics 17
4.2 Regression Results for Auditor Choice 20
4.3 Regression Results for Non-audit Fee 23
4.4 Regression Results for Audit Opinion 27
5. Conclusion 29
References31

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指導教授

盧佳琪(Chia-chi Lu)

審核日期

2010-6-17

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