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姓名 洪世昌(Shih-Chang Hung)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 產業經濟研究所在職專班
論文名稱 影響政府採購效率之實證研究—以某縣市政府為例
(The Determinants of Government Procurement Efficiency:Evidance from a County Government)
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摘要(中) 由於政府採購的預算係來自全民納稅,面對財政赤字屢創新高,稅收不斷流失,如何用最小的成本獲得最大的效用,是當前政府採購重要命題,而要如何讓成本極小化,關鍵便在於讓採購效率極大化,因此本文研究的重點正是針對如何提高政府採購效率而展開。政府採購法為規範現行採購運作之主要法律,該法案之立法有其時空背景,為求符合所需、發揮效用,自1999年實施後並曾歷經數次修正。細究我國政府採購法及其相關子法之條文內容,是否能促進落實政府採購市場透明化與效率化之目標?而以該法為中心所建構的選商機制是否確能促進競爭、降低交易成本?本文在現有文獻的基礎上,利用有關某縣市政府辦理採購的資料,探討預算金額是否公告、採購規模、採購類別、承攬廠商規模、採購方法、辦理採購機關等因素對政府採購效率的影響。
實證結果發現,採購制度越公開透明越能有助於降低採購成本或發包金額,例如預算金額是否事先公告、是否屬於競爭型標案。此外,若採購制度公開透明,從而吸引較多廠商參與競標,廠商在彼此相互競爭下,將可大幅降低採購決標金額,此可從競標廠商家數與採購預算節約率之間有顯著正向關係獲得佐證。在控制住採購規模的內生性,以該採購辦理的機關前二年採購總件數作為工具變數,本研究亦發現採購規模與預算節約率呈現正相關的情形,代表集中採購可減少行政作業程序,降低成本,可增加議價空間。
摘要(英) The government procurement budget mainly comes from the taxes paid by people. Due to the increasing financial deficit and decreasing tax collection, the main issue for the government is thus trying to minimize its cost while achieving the maximum efficiency.
The purpose of this study is to examine how to improve the government procurement efficiency. The Government Procurement Act of 1999 and its amendments are to regulate the process of government procurement. By observing the detail articles of the Government Procurement Act, we discuss the issue on whether the implementation of the Act will achieve the goal of improving market transparency and procurement efficiency; also, whether the mechanism established by the Act will fulfill the object of fair competition and reducing the transaction cost.
Based on the extant literature, this research uses the data from one county government to examine the influence of several factors on government procurement efficiency in Taiwan.The factor we study disclosure of the budget, budget, type of procurement, company sizes, method of procurement, and procurement agencies.
The empirical results suggest that the more open and transparent the procurement system is, the lower the procurement cost it results. It implies that the openness of the amount of budget and the competitive bidding would reduce the procurement cost. In addition ,the number of companies participating in the bidding is shown to be negative related to the procurement cost. That is, if the procurement system is open and transparent, they will attract more companies to participate in the bidding process. Thus, under the highly competitive situation, the procurement cost would be dramatically reduced.After controlling the endogenity of budget, we find that the budget is positively correlated with the reduction of procurement cost, implying that adopting a centralized purchasing system will reduce the administrative process. This in turn reduces the transaction cost and increased the bargaining power of the government.
關鍵字(中) ★ 採購成本
★ 採購效率
★ 政府採購
關鍵字(英) ★ government procurement
★ procurement efficiency
★ pr
論文目次 摘要 iii
Abstract iv
誌謝 v
第一章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機與目的 1
第二節 研究架構 3
第二章 政府採購法令規定與實務現況 6
第一節 政府採購法簡介 6
一、採購類別與採購金額 6
二、招標方式 7
三、決標方式 8
四、公告及等標期 8
五、廠商家數 9
六、預算金額、底價金額、決標金額 10
七、其他 10
第二節 採購實務現況分析 11
一、採購招標方式分析 12
二、採購類別分析 12
三、採購部門分析 13
第三章 文獻回顧 24
第一節 政府採購制度的功能 24
第二節 政府採購的選商機制 25
第三節 政府採購的競爭門檻 26
一、採購金額 26
二、投標廠商資格與履約能力 27
第四節 影響採購決標金額、標比的因素 28
第四章 實證模型與研究方法 33
第一節 資料來源與變數說明 33
一、應變數(dependent variable) : 33
二、解釋變數(independent variable): 33
第二節 估計方法 35
一、兩階段最小平方法(Two Stage Least Squares) 36
二、內生性檢定(endogeneity test) 36
第三節 實證模型設定與檢定 37
一、兩階段最小平方法(2SLS)估計步驟: 39
二、內生性檢定: 40
三、模型中解釋變數的符號預期 40
第五章 實證結果與討論 42
第一節 基本統計分析 42
第二節 實證結果 48
一、影響採購決標金額迴歸模型 48
二、影響採購預算節約率迴歸模型 56
第六章 結論與研究限制 71
第一節 研究結論 71
一、結論 71
二、政策建議 72
第二節 研究限制與未來研究方向 73
參考文獻 76
參考文獻 參考文獻
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指導教授 鄒孟文(Men-Wen Tsou) 審核日期 2010-7-22
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