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姓名 黃歆詒(Julia Hsin-Yi Huang) 查詢紙本館藏 畢業系所 經濟學系 論文名稱
(Three Essays of Labor Market Institutions)相關論文 檔案 [Endnote RIS 格式]
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摘要(中) 勞動市場制度在文獻中，主要被分為四個面向，一、失業補助 二、工會力量 三、就業法規四、稅楔。理論上來說，勞動市場制度對於勞動市場是一種致使勞動需求跟供給無法達到均衡的干擾。舉例來說，過度嚴謹的勞動市場制度將會造成勞動市場僵固性，並無視於勞動市場上是否有超額供給的現象，造成薪資的上漲壓力，而且寬鬆的失業給付將阻礙失業者尋求新工作職缺。更甚者，龐大的勞動制度福利支出，將會提高勞動成本，造成國家財政支出負擔，削弱生產力，提高失業率。
為探討勞動市場制度對經濟的衝擊，此研究的第一篇子研究重點在於重新檢視勞動市場制度對於失業率的影響。我們使用向量自我迴歸模型，並使用長期追蹤資料，樣本國家主要為歐洲十五個國家。我們發現，勞動市場制度與失業率在歐洲存在雙向的因果關係。亦即當失業率於當期升高時，政府將會於下期向下調整勞動市場制度(寬鬆化)，當這個向下調整過後的勞動市場制度執行後，將會使得下期失業率降低。擁有此一雙向因果關係，即擁有可以解決失業率問題的市場機制。然而，當我們將歐洲國家按照其勞動市場制度在1980年代以及1990年代的改革方向，來區分為有效改革組以及少數改革組時，我們發現有效改革組擁有雙向因果關係，但少數改革組卻沒有這樣的機制。最後經由實證結果發現勞動市場制度裡的ALMP為主要造成此兩個組別，有無雙向因果關係的主要原因。
在探討完歐洲的議題之後，我們把焦點返回亞洲地區。第二篇子研究在於探討勞動市場制度對於經濟績效以及經濟成長的衝擊，樣本為亞洲四小龍。我們發現勞動市場僵固性的逐年提高將會降低產出以及經濟成長，主要原因為勞動成本提高，降低投資、最適產出以及資本累積。另方面，我們由實證結果發現，提高國際貿易自由度將會減低勞動市場制度提高對於經濟的衝擊，主要是因為國際貿易自由度提高將會提高勞動需求彈性，藉此將會直接平衡工會力量(勞動市場僵固性)；國際貿易自由度提高也會使得產出增加，近而平衡勞動成本提高的財務壓力。因此，不需要削減勞動市場制度也可以不影響產出的解套辦法即是提高國家競爭力，開放國際貿易自由度。
第三篇子研究著眼於勞動市場制度之於台灣的影響。在勞動市場制度逐漸嚴謹，勞動市場僵固性逐年升高的情勢之下，此研究著眼於估算台灣的勞動需求彈性。文獻中對於估算勞動需求彈性的議題，不計其數，但是卻只有極少數估算台灣地區的勞動需求彈性。並且在這些文獻之中，他們忽略了勞動市場制度這個重要變數，僅少數的文獻將勞動市場制度加入函數中，但卻在估算勞動需求函數時，將薪資假設為外生的。事實上使用高層級(產業或國家層級)的樣本中，這樣的假設並不適當，因為薪資在這些層級中是內生決定而非外生給定，這將嚴重影響估算結果。此外，我們認為勞動市場制度也具有內生性，主要是來自於勞動市場制度變數與薪資有連動關係，所以估計勞動需求函數時，勞動市場制度的內生性也必須考慮進去。此研究使用兩階段估計法。實證結果發現若未考慮薪資以及勞動市場制度的內生性，將會低估勞動需求彈性。並且發現台灣勞動需求彈性相較於國外文獻來的高許多，可見台灣勞動市場需求彈性較高，勞工談判力量較低，對於勞工的剝削也較高，這也可以用來解釋何以近十年台灣薪資成長停滯以及失業率節節升高的現象。摘要(英) Labor market institutions (LMI hereafter) mainly refers to policies such as unemployment insurance, employment protection legislation, union density, taxwedge (gap between nominal and take-home payment), active labor market program and wage bargaining coordination. Theoretically, labor market rigidity is an intervention that puts pressures on the labor market. For instance, stricter LMI exert upward pressure on wages in spite of excess labor supply in the labor market, and slow down unemployed job-matching, which hinders the adjustment of labor demand and supply towards the equilibrium. Furthermore, inadequate LMI pushing up labor costs could even burden the finances of a country, cripples the inflows and outflows of the labor market, further deteriorates unemployment problems, and slows productivity , ultimately hence deminishing, the output and economic growth.
Labor market institutions turn to labor market rigidity by the following channels. A Generous unemployment benefits discourages job search and extends the duration of unemployed while strict employment protection legislation raises the hiring and firing costs that undermines employers’ incentive to create new jobs. Moreover, higher union power may give workers more bargaining power over wage determination, however, if the wage is not able to match productivity, firms would determine employment in accordance with their profits. Taxwedge is the gap between take-home pay and nominal wage. Thus, the larger the gap is, the lower the workers’ incentive to participate in the job market.
Chapter 3 revisits the connection between LMI and the unemployment rate in Europe. This paper examines the dynamic relationship between labor market rigidities and the unemployment problem in Europe between 1985 and 2007, and also explores the specific labor market institutions that might deteriorate unemployment problem. We employed country-level panel data, and applied the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model as our methodology which has the advantage of investigating the causal relationships among variables. The empirical results provide evidence of a causal relationship between labor market rigidities and the unemployment rate in European countries. The essential element determining whether a country has been successful or has failed in resolving the unemployment problem in the 1990s is the existence of causality between labor market rigidity and the unemployment rate. What contributes to the existence of the causal relationship is the design of the labor market reforms, particularly the design of active labor market program.
With the increments of labor market institutions, the potential problem caused by labor market rigidity is emerging within the four Asian tigers, namely, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan. Chapter 4 emphasizes the impact of labor market rigidity on economic performance in the four Asian tigers over the 1980-2010 period. Through the estimation of the aggregate production function, we find that labor market rigidity has a negative impact on output and economic growth. On the other hand, without imposing any labor market institutional adjustment that would lower the standard of labor conditions, the rises in country’s competitiveness can serve as a balancing force to mitigate the negative impacts of labor market rigidity. A crucial insight for policymakers is to determine the most efficient method for giving labor effective protection without hurting economic performance.
Chapter 5 investigates the impact of LMI on labor demand elasticity in Taiwan, where the non-wage cost (NWC) has presented a persistent upward trend. This study proposes a two-step estimation. In the first step we consider the NWC effect on wage determination and predict the wage rate. In the second step labor demand elasticity is estimated with the predicted wage rate included as one regressor. Empirically, this study found that the labor demand elasticity would be over-estimated if non-wage cost and its endogeneity were excluded from the estimation. Second, the non-wage wage cost tradeoffs indicates that the increase in the NWC would slow down the wage growth. Third, a crucial finding is that the labor demand elasticity is much higher in Taiwan than indicated in past studies when testing over a longer timeframe and for firms with higher foreign exposure. As such, the adverse effects of higher wage elasticity, the erosion of workers’ bargaining power over output share, and the NWC burden sharing would damage the Taiwan labor market. Given the higher labor-demand elasticity and the growing NWC, this paper explores the reasons why the economy developed while wages stagnated and the unemployment rate deteriorated over the past two decades in Taiwan.關鍵字(中) ★ 勞動市場制度
★ 經濟成長
★ 勞動需求彈性關鍵字(英) ★ labor market institutions
★ economic growth
★ labor-demand elasticity論文目次 Contents
Chapter 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 Background ............................................................................................................ 1
1.2 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 3
Chapter 2 ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Some Useful Datasets of Labor Market Institutions.................................................................... 5
Reference ..................................................................................................................... 9
Chapter 3 The Effects of Labor Market Rigidity and Reforms on European Unemployment .. 11
3.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 11
3.2 Literature Review ................................................................................................ 14
3.3 The Data ............................................................................................................... 17
3.4 Empirical Methodology and Strategies ................................................................ 18
3.4.1 Methodology ............................................................................................. 18
3.4.2 Empirical Strategies .................................................................................. 20
3.5 Empirical Results ................................................................................................. 21
3.5.1. Full sample ............................................................................................... 21
3.5.2 Effective-reform versus Minor-reform case ............................................. 23
3.5.3 Counter-Factual Analysis .......................................................................... 25
3.6 Discussion of Empirical Results .......................................................................... 26
3.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 26
Appendix .................................................................................................................... 35
Reference ................................................................................................................... 37
Chapter 4 The effect of Labor Market Rigidity on Economic Performance: Evidence from the
Four Asian Tigers ....................................................................................................................... 41
4.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 41
4.2 Background and Related Literature ..................................................................... 45
4.2.1 Background ............................................................................................... 45
4.2.2 Literature Review ..................................................................................... 47
4.3 Data and Methodology ........................................................................................ 50
4.4 Empirical Analysis ............................................................................................... 53
4.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 57
Reference ................................................................................................................... 59
Appendix .................................................................................................................... 66
Chapter 5 Labor-Demand Elasticity in Taiwan: A Consideration of Labor Market Institutions
................................................................................................................................................... 68
5.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 68
5.2 Background and Related Literature ..................................................................... 73
5.2.1 Taiwan Labor Market Policy Background ................................................ 73
VII
5.2.2 Related Literature ..................................................................................... 76
5.3 Theoretical Background ....................................................................................... 78
5.4 Estimation Issue and Data ................................................................................... 80
5.4.1 Empirical Specification ......................................................................... 80
5.4.2 Methodology and Data ......................................................................... 82
5.5 Empirical Analysis ............................................................................................... 85
5.5.1 The Overall Sample .................................................................................. 85
5.5.2 Robustness Test ......................................................................................... 86
5.6 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 89
Reference ................................................................................................................... 92
List of Tables
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics of variables used in the unemployment regressions, 1970-2003
................................................................................................................................................... 28
Table 3.2 Full Sample ................................................................................................................ 29
Table 3.3 Effective-Reform Group Across time ........................................................................ 30
Table 3.4 Minor-Reform Group Across time ............................................................................. 31
Table 3.5 Counter-Factual Analysis: Replacing LMI of Minor-reform Group by data from UK
................................................................................................................................................... 32
Table 3.6 Unemployment Rate of Effective-reform and Minor-Reform Countries in the 1990s
................................................................................................................................................... 34
Table A 3.1 Criterion of Effective-reform and Minor-reform Countries ................................... 35
Table A 3.2 Counterfactual Analysis.......................................................................................... 36
Table 4.1 NWC% and GDP per capita growth five-year average ............................................. 62
Table 4.2 Non-Wage Cost % and Output for Individual Countries ........................................... 63
Table 4.3 Non-Wage Cost % and Output for the Aggregate Sample ......................................... 64
Table 4.4 Non-Wage Cost % and Economic Growth for the Aggregate Sample ...................... 65
Table A 4.1 Descriptive Statistics .............................................................................................. 66
Table 5.1 Two Step Estimation for Model 1 .............................................................................. 96
Table 5.2 Second Step Estimation Results for Model 1 to Model 3 as p is exogenous ............. 97
Table 5.3 Two Step Estimation Result for Model 4 as p is Endogenously Determined ............ 98
Table 5.4 Robustness Check- 2nd Step for Groups ................................................................... 100
Table 5.5 Test on the Endogeneity of NWC ............................................................................ 102
Table A 5.1 ............................................................................................................................... 104
List of Figures
Figure 3.1 Average Unemployment Rate and LMRI of Fifteen European countries ................ 33
Figure 3.2 Real and Fitted Value of Unemployment Rate ......................................................... 33
Figure 4.1 Non-Wage Cost as Percentage of Total Compensation Cost (NWC%) in Hong Kong,
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan .................................................................................................... 62
Figure 5.1 Non-Wage Cost for the Four Asian Tiger ................................................................. 95
Figure 5.2 Unemployment rate, Real Wage and GDP Growth of Taiwan ................................. 95參考文獻 Reference
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