博碩士論文 984207004 詳細資訊


姓名 郭銘偉(Ming-Wei Kuo)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 人力資源管理研究所
論文名稱 高階經理人薪酬結構與公司績效之關聯
(The relationship between top management compensation and firm performance)
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摘要(中) 本研究將薪酬結構主要分成薪酬水準與薪酬差距兩大特徵,以代理理論及競賽理論的觀點為基礎探討高階經理人薪酬結構與公司績效之關連。
  過去國內的公開資料經理人股票酬勞的揭露非常缺乏,因此只能以較易獲得的高階經理人基本薪資與現金紅利等資料來進行分析。本研究與過去國內其他研究最大的相異處為加入高階經理人股票分紅,以更完整的薪酬組合資料分析台灣上市上櫃電子業公司高階經理人薪酬與公司績效之間的關聯。資料來源主要取自台灣經濟新報資料庫及公開資訊觀測站,以台灣上市上櫃電子業公司2007年至2009年財報資料為研究對象,包含了橫斷面與時間序列的資料整理。
  研究結果顯示公司高階經理人前期的薪酬水準、激勵薪占本薪比率、分紅占總員工分紅比率及高階經理人與其他員工前期的薪酬差距,對於公司績效皆具有顯著的正相關,此結果不但證實了代理理論的觀點,應將高階經理人薪酬與其績效緊密結合,更說明了股票分紅在高階經理人薪酬中所扮演的重要角色。此外,也證實了競賽理論的觀點,當高階經理人領取較多的現金與股票分紅,將能誘使公司其他員工為了獲取更高的報酬,晉升至更高的階級,而投入最大的努力。本研究期望能給予公司在思考調整薪酬結構時,提供一參考的方向。
摘要(英) The purpose of the study is to discuss the relationship between top management compensation and firm performance based on the agency theory and the tournament theory.
  The variables of top management compensation and firm performance variables are collected from Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) during 2007 to 2009, which is based on the secondary data of listed high tech companies in Taiwan. Results indicate that the top management compensation level, motivation compensation ratio, profit sharing for the top management team, and the wage differential between top management and employees have a significantly positive effect on firm performance.
  According to the agency theory and the tournament theory, they provided criterions for how to decide wage structures can increase firm performance. Based on our results, we suggest firms should give their top management team more compensation by various kinds and decide an appropriate wage structure for their firm. An appropriate wage structure not only can retain the top management team but also can motivate firm’s key talents to promote their performance hard in the sequential tournaments.
關鍵字(中) ★ 薪酬差距
★ 高階經理人薪酬結構
★ 公司績效
★ 股票分紅
關鍵字(英) ★ wage differential
★ wage structure
★ firm performance
★ top management team
★ top management compensation
論文目次 中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
目錄 iii
圖目錄 v
表目錄 v
第壹章 緒論 1
第一節 研究動機 1
第二節 研究目的 4
第貳章 文獻探討 6
第一節 代理理論 6
第二節 高階經理人薪資結構 8
第三節 高階薪酬與公司績效之關聯性 10
第參章 研究方法 28
第一節 研究架構 28
第二節 樣本資料 28
第三節 實證分析模型與變數定義 30
第肆章 研究結果 37
第一節 敘述性統計分析 37
第二節 迴歸分析 39
第伍章 結論與建議 48
第一節 研究發現與討論 48
第二節 管理意涵 50
第三節 研究限制與未來研究方向 52
參考文獻 54
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指導教授 劉念琪(Nien-Chi Liu) 審核日期 2011-7-11
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