制度改革對於關係人交易的影響

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姓名

王文聖(Wen-sheng Wang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

制度改革對於關係人交易的影響
(The Impacts of the Institutional Reform on Related Party Transactions)

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摘要(中)

本研究檢測制度改革如何影響企業的利益輸送行為。研究樣本選取2003年至2013年的中國上市企業。研究結果指出，制度改革有效抑制中國上市企業從事自利行為的交易，而這個效果在非國有企業中特別明顯。此外，無論非國有企業的控制股東是境內法人或是境外法人，利益輸送的行為均被有效地抑制。進一步的證據顯示，境內法人所控制的企業，不論是面對較佳或較差的公司治理機制，均顯著降低利益輸送的行為；反之，境外法人所控制的企業，在企業存在多重大股東時、其他大股東能夠與控制股東抗衡時以及位於發展良好或落後的區域時，會顯著降低利益輸送的行為。本研究對於政策制定者具有管理意涵。

摘要(英)

This study investigates the impacts of the institutional reform on firms’ tunneling behavior. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2013, we find that the institutional reform restrains listed firms from conducting self-dealing transactions and this effect is much stronger in non-SOEs. Moreover whether the controlling shareholder of non-SOEs is the domestic legal person or the foreign legal person, the tunneling behavior is significantly reduced. Further evidence shows that firms controlled by the domestic legal persons decrease the tunneling behavior whether they are under good governance mechanisms or not; while firms controlled by the foreign legal persons decrease their tunneling behavior in firms with multiple large shareholders, higher contestability and both well-developed and under-developed regions. Our results have some implications for policy makers.

關鍵字(中)

★ 制度改革
★ 關係人交易
★ 公司治理
★ 利益輸送

關鍵字(英)

★ institutional reform
★ related party transactions
★ corporate governance
★ tunneling

論文目次

Table of Contents
Chinese Abstract…………………………………………………………….….i
English Abstract…………………………………………………………….….ii
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………...iii
List of Tables……………………………………………………………….….iv
1. Introduction………………………………………………………..……..…1
2. Hypotheses development…………………………….……………………...3
2.1 Impacts of the institutional reform on tunneling…………………........3
2.2 Impacts of the institutional reform on tunneling in different types of firms’ controlling entities………………………………………………….……..4
3. Sample and data…………………………………………………………....6
3.1 Sample description…………………………………………………....6
4. Results………………………………………………………………….......8
4.1 Univariate analysis…………………………………………………....8
4.2 Multivariate analysis……………………………………………........11
4.3 Additional tests………………………………………………………11
5. Conclusions…………………………………………………………….....16
References.……………………………………………………………….......17

List of Tables
Table 1 Descriptive statistics…………………………………………………….7
Table 2 Univariate analysis……………………………………………………....9
Table 3 Institutional reform, the controlling ownership and firms’ tunneling behavior…………………………………………………………………………10
Table 4 Institutional reform, corporate governance mechanisms and firms’ tunneling behavior………………………………………………………………14

參考文獻

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﹝8﹞Ma, L., Ma, S., and Tian, G. (2013). Political connections, founder-managers, and their impact on tunneling in China′s listed ﬁrms. Paciﬁc-Basin Finance Journal 24, 312–339.
﹝9﹞Tsai, H.F., Lin, T.J., and Hung, J.H. (2015). The effects of the split share structure reform on Chinese listed firms’ leverage decisions. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 57, 86-100.
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指導教授

洪榮華(Jung-hua Hung)

審核日期

2016-1-7

推文