董事會智慧資本、獨立性與企業績效

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姓名

吳艾琳(Ai-lin Wu) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

人力資源管理研究所

論文名稱

董事會智慧資本、獨立性與企業績效
(Board Intellectual Capital, Board Independence, and Corporate Performance)

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摘要(中)

台灣政府與企業相較於歐美國家，在公司治理領域仍處於學習和模仿的階段，本研究藉由以2010年底資產總額達一百五十億台幣以上的台灣上市公司作為研究樣本，根據台灣各企業公開年報，提出了五項董事會智慧資本變數: 性別、任期、持股比率、教育背景(包含學歷地區、教育程度、經驗與背景)及在外兼職數，並增加董事會獨立性做為本研究之調節變數，藉由樣本迴歸分析探討台灣企業董事會智慧資本之組成和企業績效以及董事會獨立性三者之關聯性。
本研究利用迴歸分析針對提出之兩項假說進行驗證，分別是：
假說一：董事會智慧資本組成豐富性之提升，有助於提升企業績效。
假說二：當董事會傾向於監督控制功能時，董事會獨立性對於董事會智慧資本和企業績效間之關係具有正向之調節效果；當董事會傾向於資源提供功能時，董事會獨立性對於董事會智慧資本和企業績效間之關係具有負向之調節效果。
而研究結果顯示，假說一是獲得驗證的，也就是董事會智慧資本之組成豐富性越高時，的確對於企業績效有正向之相關連結性；而在假說二之部分，則發現台灣企業董事會是傾向於資源提供功能的，因此董事會獨立性將會對於董事會智慧資本與企業績效間之關係產生負向之影響。

摘要(英)

Compared to western countries, Taiwan governor and corporates are still in the beginning in corporate governance area, so we gathered all Taiwan companies that total assets above $15 billion NTD in 2012 to be our sources. We have five variables: sex, tenure, shareholding ratio, educational background and busy level, and use board independence to be the moderator. Our research wants to discuss the relationship among board intellectual capital, board independence, and corporate performance.
We use regression analysis to receive the outcome, and our research has two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Board intellectual capital and corporate performance have a positive correlation.
Hypothesis 2: When board tends to control and supervise, board independence has a positive effect in the relationship between board intellectual capital and corporate performance; when board tends to provide resources to company, board independence has a negative effect in the relationship between board intellectual capital and corporate performance.
According to our research, we found the hypothesis 1 tested to be correct, so the results showed that there exists a positive correlation between board intellectual capital and corporate performance. Besides, the research outcome also showed that Taiwan companies’ board tend to provide resources, not to control and supervise, so board independence affects negatively in the relationship between board intellectual capital and corporate performance.

關鍵字(中)

★ 董事會獨立性
★ 智慧資本
★ 董事會
★ 公司治理

關鍵字(英)

★ Board
★ Intellectual Capital
★ Board Independence
★ Corporate Governance

論文目次

目錄
第一章緒論 1
第一節研究背景 1
第二節研究動機與目的 2
第三節研究流程 4
第二章文獻回顧與假說 6
第一節董事會智慧資本與企業績效 6
第二節董事會獨立性之調節角色 11
第三章研究架構與方法 19
第一節樣本描述 19
第二節研究變項 19
第三節多元迴歸式 25
第四章研究結果與討論 27
第一節基本統計量 27
第二節迴歸結果 28
第三節研究討論 43
第五章研究結論與限制 45
第一節研究結論 45
第二節研究限制 46
參考文獻 48

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指導教授

陳明園(Ming-Yuan Chen)

審核日期

2012-7-24

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