為什麼台灣公司的現金比率逐年增加?

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胡偉哲(Wei Che Hu) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

為什麼台灣公司的現金比率逐年增加?
(Why do the ﬁrm's cash ratios in Taiwan increase over time?)

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摘要(中)

我們觀察到在台灣市場中, 公司持有的現金比率從1981年的5.37%劇增到2011年的13.94%。我們也發現那些成長機會較高, 現金流量波動度較大, 規模較小的公司, 傾向於持有較高的現金比率。但債信評等並不會影響一家公司的現金持有比率。除此之外, 我們發現主要使得現金比率劇增的因素為現金流量波動度, 其次則為其它公司特色的改變。換句話說, 一家公司持有現金最主要的動機為預防性動機, 其次則為交易成本動機。尤其是, 台灣近年來上市的公司主要都來自於電子業, 而電子業通常都有著規模較小, 成長機會較高以及較高現金流量波動度的傾向。另外, 我們發現經理人持股率與現金比率之間呈現非單調性關係。當經理人持股率低時, 他們會傾向於為了追求自身的利益而持有較多的現金, 但當經理人持股率高時, 他們則會將公司利益擺在第一位, 進而持有較少的現金。我們同時也發現當大股東持股比率愈高時, 他們會基於自身的利益考量而有效地去防止經理人持有過多的現金, 另外, 當公司董事會規模愈大及獨立董事比率愈高時, 公司會持有較多的現金。

摘要(英)

We observe that the cash ratios dramatically increase from 5.37% to 13.94% from 1981 to 2011 in Taiwan. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrms with higher growth opportunities, higher cash ﬂow volatility, and smaller size tend to hold more cash. But the credit ratings do not have inﬂuences on cash holdings. In addition, the dominate factor for the increasing in cash holdings over time is the cash ﬂow volatility and the second one is the change in other ﬁrm characteristics. In other words, the major motive for
holding cash is precautionary and the other one is transaction cost. Especially, the newly listed ﬁrms in Taiwan are almost from electronic industries and the ﬁrms in electronic industries are usually small size, high growth and high cash ﬂow volatility. In addition, we ﬁnd that the relation between the management ownership and cash
holdings is non-monotonic, and we show that when managers hold less shares, they prefer to hold more cash for their own beneﬁts, and when managers hold more shares, they will put the ﬁrms value at the ﬁrst place such that they hold less cash. We also ﬁnd that when large shareholders own more shares,they will eﬀectively prevent managers from holding excess cash and when the board size is larger and
the ratio of indenpendent directors is higher,the company will hold more cash.

關鍵字(中)

★ 現金流量波動度
★ 交易成本動機
★ 現金
★ 預防性動機
★ 代理問題

關鍵字(英)

★ precautionary motive
★ cash holding
★ agency problem
★ cash ﬂow volatility
★ transaction cost motive

論文目次

List of Tables.....V
List of Figures.....VI
Introduction.....1
Emperical results......4
Regression tests ......14
Agency problems ......23
Conclusion ......27
Reference ......30

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指導教授

賴弘能(Hung-Neng Lai)

審核日期

2012-7-25

推文