高階經理人薪酬決定因子之研究：以C公司為例

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潘郁芬(Yu-fen Pan) 查詢紙本館藏

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人力資源管理研究所在職專班

論文名稱

高階經理人薪酬決定因子之研究：以C公司為例
(The determinants of CEO compensation: A case study of C Company)

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摘要(中)

隨著全球科技與經濟快速變遷的環境，高階經理人(Executives)位居公司管理階層最高職位，高階經理人在現代組織中扮演著重要的策略性角色。美國證管會（SEC）視高階經理人酬勞為2006年公司治理首要重視的議題，於2006年1月17日一致通過提議，要求上市公司詳細揭露主管與董事會成員的津貼、退休福利以及整體薪酬情況，這是14年來美國公司薪酬揭露規則最大幅度的修改。
為能深入探討C公司與五家比較公司之高階經理人薪酬趨勢，本研究使用兩種迴歸模型：遞延模型與一階差分模型，並將資料分為兩組族群：五家比較公司與包含C公司之六家公司，資料區間為1998年至2007年。
研究結果顯示，C公司與五家比較公司的高階經理人薪酬決定因素之趨勢一致。本研究驗證結果為：『公司前期規模越大，總經理的薪酬水準越高』；『前期公司的經營績效越高，則本期的高階經理人變動薪資占全薪的比例越高』；『前期投資機會越高，當期的高階經理人長期激勵薪資占全薪的比例越高』。關於公司治理結構因素對於高階經理人薪酬之影響，本研究探討總經理兼任董事長時，高階經理人薪酬水準越高，外部董事席次占董事會之比例越高，則高階經理人變動薪資占全薪的比例越高，均未獲得顯著影響之結果。
整體而言，總經理的薪酬決定因子，明顯地受到公司規模與財務績效指標之影響。然而，公司治理結構因素雖然對高階經理人薪酬水準未有顯著的影響效果，有可能受到某些制度環境之限制。未來如果能更擴大研究樣本個數與較豐富變數的內涵及種類，對於高階經理人薪酬決定因素之探究必能帶來更大的貢獻。

摘要(英)

With the fast changing of global technology and economic environment, the executives in the corporate lead the most important strategic role in the organization. In 2006, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) took the executive compensation the first priority issue for corporate governance and unveiled new rules for disclosing executive compensation. These new rules go further than ever before in revealing just how much executives are paid, making transparent previously hard-to-find information such as pension and estimated severance package totals.
In order to analyze the trend of the CEO compensation determinants, this study used two regression models: lagged model and change model and separated the study data into two groups: five comparison companies and six companies included C company. The company data were collected from the company annual reports, proxy statements during the year of 1998 to 2007.
The study result indicates that the trend of CEO compensation determine trend of C Company is the same as the other 5 comparison companies. The study also examined “corporate size is found to be the major explanatory variable to the level of executive pay.” ; ”corporate performance has positive effect on the percentage of variable payment.” ; “ corporate investment opportunity has positive effect on the percentage of long term incentive payment.”. Nevertheless, the impacts of board’s composition and the chairman of board acting the company CEO on CEO compensation determinants are more mixed. In this study, I cannot find significant effect of corporate governance to CEO compensation determinants.
Overall, corporate size and financial performance indicators are the most significant determinants of CEO pay determinants. Although the variables of corporate governance have no significant effects on the CEO compensation determinants in this study due to some environmental restrictions, in the future studies, it can be further examined by using larger sample sizes and more variables.

關鍵字(中)

★ 高階經理人
★ 薪酬設計
★ 公司治理

關鍵字(英)

★ CEO
★ executive pay
★ corporate governance

論文目次

中文摘要 ……………...……………….....………………….…....………....i
英文摘要……………………………………………….…………….........…ii
目錄………………………………………………………….……………….iii
圖目錄…………………………………………….………………………….iv
表目錄……………………………………………….……………………….v
第一章緒論........................................................................................1
第一節研究動機.......................................................................................................... 1
第二節研究目的.......................................................................................................... 3
第三節研究流程.......................................................................................................... 3
第二章文獻回顧................................................................................4
第三章研究方法..............................................................................12
第一節研究架構........................................................................................................ 12
第二節研究假設........................................................................................................ 13
第三節研究對象........................................................................................................ 14
第四章個案研究與分析..................................................................16
第一節產業概況........................................................................................................ 16
第二節公司簡介........................................................................................................ 18
第三節資料搜集........................................................................................................ 23
第四節分析模型........................................................................................................ 24
第五節統計分析方法................................................................................................. 31
第五章統計分析..............................................................................33
第一節樣本特性分析................................................................................................. 33
第二節模型之相關分析............................................................................................. 35
第三節五家公司之模型迴歸分析.............................................................................. 38
第四節六家公司之模型迴歸分析.............................................................................. 40
第六章結論......................................................................................43
第一節結論................................................................................................................ 43
第二節研究限制........................................................................................................ 48
第三節建議................................................................................................................ 49
參考文獻..........................................................................................51

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指導教授

李誠(Joseph S. Lee)

審核日期

2008-7-22

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