在退貨政策下，供應商對於風險趨避之零售商所作的決策及通路協調

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姓名

黃建賓(Chien-Pin Huang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

工業管理研究所

論文名稱

在退貨政策下，供應商對於風險趨避之零售商所作的決策及通路協調
(Decision Models of the Supplier Facing Risk-Averse Retailer and Channel Coordination under the Return Policy)

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摘要(中)

在供應鏈管理之研究中，供應鏈的協調已成為現今主要的一個議題。在此領域裡，供應鏈之合約也被引起注意了，我們知道這些合約政策可協調供應鏈之作業，且大部分媒介被認為是風險中立者，不管如何，供應商與零售商對風險可能有不同態度。
本論文架構為一個報童問題之推式模型，單一供應商售單一產品於單一零售商，且零售商為風險趨避者，為了增加供應商與零售商之期望利潤，我們將結合退貨政策於此報童模型中。我們進一步分析兩個部分，第一部分為供應商不知道零售商為風險趨避者；第二部分為相反情況，即供應商知道零售商為風險趨避者。我們想要瞭解在第一部分與第二部分中，零售商之最佳訂購量的關係，以及零售商之風險態度對於供應商與零售商之利潤有何影響。
最後我們發現，當結合退貨政策於報童推式模型中，零售商將更無後顧之憂訂購更多數量產品，我們將分析在不同的風險參數，最佳訂購量彼此的關係，並發展一個資訊表與2007年曾學者發表之論文比較訂購量之差別關係，並幫助供應商如何做出一個最佳決策來增加供應鏈利潤。

摘要(英)

Coordinating supply chains has been a major issue in supply chain management (SCM) research. Supply chain contracts have attracted many researchers in the field, and have generated a significant body of literature. It is known that these contracts can coordinate supply chains for expected performance measure. Most of them are considered the agents in the supply chain risk neutral. Whatever the situation, the supplier and the retailer may have different attitudes toward risk.
This thesis studies a supply chain model in which a single supplier sells a single product to a single retailer who faces the newsvendor problem with a push model. The retailer is loss averse. In order to advance the profits of the supplier and the retailer, we incorporate risk preference with the buy back contract into the newsvendor model with a push contract. We further analyze two parts. The first part is the supplier does not know the risk-averse retailer is risk averse, and the second part is the opposite situation that the supplier knows that the risk-averse retailer is risk averse. We want to realize the relationship between retailer’s optimal order quantities in Part 1 and the ones in Part 2, and whether information of the retailer’s risk attitude affects the supplier’s and retailer’s profit.
We find out that if we add the buy back contract into the newsvendor model, the retailer will not have trouble back at home to order more amount of product. We analyze the optimal quantity the retailer orders and the relationship of the different risk parameter. We also develop an information menu to compare with Tseng(2007) and help the supplier how to make a better decision to increase the supply chain profit.

關鍵字(中)

★ 退貨政策
★ 風險趨避
★ 供應鏈管理

關鍵字(英)

★ supply chain management
★ buy back contract
★ risk aversion

論文目次

摘要 I
Abstract II
Table of contents III
List of Figures IV
List of Tables V
Chapter I Introduction 1
1.1 Motivation 1
1.2 Background 2
1.3 Objectives 3
1.4 Thesis Framework 6
Chapter II Literature Review 8
2.1 Risk Preference 8
2.2 Buy Back Problem 14
Chapter III Model and Analysis 16
3.1 A Risk-neutral Retailer 19
3.2 A Risk-averse Retailer 21
Chapter IV Numerical Example 29
Chapter V Sensitivity Analysis and Comparison 35
5.1 Sensitivity Analysis 35
5.2 Information Menu 44
Chapter VI Summary, Conclusion and Future Research 48
6.1 Summary 48
6.2 Conclusion 49
6.3 Future Research 49
References 50
Appendix 53

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指導教授

葉英傑(Ying-Chieh Yeh)

審核日期

2008-6-23

推文