家族企業與會計保守性之關聯性

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姓名

陳羿安(Yi-an Chen) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

家族企業與會計保守性之關聯性
(The Association between Founding Family Firms andAccounting Conservatism)

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至系統瀏覽論文 ( 永不開放)

摘要(中)

本研究探討家族企業與會計保守性間之關聯性。本研究使用三種會計保守性衡量方法，包括市場基礎、應計項目以及不對稱盈餘認列。實證結果發現，家族企業會計保守性較高。此一結果顯示，家族企業較關心聲譽的損失，會提高會計保守性。進一步測試發現，家族外聘CEO會增加會計保守性，無股權偏離的家族企業會計保守性較高。

摘要(英)

This study investigates the association between founding family ownership and account-ing conservatism with using three conservatism measures: a market-based measure, and an accrual-based measure, and a measure of asymmetric timeliness of earnings. We find that family firms are more conservatism than non-family firms. These findings are consistent with the notion that family owners are more concerned with reputation costs, are more conservat-ism. Furthermore, we find that conservatism increases with family firms in non-family profes-sional CEOs, and document that without voting-cash flow rights divergence prefer accounting conservatism.

關鍵字(中)

★ 家族企業
★ 會計保守性

關鍵字(英)

★ family firms
★ accounting conservatism

論文目次

目錄
中文提要
………………………………………………………………
i
英文提要
………………………………………………………………
ii
致謝
………………………………………………………………
iii
目錄
………………………………………………………………
iv
表目錄
………………………………………………………………
v
第一章
緒論…………………………………………………………
1
第二章
文獻探討……………………………………………………
3
第一節
家族相關文獻……………………………………………
3
第二節
股權結構與保守性………………………………………
5
第三章
假說發展……………………………………………………
7
第四章
研究方法……………………………………………………
9
第一節
主要相關之解釋變數……………………………………
9
3.1.1
家族企業相關變數……………………………………
9
3.1.2
保守性相關變數…………………………………………
9
第二節
實證模型…………………………………………………
10
3.2.1
使用OLS迴歸式，用以檢測家族相關變數與市場基礎及應計基礎間之相關性…………………………………
10
3.1.2
使用LaFond and Roychowdhury(2007)之盈餘報酬迴歸模式………………………………………………………
12
第三節
樣本選取…………………………………………………
13
第五章
實證研究……………………………………………………
15
第一節
敘述性統計與相關分析…………………………………
15
第二節
實證結果…………………………………………………
19
第六章
穩健性測試…………………………………………………
23
第一節
家族企業經理人類型……………………………………
23
第二節
家族企業有無控制權偏離………………………………
26
第三節
非線性分析………………………………………………
28
第七章
結論…………………………………………………………
30
中文文獻
………………………………………………………………
31
英文文獻
………………………………………………………………
31

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指導教授

羅庚辛、曹壽民

審核日期

2009-7-13

推文