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姓名 劉其享(Chi-Hsiang Liu) 查詢紙本館藏 畢業系所 產業經濟研究所 論文名稱
(Three Essays on the Industrial Economics)相關論文 檔案 [Endnote RIS 格式]
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摘要(中) 本論文包含三個子題，其題目分別為 "Market Competition and the Internal Structure of Firms"，
"A Simple Theory of the Seller′s Listing Strategy in Online Auctions"，以及
"Late Bidding in the Pay-per-Bid Auction"。
第一篇文章旨在研究廠商在面對市場環境的競爭時，如何調整其內部結構與其誘因契約。
具體的說，當中層管理者的功能為蒐集市場資訊時，此文考慮在不同市場競爭參數下，廠商的最適人事結構以及給予管理者的最適誘因契約問題。
我提出兩種衡量市場競爭程度的指標，在第一種指標下，增加競爭使得廠商進行組織扁平化，並提供管理者較強的工作誘因。
這與近年來的實證研究相符合。
但若以另一種指標衡量競爭時，則會得到相反的結果。
因此，此文不僅提供實證文獻所得到關於市場競爭與廠商內部結構的關係一個理論的詮釋，並說明這些實證發現在理論上的真正意涵。
第二篇文章提供了一個理論架構，用以刻劃賣家在網路拍賣中選擇最適銷售機制的策略。
此時，根據不同時間折現率的賣家會偏好不同的銷售機制。
具體的說，固定價格拍賣、純拍賣以及直接購買價拍賣分別會是不同時間折現率賣家的最適問題的解：
對時間不折現的賣家將會採用純拍賣販售商品；對時間折現中等的賣家會採用直購價拍賣販售商品；
而對時間折現最多的賣家將會選擇用固定價格拍賣銷售商品。
此文亦指出固定價格會高於直購價拍賣中的起標價，而純拍賣的起標價的值則為最低。
這表示最適起標價與賣家的時間折現率有反向關係。
最後一篇文章是關於一個網路上正在興起的一種銷售機制，稱之為付費競標拍賣。
此文的目的是建立一個理論模型用以研究買家在付費競標拍賣中的最後一刻下標行為。
我拓展了 Augenblick (2012) 的理論模型，使買家能有機會在最後一刻下標。
其中，根據過去文獻，我假設買家在最後一刻下標時有可能失敗，並且在最後一刻下標時無法對價格及時做出反應。
利用對稱 Markov 完全均衡為均衡概念可以得到買家採取最後一刻下標策略的可能性。
我更進一步可得知當前價格越低、出價費越低以及買家數目越少時，買家越可能採用最後一刻出價策略。摘要(英) This dissertation consists of three essays on the industrial economics each entitled
"Market Competition and the Internal Structure of Firms",
"A Simple Theory of the Seller′s Listing Strategy in Online Auctions", and
"Late Bidding in the Pay-per-Bid Auction".
The first essay investigates how the firm adjusts its internal structure and alters its incentive contracts in response to the market environment.
Specifically, it is concerned with the firm′s optimal hierarchical structure and the corresponding incentive contracts for the managers as a function of variables which are related to the degree of market competition,
when the middle manager′s sole function is information-gathering.
Consistent with recent empirical literature, I show that under one measure of market competitiveness, an increase in its value leads the firm to flatten its hierarchy and offer stronger incentives to its agents.
However, under another measure, the reverse is true.
This essay therefore not only offers a theoretical rationale for some of the recent empirical findings regarding the relation between market competition and internal structure of firms,
but also provides theoretical qualifications for these findings.
The second essay proposes a unified framework to characterize the sellers′ optimal listing strategy in the online auction as a function of their rates of time-impatience.
Specifically, the fixed-price listing, the pure auction, and the buy-it-now auction are each a solution of the seller′s single optimization problem under different values of the rate of time-impatience: the perfectly patient seller adopts the pure auction; the sellers with medium range of time-impatience adopt the buy-it-now auction; and the most impatient sellers adopt the fixed-price listing.
It is also shown that the optimal posted price for the fixed-price listing is greater than the optimal reserve price for the buy-it-now auction, which in turn is greater than that of the pure auction.
This implies that the optimal reserve price is inversely related to the seller′s degree of time-patience.
The final essay relates to an emerging type of online auction known as pay-per-bid auction.
The purpose of this section is to construct a simple theoretical model to investigate the bidders′ late bidding behaviour in the pay-per-bid auctions.
We extend Augenblick (2012)′s model to incorporate late bidding stage in which the bids have a positive probability of being lost and that bidders have no time to react to the price change.
Using symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium as our solution concept,
we show that late bidding can be the equilibrium strategy.
Moreover, late bidding is more likely to occur if the current price is lower, the bidding fee is cheaper and the number of bidders are fewer.
關鍵字(中) ★ 網路拍賣
★ 產業組織
★ 契約理論關鍵字(英) ★ Online Auction
★ Industrial Organization
★ Contract Theory論文目次 中文摘要 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Market Competition and the Internal Structure of Firms . . . . . . . 5
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.3 Optimal Contracts and Firm Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.1 The Optimal Contracts for the Two-tier Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3.2 The Optimal Contracts for the Three-tier Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.3.3 Firm Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4 Incentive Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 A Simple Theory of the Seller’s Listing Strategy in Online Auctions . 35
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2 Theoretical Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
3.3 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4 Late Bidding in the Pay-per-Bid Auction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.2 The Model Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
4.3 Sustainable Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . 69
i4.4 Non-sustainable Symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibria . . . . . . . . . 70
4.5 Conclusion Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83參考文獻 [1] Alonso, R., W. Dessein, and N. Matouschek (2008a), “When Does Coordination
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(Kong-Pin Chen、Meng-Wen Tsou)審核日期 2014-5-28 推文 plurk
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