股東常會開會時間長度探討與分析

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姓名

何旻瑾(Min-Jin Ho) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

財務金融學系

論文名稱

股東常會開會時間長度探討與分析
(Research on the length of time of annual shareholder meeting)

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摘要(中)

年度股東大會是外部投資人唯一能與公司管理階層進行溝通的年度盛會，外部投資人把握此機會向公司內部人提問或發言，以探索公司相關資訊，再進行投資決策。公司法要求上市、櫃公司每年必須至少召開一次股東會，但對於股東會特性(如地點、日期、時間)沒有規定。過去鮮少有文獻對於股東會開會特性進行研究，本文發現2013年台灣上市、櫃公司開會時間長度差距最大為10小時，故本篇論文探討是什麼可能的因素影響股東常會開會的時間長度，使用2013年台灣上市、櫃公司股東常會資料。研究發現當公司內部人與外部投資者資訊不對稱程度高、董監事股權質押比率高、財報重編次數多與營業外轉投資比率高，該公司當年度股東常會開會時間較久。本文更進一步研究開會時間較久的公司未來一年的績效表現，實證結果發現開會時間較久的公司，在股東常會一年後，不論是股價績效表現或是經營績效表現皆顯著差於開會時間較短的公司，證實開會時間較久的公司隱含未來績效不佳的資訊。

摘要(英)

Annual shareholder meeting is an event for outside investors to communicate with insiders such as directors and managers. Outside investors will seize the opportunity to ask questions about operating activities of company or future prospects before they make investment decisions. In the past, not much literature discuss about characteristics of shareholder meeting. In this paper, we use annual shareholder meeting data of Taiwan listed companies in 2013 to study what factors affect the length of time of annual shareholder meeting. We find strong evidence that listed companies with high degree of information asymmetry between insiders and outside shareholders, high pledge ratio of directors and supervisors, high frequency of financial restatement and high non-operating investment will take longer time to hold an annual shareholder meeting. We further research on the performance of these companies after a year. And we find that the stock price and operating performance of companies with longer length of time are significantly poor than companies with shorter length of time. It verifies that companies with longer length of time implied some unfavorable future information.

關鍵字(中)

★ 股東常會開會時間長度
★ 資訊不對稱
★ 董監質押
★ 財報重編
★ 業外轉投資

關鍵字(英)

★ the length of time of annual shareholder meeting
★ information asymmetry
★ pledge
★ financial restatement
★ non-operating investment

論文目次

中文摘要 i
英文摘要 ii
謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章緒論 1
第二章文獻探討與假說建立 4
2.1 股東們質疑之事項 4
2.1.1內部人與外部投資者間之資訊不對稱 4
2.1.2董監事之股權質押 6
2.1.3財務報表重新編製 7
2.1.4營業外轉投資活動 9
2.2隱含資訊之公司未來績效表現 10
第三章研究設計 12
3.1 資料來源與樣本選取 12
3.2 變數定義與衡量 12
3.2.1 應變數 12
3.2.2 自變數 15
3.2.3 控制變數 16
3.3 實證模型 19
第四章實證結果分析 22
4.1 敘述性統計與相關性分析 22
4.2 股東常會開會時間長度分析 28
4.3 股東常會開會後績效表現分析 35
第五章結論 38
參考文獻 43

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指導教授

沈信漢(Hsin-Han Shen)

審核日期

2016-6-17

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