摘要(英) |
Since 1980s, the investment behavior already has been a national activity. At that time, people obtained investment gains by spending salaries based on labor force, even by leasing finance and by money making money. Along with the national income increase, each people all had the demand of managing finances. Through different preferences, investors participated in financing activities from the simple savings deposit to the relatively complex structure commodity. The simplest way to engage in investment and manage money is via banks and financial institutions. Therefore, the wealth management service developed. In order to provide customer multiple services, financial consultants were allocated.
The investment market must fluctuate with the business cycle. Hence, when the investors, financial consultants and banks with wealth management services all enjoy the periods of expansion, would they remember the lesson during recession periods? Meanwhile, would the financial consultants faithfully face the customers’ properties and give them appropriate investment suggestions which is testing the financial consultants’ occupational ethics. Since financial consultants are the bridge between the bank and investors. The banks hope the financial consultants can create more non-risk income while the investors hope the financial consultants to earn exceed return for them. Moreover, the financial consultants also want to get more bonus of their own. In this conflicts of interests, the banks’ rewarding system based on performance and the authority′s sale standard both play extremely important role.
Review traditional performance evaluation and rewarding system, we find out that they are primarily about promoting financial consultants to rise trading volume, which may cause financial consultants to sell commodities of high performance and high commission to customers. Thus, financial consultants can earn higher sales bonus and individual annual performance review. Since the commodity is not appropriately evaluated and interpreted to customers, the financial consultants’ moral hazard and customers’ complaints events happen again and again. Certainly, creating a brand-new performance evaluation pattern to establish a well-behaved system is really difficult. Therefore, in this paper, we analyze the design of performance and the rewarding system for financial consultants. Through the analysis, we discuss about whether the rewarding system and banks’ ability to earn profits are positive correlation or not. Besides, the performance and reward rating standard, the financial consultants’ value system, moral hazard, etc. are considered. With our analysis, we make a reference for constructing a complete rewarding system which can let talented people do themselves justice and solve the problem of moral hazard.
To sum up, a performance and rewarding system should be in line with a reasonable and fair standard. Besides, the rewarding system should not only be drawn up by the performance evaluation department, each service related personnel should participates in the performance and rewarding system together to react real value and the effect. The administrator should stand on fostering talent and retain talent while establishing a well-behaved and friendly performance and rewarding system. Also, the administrator should try to reduce the non-coincidence between financial consultants’ reward and goal. An ideal rewarding system should be clear and simple to evoke resonant with the participants. Most importantly, rather than only depending on real commission, activation of customers’ property must be included for performance evaluation so as to enhance service quality and wealth management complex disposition. |