公司治理、公司避稅與現金持有

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姓名

王柏舜(Po-Shun Wang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

公司治理、公司避稅與現金持有
(Corporate Governance、 Corporate Tax Avoidance and the Level of Firm Cash Holdings)

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摘要(中)

摘要
本篇論文探討公司現金持有與避稅間之關係，以及加入公司治理變數後，觀察公司治理變數是否會影響現金持有與避稅之關係。本研究發現，在不加入公司治理的情況下，現金與避稅是呈正向關係，也就是公司的避稅行為，會提高企業現金持有量。現金是需要高度的內控機制及公司治理，否則容易受代理問題影響，管理階層可能透過盈餘管理，將公司現金挪為他用，因此在我們進一步的研究，將公司依公司治理強與弱分組，結果發現，在公司治理強的情況下，避稅與現金持有是呈現正向關係，代表在公司治理強的企業，公司避稅會使公司持有的現金提升；但在公司治理弱的情況下，現金與避稅是呈現反向關係，證明在公司治理較弱的公司，公司避稅所增加的稅金，可能被管理階層透過盈餘管理、隧道行為等方式，將稅金挪至其他用途。

摘要(英)

Abstract ,
This paper explore the relationship between the company′s cash holdings and tax avoidance. And after the addition of corporate governance variables, observe corporate governance variables will affect the relationship between cash holdings and tax avoidance .We found that without the addition of corporate governance. Cash and tax avoidance is in a positive relationship, which means company′s tax avoidance will increase the corporate cash holdings. Cash is required a high degree of corporate governance and internal control mechanisms, or likely to be affected agency problem. Management possible diverted the company′s cash to other uses through earnings management. Therefore, in our further research .We will divide the company into different groups in accordance with the strong and weak corporate governance. It was found that in the case of strong corporate governance, tax avoidance and cash holdings are showing a positive relationship. It means that corporate in strong governance business, cash holdings by the company will enhance the tax avoidance . But in the case of weak corporate governance, tax avoidance and cash holdings are presented inverse relationship. Proved weaker corporate governance of the company, the cash increase in tax avoidance, management might move to other purposes through earnings management, tunneling, etc.

關鍵字(中)

★ 避稅行為
★ 現金持有
★ 公司治理

關鍵字(英)

★ Tax avoidance
★ Cash holdings
★ Corporate Governance

論文目次

目錄
中文摘要-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------i
Abstract-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ii
誌謝辭--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------iii
目錄-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------iv
表目錄---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------v
一、緒論------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1-1. 避稅行為------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
1-2. 避稅動機------------------------------------------------------------------------------2
1-3. 現金持有量---------------------------------------------------------------------------3
1-4. 現金持有-交易理論-----------------------------------------------------------------3
1-5. 現金持有-融資階級理論-----------------------------------------------------------5
二、文獻回顧與假說發展---------------------------------------------------------------------7
三、研究設計------------------------------------------------------------------------------------9
3-1. 衡量避稅行為------------------------------------------------------------------------9
3-2. 研究模型-現金持有---------------------------------------------------------------10
3-3. 研究模型-現金持有、加入公司治理------------------------------------------12
3-4. 研究模型-現金持有、區分公司治理好與壞---------------------------------12
四、敘述性統計-------------------------------------------------------------------------------14
五、實證結果----------------------------------------------------------------------------------19
5-1. 財稅差異與公司現金持有-------------------------------------------------------19
5-2. 永久性財稅差異與公司現金持有----------------------------------------------20
5-3. 財稅差異與公司現金持有、是否受四大查核-------------------------------20
5-4. 永久性財稅差異與公司現金持有、是否受四大查核----------------------20
5-5. 財稅差異與公司現金持有、公司治理強弱----------------------------------21
5-6. 永久性財稅差異與公司現金持有、公司治理強弱-------------------------21
六、結論----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------29
參考文獻----------------------------------------------------------------------------------31

參考文獻

參考文獻
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指導教授

郭南廷、陳建中(Nan-ting Guo Jian-zhong Chen)

審核日期

2016-6-14

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