經理人激勵薪酬與財務報表重編

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姓名

邵詩芸(Shih-Yun Shao) 查詢紙本館藏

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會計研究所

論文名稱

經理人激勵薪酬與財務報表重編
(CEO Incentive Compensations and Financial Restatements.)

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摘要(中)

適當的經理人激勵薪酬制度有助於提升企業經營績效與減緩代理成本，但過度激勵作用可能導致經理人為追求自身利益而操弄損益，使得後續須對財務報表做修正而進行重編。故本文研究員工股票選擇權與員工分紅配股制度，對於財務報表重編及具美化財務報表動機的向下盈餘重編的影響。
實證結果顯示，員工股票選擇權對於財務報表重編有正向關係但不顯著，可能原因為重編樣本中包含許多非舞弊性質之樣本。當聚焦於美化財務報表及向下盈餘重編時，股票選擇權與其呈現顯著正向關係，表示高階經理人有較高的誘因進行美化財務報表及盈餘管理，導致後續須對財務報表做修正。另一方面，員工分紅配股對於財務報表重編與具美化財務報表及向下盈餘重編之關係，皆為顯著負向關係，顯示相較於股票選擇權，確定性報酬的分紅配股對於財務報表重編較有抑制的效果。

摘要(英)

A proper incentive compensating system is beneficial for developing company’s operating performance and reducing the cost of agency. However, an overdriven incentive system may lead to manipulation of manager’s own interest, and a financial revision is necessary for restatement. In this way, this research is going to be the impact of downsizing earning and comparison of the financial restatement and motive of beautifying financial statement to the stock option and profit sharing of employee.
The research is proven the employee option has a positive relationship to the financial restatement but not significant, in which may be because the non-fraud type of sample is established in the statement. On the one hand, the significant relationship is found when focusing on the beautify of financial restatement and downsizing earning restatement; in this case, senior management has higher motivation of beautifying financial statement and earning management, which lead the financial restatement afterward. On the other hand, the relationship between employee’s profit sharing to the beautifying of financial statement and downsizing earning restatement is negative significantly; in this case, compared with the stock option, certain incentive compensation of profit sharing has more mitigated effect to financial restatement.

關鍵字(中)

★ 員工股票選擇權
★ 員工分紅配股
★ 激勵薪酬
★ 財務報表重編

關鍵字(英)

★ Stock option
★ Profit sharing
★ Incentive compensation
★ Financial restatement

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
圖目錄 v
表目錄 v
第一章緒論 1
1-1研究背景、動機與目的 1
1-2 研究架構 3
第二章文獻回顧 5
2-1 員工股票選擇權 5
2-2 員工分紅配股制度 6
第三章研究方法 7
3-1 樣本篩選與資料來源 7
3-2 研究假說 11
3-3 實證模型與變數定義 12
第四章實證結果與分析 15
4-1 敘述性統計分析 15
4-2 相關係數分析 17
4-3 多元迴歸模型之實證結果 19
第五章敏感性分析 22
第六章結論與建議 23
參考文獻 25

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指導教授

王曉雯(Hsiao-Wen Wang)

審核日期

2016-7-6

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