薪酬索回條款對經理人獎酬之影響-以美國零售業公司為例

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姓名

羅慧君(Hui-Chun Lo) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

薪酬索回條款對經理人獎酬之影響-以美國零售業公司為例
(The effects of clawback provisions on executive’s compensations: A case study of US retail companies)

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摘要(中)

本研究以Abercrombie & Fitch (簡稱A&F), GAP, NIKE, SKECHERS, Steve Madden, Under Armour，作為本研究之樣本。本研究蒐集公司自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款之年度，以及各公司經理人各年度之薪酬、營收總額。而資料年度主要涵蓋2004年至2015年間。
本研究發現公司自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款後，相較於自願採用前，經理人獲得的紅利獎金減少、紅利獎金佔總薪酬比重下降。本研究亦發現，公司在DFA 954頒布後，相較於DFA 954頒布前，不論先前有無自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款，經理人獲得的紅利獎金減少、紅利獎金佔總薪酬比重下降。

摘要(英)

This study was conducted by companies such as A & F, GAP, NIKE, SKECHERS, Steve Madden, and Under Armor as a sample of this study. And this study collect the company voluntarily adopted the clawback provisions of the year, as well as the company′s annual executive’s compensations, total revenue in the company′s annual report and Proxy Statement. The above data mainly covers from 2004 to 2015 .
This study found that the company voluntarily adopted the clawback provisions, bonus decrease, bonus to total compensations ratio decreased. This study also found that the company after DFA 954 released, bonus decrease, bonus to total compensations ratio decreased.

關鍵字(中)

★ 經理人薪酬索回條款
★ 紅利獎金
★ 經理人薪酬
★ 沙氏法案
★ 多德-佛蘭克華爾街改革與消費者保護法

關鍵字(英)

★ Clawback provisions
★ bonus
★ executive compensations
★ SOX 304
★ DFA 954

論文目次

摘要 i
ABSTRACT ii
致謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
表目錄 vi
第一章、緒論 1
1-1 研究背景及研究動機 1
1-2 研究架構 5
第二章、文獻探討與假說發展 6
2-1 經理人薪酬索回條款 6
2-2 經理人薪酬索回條款之相關文獻 10
2-3 經理人薪酬及經理人薪酬之相關文獻 15
2-4 假說發展 17
第三章、研究設計 22
3-1 資料來源與樣本選取 22
3-2 研究方法 24
第四章、實證結果 26
4-1 敘述性統計分析 26
4-2 有自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款的群體之分析 28
4-3 有自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款個別公司之分析 28
4-4 小結--有自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款之公司 30
4-5 沒有自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款的群體之分析 30
4-6 沒有自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款個別公司之分析 31
4-7 小結—沒有自願採用經理人薪酬索回條款之公司 31
4-8 敏感性分析 32
第五章、結論 46
參考文獻 48

參考文獻

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指導教授

王曉雯

審核日期

2017-7-6

推文