| 摘要(英) |
Nowadays, the increase of environmental awareness has risen and the volume of E-waste produced has been growing rapidly. Thus, government have formulated relevant policies to improve the amount of recycling and achieve the goal of sustainable use of resources. The purpose of study is to compare whether the government has provided recycling subsidies, the impact on the amount of recycling and the manufacturer′s profit in order to maximize the manufacturer′s profit. The study refers to the structure of Weng and Chen (2016), taking the competition coefficient into consideration, discussing the effect of recyclers on the supply chain under the competitive environment. A closed-loop supply chain that includes a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party company. There are two roles including leader and follower in the Stackelberg model. The manufacturer is the leader, the retailer and third-party are followers. In addition to, the manufacturer engages in remanufacturing, the third party and the retailer in charge of recycling, and the retailer sells products to the consumers. The results of study show that when under the competitive environment of recyclers, the government provides subsidies to the third-party and the retailer, prices for recycled materials and amounts of recycling have increased, which has also increased the manufacturers’ profits. Therefore, the government provides subsidies to recyclers, which not only benefits all members of the supply chain, but also benefits consumers. In other words, it maximizes social profits. Based on the results of the sensitivity analysis, they provide the performance of the two scenarios in terms of recycling amounts and manufacturers’ profits, so that the government can formulate policies that are beneficial to the overall supply chain. |
| 參考文獻 |
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