伊斯蘭教義公司治理與成長機會對公司風險承擔影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例

以作者查詢圖書館館藏

、以作者查詢臺灣博碩士

、以作者查詢全國書目

、勘誤回報

、線上人數：22

、訪客IP：3.133.126.241

姓名

黃韋傑(Wei-Chieh Huang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

企業管理學系

論文名稱

伊斯蘭教義公司治理與成長機會對公司風險承擔影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例

相關論文

★ 宗教對公司治理及投資的影響--以印尼上市公司為例	★ 伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與成長機會對資本結構影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例
★ 營運資金、固定資產投資與公司績效的關係－以印尼上市公司為例	★ 伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與成長機會對投資現金流量敏感度影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例
★ 伊斯蘭教義對資本結構與績效的影響 -以印尼公司為例	★ 伊斯蘭教義、所有權結構與成長機會對公司風險承擔影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例

檔案

[Endnote RIS 格式]

[Bibtex 格式]

[相關文章]

[文章引用]

[完整記錄]

[館藏目錄]

[檢視]

[下載]

本電子論文使用權限為同意立即開放。
已達開放權限電子全文僅授權使用者為學術研究之目的，進行個人非營利性質之檢索、閱讀、列印。
請遵守中華民國著作權法之相關規定，切勿任意重製、散佈、改作、轉貼、播送，以免觸法。

摘要(中)

本研究主要在探討伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與成長機會對於公司風險承擔的影響，以2011年到2018年印尼上市公司作為樣本，共計2740個觀察值進行實證性分析。伊斯蘭教為全球最大宗教之一，其教義對於人民的思想以及行為影響深遠，同時印尼正處於快速發展的東南亞地區，本文期望透過伊斯蘭教義與實務上的公司治理機制來探討其對管理者對於風險承擔的態度，並加入成長機會作為外在環境因素來觀察其對風險承擔的調節作用。研究結果發現，遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司相較於非遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司風險承擔較低；遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司相較於非遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司，其董事會規模越大，公司的風險承擔也越大；遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司相較於非遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司，其監事會獨立董事比例越高以及董事會獨立董事比例越高分別有不同的結果；遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司相較於非遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司，其機構投資人持股比例越高以及內部投資人持股比例越高，皆會提高公司的風險承擔。此外，當加入成長機會做為考量後，本文發現遵循伊斯蘭教義公司，內部人持股比例越高，風險承擔越低。整體而言，本文實證結果對於宗教如何影響管理者行為，以及宗教與公司治理機制在新興市場扮演的角色有其管理與實務意涵。

摘要(英)

The main purpose of this study is examining how Shariah, corporate governance, and growth opportunity affect corporate risk-taking. Based on a sample of Indonesian listed company over the period of 2011-2018, a total of 2740 observations were used for our empirical analysis. Islam is one of the world’s largest religions, and its doctrine has a profound impact on Muslims’ thoughts and behavior. In addition, Indonesia is located in Southeast Asia as a fast-growing country. We investigate managers’ attitude to the risk through Shariah and practical corporate governance mechanisms. Moreover, we consider growth opportunities as an external factor to observe the moderate effect to the risk-taking. Our research shows that: Shariah companies compare to non-Shariah companies have lower risk; the larger size of board of directors that the Shariah compliant companies have, the higher risk they take; in the part of board independence in the Shariah compliant companies, there are opposite results between the board of commissioners and the board of directors; in the part of ownership structure in the Shariah compliant companies, the more shares that institutions or insiders hold, the more risk the companies take. Furthermore, when taking growth opportunity into account, we find that the higher the insiders’ shareholding ratio, the lower the risk taking. Overall, the empirical results of this paper have implications for management and practice on how religion affects managerial behavior and the role of religion and internal governance mechanisms in emerging markets.

關鍵字(中)

★ 伊斯蘭教義
★ 公司治理
★ 董事會
★ 股權結構
★ 成長機會
★ 風險承擔

關鍵字(英)

★ Shariah
★ Corporate governance
★ Board of director
★ Ownership structure
★ Growth opportunity
★ Risk-taking

論文目次

目錄

摘要 i
Abstract ii
致謝辭 iii
目錄 iv
第一章緒論 1
1-1 研究背景與動機 1
1-2 本論文結構 6
第二章文獻探討與研究假說 7
2-1 伊斯蘭教義與風險承擔之關係 7
2-2 伊斯蘭教義與公司治理機制對於風險承擔的影響 8
2-2-1 伊斯蘭教義與董事會規模對於風險承擔的影響 9
2-2-2 伊斯蘭教義與獨立董事比率對於風險承擔的影響 10
2-2-3 伊斯蘭教義與機構投資人比例對於風險承擔的影響 10
2-2-4 伊斯蘭教義與內部所有權人持股比例對於風險承擔的影響 11
2-3高成長機會的影響 12
第三章研究方法 14
3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選 14
3-2 模型建立 14
3-3 變數定義 15
第四章實證結果與分析 17
4-1 敘述性統計分析 17
4-2 迴歸分析 23
4-2-1 伊斯蘭教義對於公司風險承擔之影響 23
4-2-2 伊斯蘭教義與董事會規模對於公司風險承擔之影響 24
4-2-3 伊斯蘭教義與獨立董事比率對於公司風險承擔之影響 25
4-2-4 伊斯蘭教義與機構投資人持股比例對於公司風險承擔之影響 27
4-2-5 伊斯蘭教義與內部投資人持股比例對於公司風險承擔之影響 29
4-3 成長機會之影響 30
4-4 穩健性分析 33
第五章結論與建議 40
5-1 研究結論 40
5-2 管理意涵與研究限制 41
參考文獻 42

參考文獻

1. Adhikari, B. K., Agrawal, A. (2016). Does local religiosity matter for bank risk-taking? Journal of Corporate Finance, 38, 272-293.
2. Amihud, Y., Lev, B.(1981). Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. The Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2), 605-617.
3. Balkin, D. B., Markman, G. D., and Gomez-Mejia, L. R. (2000). Is CEO pay in high-technology firms related to innovation? Academy of Management Journal, 43(6), 1118–1129.
4. Bassiouni, M. C. (1993). Business Ethics in Islam. The Ethics of Business in a Global Economy, 4, 117-122.
5. Brickley, J. A., and James, C. M. (1987). The takeover market, corporate board composition, and ownership structure: The case of banking. The Journal of Law and Economics, 30(1), 161–180.
6. Burkart, M., Radicevic, P., and Yu, J. (2017). Risk and leverage choices in owner-controlled firms. Available at SSRN 2667280.
7. Chapra, Mohammad. Umar., Ahmed, Habib. (2002). Corporate governance in islamic financial institution. The Islamic Research and Teaching Institute, 93.
8. Cheng, S. (2008). Board size and the variability of corporate performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(1), 157–176.
9. Chung, K. H., and Pruitt, S. W. (1994). A simple approximation of Tobin’s q. Financial Management, 23(3), 70-74.
10. Cihak, M., Hesse, H. (2008). Islamic banks and financial stability: An empirical analysis. England: International Monetary Fund.
11. Coles, J., Daniel, N., and Naveen, L. (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), 431-468.
12. Core, J. E., Holthausen, R. W., and Larcker, D. F. (1999). Corporate governance, chief executive officer compensation, and firm performance. Journal of Financial Economics, 51(3), 371-406.
13. Díez-Esteban, J. M., Farinha, J. B., and García-Gómez, C. D. (2018). Are religion and culture relevant for corporate risk-taking? International evidence. Business Research Quarterly, 22(1), 36-55.
14. Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., and Ozbas, O. (2010). When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), 195-214.
15. Erkens, D. H., Hung, M., and Matos, P. (2012). Corporate governance in the 2007-2008 financial crisis: Evidence from financial institutions worldwide. Journal of Corporate Finance, 18(2), 389-411.
16. Faccio, M., Marchica, M.-T., and Mura, R. (2011). Large shareholder diversification and corporate risk-taking. Review of Financial Studies, 24(11), 3601-3641.
17. Fahlenbrach, R., Prilmeier, R., and Stulz, R. M. (2012). This time is the same: using bank performance in 1998 to explain bank performance during the recent financial crisis. The Journal of Finance, 67(6), 2139-2185.
18. Fama, E. F., and Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327-349.
19. Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., and Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241-250.
20. Guiso, L., and Paiella, M. (2008). Risk Aversion, Wealth, and Background Risk. Journal of the European Economic Association, 6(6), 1109-1150.
21. Hansen, G. S., and Hill, C. W. L. (1991). Are institutional investors myopic? A time-series study of four technology-driven industries. Strategic Management Journal, 12(1), 1-16.
22. Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., and Maxwell, W. F. (2008). Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US. Journal of Financial Economics, 87(3), 535-555.
23. Hasan, M., and Dridi, J. (2011). The effects of the global crisis on Islamic and conventional banks: A comparative study. Journal of International Commerce, Economics and Policy, 2(2), 163-200.
24. Hayat, R., and Hassan, M. K. (2017). Does an Islamic label indicate good corporate governance?. Journal of Corporate Finance, 43, 159-174.
25. Hermalin, B. E., Adams, R. B., and Weisbach, M. S. (2010). The role of boards of directors in corporate governance: A conceptual framework and survey. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(1), 58-107.
26. Hilary, G., and Hui, K. W. (2009). Does religion matter in corporate decision making in America? Journal of Financial Economics, 93(3), 455-473.
27. Holmstrom, B. (1989). Agency costs and innovation. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 12(3), 305-327.
28. Huang, S. Y., Chung, Y. H., Chiu, A. A., and Chen, Y. C. (2015). Growth opportunity and risk: empirical investigation on earnings management decision. Investment Management and Financial Innovations, 12(1-2), 299-309.
29. Huther, J. (1997). An empirical test of the effect of board size on firm efficiency. Economics Letters, 54(3), 259-264.
30. Iannaccone, L. R. (1998). Introduction to the economics of religion. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(3), 1465-1495.
31. Iannotta, G., Nocera, G., and Sironi, A. (2013). The impact of government ownership on bank risk. Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(2), 152-176.
32. Imamah, N., Lin, T. J., Handayani, S. R., and Hung, J. H. (2019). Islamic law, corporate governance, growth opportunities and dividend policy in Indonesia stock market. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 55, 110-126.
33. Jensen, M. C., and Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
34. Jensen, M. C. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831-880.
35. John, K., Litov, L., and Yeung, B. (2008). Corporate governance and risk‐taking. The Journal of Finance, 63(4), 1679-1728.
36. Kanagaretnam, K., Lobo, G. J., Wang, C., and Whalen, D. J. (2015). Religiosity and risk-taking in international banking. Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, 7, 42-59.
37. Kim, E. H., and Lu, Y. (2011). The independent board requirement and CEO connectedness. Accounting, Corporate Governance, Law and Institutions Journal, 3(75), 1-59.
38. Kumar, A., Page, J. K., and Spalt, O. G. (2011). Religious beliefs, gambling attitudes, and financial market outcomes. Journal of Financial Economics, 102(3), 671-708.
39. Knyazeva, A., Knyazeva, D., and Masulis, R. W. (2013). The Supply of Corporate Directors and Board Independence. Review of Financial Studies, 26(6), 1561-1605.
40. Li, K., Griffin, D., Yue, H., and Zhao, L. (2013). How does culture influence corporate risk-taking? Journal of Corporate Finance, 23, 1-22.
41. Lu, J., and Wang, W. (2018). Managerial conservatism, board independence and corporate innovation. Journal of Corporate Finance, 48, 1-16.
42. Meulbroek, L. K. (2001). The efficiency of equity-linked compensation: Understanding the full cost of awarding executive stock options. Financial Management, 5-44.
43. Mihet, R. (2012). Effects of culture on firm risk-taking: a cross-country and cross-industry analysis. Journal of Cultural Economics, 37(1), 109-151.
44. Mohamad, S., and Ali, T. (2008). Islamic hedging: Gambling or risk management? Islamic Law and the Law of the Muslim World, 8-47. 21st Australian Finance and Banking Conference. Retrieved July 17, 2009, from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1260110.
45. Mollah, S., and Zaman, M. (2015). Shari’ah supervision, corporate governance and performance: Conventional vs. Islamic banks. Journal of Banking and Finance, 58, 418-435.
46. Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147-175.
47. Nakano, M., and Nguyen, P. (2012). Board size and corporate risk taking: Further evidence from Japan. corporate governance: An International Review, 20(4), 369-387.
48. Romer, P. M. (1990). Are Nonconvexities Important for Understanding Growth? American Economic Review 80(05), 97¬-103.
49. Schwartz, Z, M., and Weisbach, M. S. (2013). What do boards really do? Evidence from minutes of board meetings. Journal of Financial Economics, 108(2), 349-366.
50. Segerstrom, P. S. (1991). Innovation, imitation, and economic growth. Journal of Political Economy, 99(4), 807-827.
51. Skinner, D. J., and Sloan, R. G. (2002). Earnings surprises, growth expectations, and stock returns or don′t let an earnings torpedo sink your portfolio. Review of Accounting Studies, 7(2-3), 289-312.
52. Smith, C. W., and Stulz, R. M. (1985). The determinants of firms′ hedging policies. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 391-405.
53. Smith, C. W., and Watts, R. L. (1992). The investment opportunity set and corporate financing, dividend, and compensation policies. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(3), 263-292.
54. Sundheim, D. (2013). Taking smart risks: How sharp leaders win when stakes are high. New York, NY: McGraw Hill.
55. Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of Political Economy, 94(3), 461-488.
56. Tarus, T. K., Tenai, J. K., and Komen, J. (2020). Does Ownership Structure Affect Risk Management? Evidence from an Emerging Economy, Kenya. Journal of Accounting, Business and Finance Research, 8(1), 1-10.
57. Tufano, P. (1996). Who manages risk? An empirical examination of risk management practices in the gold mining industry. the Journal of Finance, 51(4), 1097-1137.
58. Wang, C. J. (2012). Board size and firm risk-taking. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 38(4), 519-542.
59. Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., and Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and the dynamics of internal corporate governance. Journal of Financial Economics, 105(3), 581-606.
60. Wright, P., Ferris, S. P., Sarin, A., and Awasthi, V. (1996). Impact of corporate insider, blockholder, and institutional equity ownership on firm risk taking. Academy of Management Journal, 39(2), 441-458.
61. Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185-211.

指導教授

洪榮華林翠蓉

審核日期

2020-6-4

推文