伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與成長機會對投資現金流量敏感度影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例

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張洲豪(Chou-Hao Chang) 查詢紙本館藏

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企業管理學系

論文名稱

伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與成長機會對投資現金流量敏感度影響之研究—以印尼上市公司為例

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摘要(中)

本文主要探討伊斯蘭教義、公司治理與成長機會對投資現金流量敏感度之影響，並以2011年至2018年印尼非金融上市公司為樣本，進行實證分析。本文從伊斯蘭教義與法令與實務面相，推論出五個研究假說，分別為遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司有較高的投資現金流量敏感度；遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司，董事會規模越大，投資現金流量敏感度越高；遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司，獨立董事占董事會比例越高，投資現金流量敏感度越低；遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司，機構投資人持股越高，投資現金流量敏感度越高及遵循伊斯蘭教義的公司，內部所有權人持股越高，投資現金流量敏感度越高之假說。最後，加入成長機機會變數，探討成長機會對伊斯蘭教義，公司治理與投資現金流量敏感度間扮演何種角色。
本文實證研究發現，遵行伊斯蘭教義公司，投資現金流量敏感度較高；遵行伊斯蘭教義的公司，董事會規模越高，投資現金流量敏感度越高；獨立董事占董事會比例越高，投資現金流量敏感度越低；機構投資人持股比例越高，投資現金流量敏感度越低；內部所有權人持股比例越高，投資現金流量敏股度越高。最後加入成長機會後，在高成長機會時，伊斯蘭教義與公司治理對投資現金流量敏感度影響之結果與未加入成長機會時相同；在低成長機會時，伊斯蘭教義與公司治理對投資現金流量敏感度皆無顯著影響。本文研究結果對伊斯蘭教義的管理行為有重大貢獻，亦即教義的實踐與管理行為的反饋，落實於投資現金流量敏感度具有不同之影響。

摘要(英)

This paper mainly discusses the relation among Islamic doctrine, corporate governance, growth opportunity and investment-cash flow sensitivity, and conducts empirical analysis based on the sample of Indonesian companies from 2011 to 2017. Islam is one of the four major religions in the world, and its doctrine has far-reaching effects on managers ’behavior.

This paper discusses the implementation of Islamic doctrine in managers’ behavior and its impact on investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper deduces five research hypotheses from the purpose and practice of Islamic doctrine. The companies that follow the Islamic doctrines have higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. The companies that follow Islamic doctrine, the larger the size of the board of directors, the higher investment-cash flow sensitivity. The companies that follow Islamic doctrine, the higher the percentage of independent directors, the lower the investment-cash flow sensitivity; the company that follows the Islamic principles, the higher the shareholding of institutional investors, the higher the investment-cash flow sensitivitys and the companies that follow the Islamic principles, the higher the shareholding of internal owners, the higher the investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Finally, we consider the growth opportunity into the model and determine the impact of Islamic doctrine and corporate governance variables on the investment-cash flow sensitivity, the impact of Islamic doctrine and corporate governance on the investment-cash flow sensitivity is the same for high-growth opportunities as original; when the low growth opportunities, Islamic doctrine and corporate governance are sensitive to investment cash flow is no significant effect. The research results of this paper make a significant contribution to the management of Islamic doctrine, that is, the doctrine of practice and the feedback of management behaviors, which have different effects on the investment-cash flow sensitivity.

關鍵字(中)

★ 伊斯蘭教義
★ 投資現金流量敏感度
★ 公司治理
★ 董事會規模
★ 獨立董事
★ 所有權結構
★ 成長機會

關鍵字(英)

★ Shariah
★ Investment-cash flow sensitivity
★ Corporate Governance
★ Board Size
★ Independent Director
★ Ownership Structure
★ Growth Opportunity

論文目次

摘要 ...................................................................................i
Abstract ..............................................................................ii
第一章緒論 …………………………………………………………………………………………………….1
1-1研究動機與目的 1
1-2研究架構 5
第二章文獻探討與假說建立…………………………………………………………………………………. 6
2-1伊斯蘭教義對投資與現金流量敏感度之影響 6
2-2伊斯蘭教義與公司治理對投資現金流量之影響 7
2-2-1 伊斯蘭教義與董事會規模對投資與現金流量敏感度之影響 8
2-2-2 伊斯蘭教義與獨立董事比例對投資與現金流量敏感度之影響 9
2-2-3伊斯蘭教義與機構投資人持股比例對投資與現金流敏感度之影響 10
2-2-4伊斯蘭教義與內部所有權人持股比例對投資與現金流量敏感度之影響 11
2-3成長機會、伊斯蘭教義與公司治理對投資現金流量敏感度之影響 12
第三章研究方法 ........................................................................ 13
3-1 資料來源與樣本篩選 13
3-2 模型建立 13
3-3變數定義 14
第四章實證結果與分析 ……………………………………………………………………………………… 16
4-1 基本敘述統計分析 16
4-2 迴歸分析 21
4-2-1 伊斯蘭教義對投資現金流量敏感度的影響 21
4-2-2伊斯蘭教義與董事會規模對投資現金流量敏感度之影響 23
4-2-3 伊斯蘭教義與獨立董事占董事會比例對投資現金流量敏感度之影響 26
4-2-4 伊斯蘭教義與機構投資人持股比例對投資現金流量敏感度之影響 29
4-2-5 伊斯蘭教義與內部所有權人持股比例對投資現金流量敏感度之影響 32
4-2-6 成長機會、伊斯蘭教義與公司治理對投資現金流量敏感度之影響 ……………………35
4-3 穩健性分析 …………………………………………………………………………………………40
第五章結論與建議 …………………………………………………………………………………………… 47
5-1 研究結論 47
5-2 管理意涵與研究限制 48
參考文獻 ……………………………………………………………………………………………………… 49

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指導教授

洪榮華林翠蓉

審核日期

2020-6-5

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