博碩士論文 102481026 詳細資訊




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姓名 吳燕瑛(Yen-Ying Wu)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 企業管理學系
論文名稱 內部治理是信用評等助推器?以台灣公司為例
(Is internal governance a credit rating booster?Evidence from Taiwanese listed companies)
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摘要(中) 本文從公司內部治理角度出發,分析董事會獨立性對企業風險管理及財務資訊品質之影響以及內部治理與信用評等相關性。我們將回收之問卷以偏最小平方法(PLS)進行研究議題探索。研究發現董事會獨立性對企業風險管理成效具顯著正相關,此意謂董事會為確保組織承擔的風險是符合股東冒險意願,其扮演約束和協調管理層在追求組織價值行動方案時監督角色。另財務資訊會左右決策方向具經濟後果故資訊品質盼重要角色,研究發現董事會獨立性顯著正向影響財務資訊品質。前述結果表明董事會獨立性在內部治理中發揮重要作用。在內部治理與信用評等相關性方面,實證發現同一經營團隊企業風險管理成效及財務資訊品質,會顯著影響公司連續多年信用評等優劣,但董事會獨立性則無。由於董事會位居公司治理系統核心,進一步分析發現同一經營團隊之企業風險管理成效,具增進董事會獨立性與連續多期較佳的信用評等中介效果。本研究結論是履行內部治理規範程度越高的公司,其在許多方面直接或間接為公司帶來更佳的信用評等。此一發現為企業實踐公司治理提供動力,因此對管理研究領域具重要意義。
摘要(英) From the perspective of internal governance, we analyze the effect of board independence on the enterprise risk management (ERM) and financial information quality and the relationship between internal governance and credit rating. We explore our topic by the use of survey methods and partial least squares regression (PLS). Our research indicates that board independence has a positive relationship with ERM, which makes board of directors (BOD) a supervisor overseeing the management while the management pursues the operational goals in order to ensure the operational risks the corporation takes are to the shareholders’ liking. We also discover that financial information quality assumes great significance since it will influence a decision maker’s action and has economic implications. Our study points out board independence evidently affects financial information quality. This indication helps us deduce that board independence plays an important part in internal governance. As for internal governance and credit rating, our empirical evidence shows that the ERM and financial information quality under the same management team will prominently influence the credit rating of a corporation for many periods to come with board independence having no effect on it. Since BOD is positioned at the core of corporate governance, our further analysis points out that the ERM under the same management team facilitates the mediation effect of increasing board independence and the credit rating for a longer period. We conclude that a corporation with higher internal governance will bring about better credit rating for a corporation for many terms directly or indirectly so it provides the incentive for a corporation to practice corporate governance.
關鍵字(中) ★ 內部治理
★ 董事會獨立性
★ 企業風險管理
★ 財務資訊品質
★ 信用評等
關鍵字(英) ★ Internal governance
★ Board independence
★ Enterprise risk management
★ Financial information quality
★ Credit rating
論文目次 TABLE OF CONTENTS
中文摘要……………………………………………………………………………….. i
Abstract………………………………………………………………………………….ii
Acknowledge……………………………………………………………………………iii
Table of Contents……………………………………………………………iv
List of Figure and Tables……………………………………..vi
1.Introduction…………………………………………………………………….. 1
2.Theoretical framework………………………………………………………… 5
2.1 Agency theory and corporate governance……………………………........


5
2.2 Board independence…………………………………………………………. 6
2.3 Enterprise risk management………………………………………………… 7
2.4 Quality of financial Information……………………………………………… 8
3. Research hypotheses…………………………………………………………. 8
3.1 The effect of board independence on internal governance……………… 8
3.2 The relationship between internal governance and credit rating………… 11
3.3 Mediation effect……………………………………………………………….. 14
4.Research model and methodology………………………………………….. 15
4.1 Proposed research model…………………………………………………… 15
4.2 Questionnaire development and construct identification………………… 16
4.3 Target audience………………………………………………………………. 18
4.4 Data collection and profile of the sample firms…………………………… 18
4.5 Research methodology…………………………………………………........
19
5.Results………………………………………………………………………….. 20
5.1 Measurement model…………………………………………………………. 20
5.2 Structural model…………………………………………………………........ 20
5.2.1 Direct effect………………………………………………………........ 23
5.2.2 Indirect effect………………………………………………………….. 25
5.3 Predictive relevance………………………………………………………….. 26
6.Discussion and implications………………………………………………….. 26
6.1 Findings……………………………………………………………………… 26
6.2 Contributions and implications for research and practice………………. 28
6.3 Limitations and future research……………………………………………. 29
7. Conclusion……………………………………………………………………… 30
References………………………………………………………………………………. 32
Appendix A. Survey instrument……………………………………………………… 42
Appendix B. Credit rating classifications……………………………………………. 43




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指導教授 蔡文賢(Wen-Hsien Tsai) 審核日期 2021-1-20
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