公司治理評鑑等級與文本資訊揭露之關聯

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姓名

王馨誼(Sin-Yi Wang) 查詢紙本館藏

畢業系所

會計研究所

論文名稱

公司治理評鑑等級與文本資訊揭露之關聯
(The Relationship Between Corporate Governance Assessment Levels and Textual Information Disclosure)

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至系統瀏覽論文 (2027-6-30以後開放)

摘要(中)

良好的公司治理機制是防範舞弊的一項重要措施，當公司與其股東和外部投資人間存在資訊不對稱之情形時容易使公司內部投機人士有操作的空間，發生舞弊的機率也會大幅提升，為了解決存在於公司與利害關係人間的代理問題，我國政府制定了許多有關公司治理的相關規章，其中公司治理評鑑便是以不同評鑑指標為衡量標準對公司揭露給外部人所知之資訊進行評分並依結果分類成不同級距，而致股東報告書是公司年報中相對於其他章節，管理階層擁有最多裁量權的部分，因此本研究探討公司治理評鑑不同級距之致股東報告書的文本特性，以及年度與年度間是否存在變化，以佐證評鑑等級之高低確實也能反映其在文本資訊揭露上的透明度。
本研究以台灣公司治理評鑑排名前 5% 和 81~100% 這兩個等級中同時都有樣本的 11 個產業共 102 家公司的致股東報告書為研究主體，使用統計之方式和測量文字相似度的歐式距離及餘弦相似度等方法衡量公司治理評鑑結果是否可以同時反映公司之資訊揭露程度，研究結果顯示公司治理等級較高之公司其所揭露之內容確實較具有資訊內涵，並且在致股東報告書文本字數和內容上都確實較公司治理評鑑等級較低之公司更有變化。

摘要(英)

A good corporate governance mechanism is an important measure to prevent fraud. When there is information asymmetry between the company and its shareholders and external investors, it is easy for speculators inside the company to have chance to operate, and the probability of fraud will be greatly increased. In order to solve the agency problem that exists between the company and its stakeholders, the Taiwan government has formulated many relevant regulations on corporate governance. Among them, the corporate governance evaluation is to use different evaluation indicators as measurement standards to score the information disclosed by the company to outsiders and classify it into different levels according to the results, and the report to shareholders is the company′s annual report relative to other chapters ,where management has the most discretion, therefore this study explores the textual characteristics of shareholder reports to shareholders at different levels of corporate governance evaluation, and whether there are changes from year to year, so as to prove that the level of evaluation level can indeed reflect the degree of disclosure of textual information.
This research focuses on the reports to shareholders of 102 companies in 11 industries that are in the top 5% and 81~100% of the Taiwan Corporate Governance Evaluation rankings, using statistical methods and methods such as Euclidean distance and cosine similarity to measure text similarity. To measure whether the results of the corporate governance evaluation can reflect the degree of information disclosure of the company at the same time, the research results show that the content disclosed by companies with better corporate governance ratings is indeed more informative, and the word count and content of reports to shareholders are indeed more varied than companies with lower corporate governance ratings.

關鍵字(中)

★ 公司治理評鑑
★ 致股東報告書
★ 文本特性

關鍵字(英)

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
目錄 iii
圖目錄 iv
表目錄 v
第一章、緒論 - 1 -
1-1 研究動機與目的 - 1 -
第二章、研究背景與文獻探討 - 3 -
2-1 公司治理之定義 - 3 -
2-1-1 公司治理相關研究 - 3 -
2-1-2 公司治理評鑑系統 - 4 -
2-1-3 公司治理評鑑系統之相關規定 - 5 -
2-2 致股東報告書之規定 - 7 -
2-2-1 致股東報告書相關文獻 - 8 -
2-2-2 致股東報告書之資訊內涵 - 9 -
第三章、研究問題與研究設計 - 11 -
3-1 研究問題 - 11 -
3-2 樣本選取與資料來源 - 12 -
3-3 研究設計 - 14 -
3-4 變數之定義與衡量 - 18 -
第四章、研究結果 - 20 -
4-1 議題一致股東報告書整份文本特性 ............................. - 20 -
4-2 議題二致股東報告書文本相似度 - 29 -
第五章、結論與建議 - 34 -
5-1 研究結論與貢獻 - 34 -
5-2 研究建議 - 35 -
5-3 研究限制 - 35 -
參考文獻 - 37 -
附錄 - 40 -
附錄一、文本拆分範例 - 40 -

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指導教授

盧佳琪

審核日期

2022-7-12

推文