| 摘要(英) |
Metro Railway Transportation (MRT) plays an important role in regional development for many economies. It typically cuts through a metropolitan area and becomes an indispensable mode of transportation for its residents. In terms of fare collection, various advance payment technologies have been integrated, in addition to cash and automatic-fare-collection (AFC) systems. These include near-field communication (NFC) devices, credit cards, debit cards, and electronic payment platforms such as Line-Pay, AliPay, JKOSPay, etc. It is challenging for MRT managements and AFC vendors to manage the operation and maintenance.
The target of this study is the MRT company T, which encountered problems with its AFC vendors. This study investigates the problems and systematic risks associated with the development and implementation of mobile payment systems, as well as risk mitigation, and root-cause-analysis. Also, system requirement analysis is used to collect different design options throughout the project, so that the specifications and requirements in upcoming tender document will have less frequent modification and optimization.
The outbreak of Covid-19 pandemic was a major crisis, resulting in strict quarantine regulations, which in turn almost toppled the tourism and transportation industries. Company T runs an intercity Airport Express line, thus the pandemic leads to a sharp decrease in passengers, which is more severe than any other MRTs. This in turn results in diminished revenue for the AFC vendor, which is based on the original pricing model that did not take in accounts the risk in such traffic cut, to a point that the revenue is much lower than its labor cost. This study proposes a new pricing scheme based on the “minimum revenue guarantee” strategy. The proposal is shown to be feasible through a feasibility analysis. |
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