博碩士論文 111426011 詳細資訊




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姓名 蘇晉猷(Jing-You Su)  查詢紙本館藏   畢業系所 工業管理研究所
論文名稱 綠色供應鏈之合約設計:利潤與永續性的平衡
(Design of Contract in the Green Supply Chain: Balancing Profits and Sustainability)
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摘要(中) 本研究探討了台灣導入再生能源市場中綠色供應鏈的問題,聚焦於如何在追求利潤和實現永續性之間取得平衡,研究主要建立及分析三個模型,深入探討了聚合商不同投資策略對再生能源供應鏈的績效和永續性的影響。
突顯了聚合商作為發電商和企業之間中介的關鍵角色,強調其在分擔風險和促進再生能源發展方面的重要作用,通過這些模型,研究提供了對不同合約設計和聚合商投資策略如何影響供應鏈成員盈利能力以及再生能源供應穩定性的深入觀察,
主要研究內容包括三個方面,首先分析聚合商的決策對供應鏈各成員利潤的影響,其次比較投資發電裝置與投資儲能設備的獲利能力,最後探討收益分享合約如何提高綠色供應鏈的永續性。
我們發現,聚合商在制定投資決策時需要考慮短期盈利能力和長期永續性之間的平衡,採用收益分享合約可以確保供應鏈所有成員長期獲利,從而提高整體的永續性,為理解再生能源供應鏈中盈利能力和永續性的平衡提供了新的視角,為這一快速發展領域的未來研究和實際應用奠定了基礎,本研究強調了聚合商在再生能源供應鏈中的關鍵作用,以及分享合約在促進行業永續發展方面的潛在效益,通過平衡經濟利益與環境可持續性,研究為推動再生能源市場的健康發展提供了有價值的見解和建議。
摘要(英) This study examines the challenges of green supply chains in Taiwan′s emerging renewable energy market, focusing on balancing profit pursuit with sustainability. The research primarily establishes and analyzes three models, thoroughly investigating how different investment strategies of aggregators affect the performance and sustainability of renewable energy supply chains.
The study highlights the critical role of aggregators as intermediaries between power generators and enterprises, emphasizing their importance in risk-sharing and promoting renewable energy development. Through these models, the research provides in-depth observations on how various contract designs and aggregator investment strategies influence the profitability of supply chain members and the stability of renewable energy supply.
The main research content encompasses three aspects: First, analyzing how aggregators′ decisions affect the profits of various supply chain members; second, comparing the profitability of investing in power generation facilities versus energy storage equipment; and finally, exploring how revenue-sharing contracts can enhance the sustainability of green supply chains, Adopting revenue-sharing contracts can ensure long-term profits for all supply chain members, thereby improving overall sustainability. This provides a new perspective for understanding the balance between profitability and sustainability in renewable energy supply chains, laying a foundation for future research and practical applications in this rapidly developing field, This research emphasizes the key role of aggregators in renewable energy supply chains and the potential benefits of sharing contracts in promoting industry sustainability. By balancing economic interests and environmental sustainability, the study offers valuable insights and recommendations for promoting the healthy development of the renewable energy market.
關鍵字(中) ★ 綠色供應鏈
★ 交易合約設計
★ 中間商之投資決策
關鍵字(英) ★ Green supply chain
★ Trading contract design
★ Middleman investment decisions
論文目次 中文摘要 i
Abstract ii
Contents iii
List of tables v
List of figures vi
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Background and Motivation 1
1.2 Research Objectives 3
1.3 Research framework 4
Chapter 2 Literature Review 5
2.1 Double Marginalization Problem 5
2.2 Supply Chain Coordination and Contract Design 6
2.3 Energy Markets and Storage Problem 7
Chapter 3 Methodology 10
3.1 Environment Statement 10
3.2 Trading Model on renewable energy supply chain 11
3.3 Aggregator-Enterprise Contract Design 14
3.4 Power Generation’s behavior and decision: 15
3.4.1 Model 1 : Not investing 16
3.4.2 Model 3 : Invest in energy storage equipment 19
Chapter 4 Numerical Example 22
4.1 Model 1: Basic model decision results 22
4.2 Model 2 : Invest in power generation equipment 23
4.3 Model 3 : Invest in energy storage equipment 24
Chapter 5 Sensitive analysis 26
5.1 Model 1 Sensitivity analysis 26
5.2 Model 2 Sensitivity analysis 28
5.3 Model 3 Sensitivity analysis 31
Chapter 6 Conclusion and Future Research 34
6.1 Conclusion 34
6.2 Future research 35
Reference 37
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指導教授 曾富祥 審核日期 2024-8-19
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