關於企業環境社會責任的三項議題

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張家榮(Jia-Rong Zhang) 查詢紙本館藏

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關於企業環境社會責任的三項議題

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摘要(中)

企業社會責任的風潮在近年愈趨興盛，追求利潤不再只是企業經營的唯一目標，環境保護、勞工人權、消費者權益等議題愈發受到重視。本文研究目的在於分析當廠商具有友善環境的經營目標時，其對社會福利以及市場均衡會產生何種影響，分別從政府汙染稅政策、廠商技術授權策略以及市場結構等三個面向加以討論。
首先考量政府課徵的汙染稅為外生決定且ECSR廠商獨占時，汙染防治邊際成本提高則廠商利潤有可能增加；邊際汙染損害愈大在廠商關心環境程度夠高下，反使汙染程度減輕。進一步分析汙染稅為內生決定時，關心環境程度愈高則汙染稅率愈低有益其自身利潤，但無助於改善環境品質與社會福利。若是在雙占市場下愈強烈的友善環境動機同樣無法改善環境，且因為整體汙染防治支出增加造成福利惡化。
其次，擁有先進生產技術的領導廠商具有友善環境動機時，若採固定權利金授權方式，當廠商關心自身環境汙染程度愈高時，其授權後利潤可能增加，最終均衡結果亦可能發生市場失靈現象。若採單位權利金授權方式，當邊際汙染損害較大且廠商較不在意整體產業汙染水準時，會收取較成本差距小的權利金，且此時固定權利金策略可能優於單位權利金策略，惟福利變動方向未定。
最後，在短期寡占情形下，若產品生產的邊際汙染損害較嚴重時，廠商的友善環境行為的確有益於改善環境品質與社會福利；但當長期下利潤極大廠商自由進出市場時，關心環境動機愈強烈只會造成其虧損愈嚴重且無法減輕汙染，社會福利反而隨之惡化。若是邊際損害愈高，本國政府將有動機調降關稅以鼓勵外國廠商多生產，此時國內環境品質有可能因此改善。

摘要(英)

ECSR (Environment Corporate Social Responsibility) has been a hot issue in recent years. In this article, we will discuss this issue from three different aspects.
First, if the ECSR firm is a monopoly in the industry, facing the pollution tax determined exogenously, the rise of pollution abatement investment cost may increase its profit. If the ECSR firm has great concern about the environment, then larger marginal damage may reduce pollution. If the pollution tax is determined endogenously, the monopolistic ECSR firm with greater concern about the environment will gain higher profit due to a lower pollution tax, but environment quality and social welfare remain unchanged. If the firms in a duopoly market structure face the same situation, the same behavior will worsen social welfare due to higher pollution abatement investment expenditure.
Secondly, if an ECSR firm owns cost-reducing innovation, its licensing behaviors will differ from normal firms. Considering the fixed-fee strategy, the ECSR firm with greater concern about the environment may gain higher profit and is more likely to improve social welfare. Considering the royalty strategy, the ECSR firm may charge a royalty that is smaller than the cost gap. Unlike normal firms, the fixed-fee strategy may be superior to the royalty strategy.
Lastly, under endogenous market structure, more eco-friendly behaviors, like greater concern about the environment or a larger number of ECSR firms, can’t reduce pollution; instead, worsen welfare. If marginal damage becomes larger, the government tends to lower tariff rate to encourage foreign firm to produce more, then may result in better environment quality.

關鍵字(中)

★ 企業環境社會責任

關鍵字(英)

★ Environment Corporate Social Responsibility

論文目次

摘要 i
Abstract ii
誌謝 iii
目錄 iv
圖表目錄 vi
第一章緒論 1
1.1研究動機與目的 1
1.2論文架構 3
第二章企業環境社會責任下的汙染稅與汙染防治 4
2.1前言 4
2.2基本模型 9
2.3汙染稅外生給定 10
2.3.1 ECSR廠商獨占 10
2.3.2 ECSR廠商與利潤極大廠商雙占 14
2.4汙染稅內生決定 18
2.4.1 ECSR廠商獨占 18
2.4.2 ECSR廠商與利潤極大廠商雙占 24
2.5本章小結 29
2.6本章附錄 30
第三章企業環境社會責任下的技術授權策略 32
3.1前言 32
3.2模型設定 35
3.3固定權利金授權策略 40
3.4單位權利金授權策略 47
3.5單位權利金與固定權利金授權策略比較 53
3.6本章小結 55
第四章企業環境社會責任的福利分析-內生市場結構之影響 57
4.1前言 57
4.2基本模型 60
4.3封閉經濟 62
4.3.1本國廠商家數固定 62
4.3.2本國市場自由進出 64
4.4開放經濟 65
4.4.1本國廠商家數固定 65
4.4.2本國市場自由進出 69
4.5本章小結 72
第五章結論 74
參考文獻 76

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指導教授

邱俊榮劉錦龍(Jiunn-Rong Chiou Jin-Long Liu)

審核日期

2024-12-26

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