中大學術數位典藏-NCU Institutional Repository-提供博碩士論文、考古題、期刊論文、研究計畫等下載:Item 987654321/101180
English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Items with full text/Total items : 94274/94274 (100%)
Visitors : 82857895      Online Users : 1781
RC Version 7.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version


    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://ir.lib.ncu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/101180


    Title: Remuneration systems and economic performance: Theory and Vietnamese small-scale purse seine fisheries
    Authors: 阮金英;Pham, Thi Thanh Thuy;Flaaten, Ola;Nguyen, Thi Kim Anh
    Contributors: 太空及遙測研究中心
    Keywords: 2005-2008;Anreiz;Arbeitsvertrag;case studies;Contract incentives;Contracts;Economic analysis;economic factors;Economic performance;economic systems;Economics;Economists;Efficiency;Employee compensation;Engines;Fischerei;fish nets;Fisheries;fishermen;Fishers;Fishery economics;Fishing;fishing boats;household income;Households;incentive;insurance;Literature reviews;Marine;marine fisheries;Miete;monitoring costs;Operating costs;propensity score matching;remuneration systems;risk;Risk aversion;Rural areas;transaction costs;Transaktionskosten;Underwater resources;Urban areas;Vietnam;wages and remuneration
    Date: 2013-07-22
    Issue Date: 2026-04-21 14:26:24 (UTC+8)
    Publisher: University of Chicago Press;Chicago: MRE Foundation, Inc
    Abstract: 摘要: This study analyzes the determinants of the choice of remuneration system and examines their influence on the economic performance of fisheries. The purse seine fisheries in Khanh Hoa province, Vietnam, are used as the study case, with data collected from 158 fishing households in 2005 and 2008. The principal-agent framework and the propensity score-matching technique are employed for the analysis. We demonstrate that insurance incentive-based problems are the rationale for the coexistence of share contracts and flat-wage contracts, even though share contracts bring greater economic benefit to both vessel owners and crew members. Crew members are found to be risk averse. Crew size and residence are important factors that influence the choice of contracts. Compared with flat-wage contracts, small share-contracted vessels are more efficient in managing the operating costs, while large ones are more efficient in yielding a high catch.
    出版者: Chicago: MRE Foundation, Inc
    出版日期: 2013-01-01
    出處: Marine resource economics, 2013-01, Vol.28 (1), p.19-41
    資源來源: ABI/INFORM Collection
    版權: 2013 MRE Foundation, Inc.
    版權: Copyright © 2013 MRE Foundation, Inc.
    版權: Copyright Allen Press Publishing Services Mar 2013
    識別號: ISSN: 0738-1360
    識別號: EISSN: 2334-5985
    識別號: DOI: 10.5950/0738-1360-28.1.19
    Appears in Collections:[Center for Space and Remote Sensing Research ] journal & Dissertation

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    index.html0KbHTML11View/Open


    All items in NCUIR are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.

    社群 sharing

    ::: Copyright National Central University. | 國立中央大學圖書館版權所有 | 收藏本站 | 設為首頁 | 最佳瀏覽畫面: 1024*768 | 建站日期:8-24-2009 :::
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 隱私權政策聲明