摘要： Firms can curb opportunistic managerial R&D investing behavior by increasing the sensitivity of CEO compensation to R&D investment. Using a sample of firms in Taiwan's R&D-intensive industries, this study examines whether family ownership moderates the sensitivity of CEO compensation to R&D investment. The results show that the sensitivity of CEO compensation to R&D investment is higher for family firms than for nonfamily firms, and that CEO compensation in family firms is based more heavily on the firm's level of R&D investment than on performance. In addition, R&D investment by family firms leads to greater investment efficiency, firm value, and growth rates than similar investment by nonfamily firms. These findings suggest that, in family firms, a compensation structure based on R&D investment enhances firm value. 出版者： New York: Elsevier Inc 出版日期： 2015-03-01 出處： Journal of business research, 2015-03, Vol.68 (3), p.599-606 資源來源： Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete 版權： 2014 Elsevier Inc. 版權： Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Mar 2015 識別號： ISSN: 0148-2963 識別號： EISSN: 1873-7978 識別號： DOI: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2014.09.001
